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SYNOPSIS OF THE AREA OF ARGUMENT 
The area of study decided upon for this dissertation 
involves a combination of public international lmoJ and 
jurisprudence. It takes as its starting point the model 
of a legal system devised by Hart, consisting of primary 
rules of obligation supplemented by secondary rules. This 
general survey of Hart's work leads on to a detail.e.d 
examination of his treatment of international law: a 
treatment \'Jhich it should be said rests on the assumption 
that since the primary/secondary rule analysis enables law 
to be elucidated rather than defined, then there is no 
necessity to describe international law in its terms. 
This assumption is for the most part borne out by Hart's 
analysis of international law except in so far as the 
following assertions are concerned: 
(i) international law has no rule of recognition/basic 
norm 
(ii) international law is as a consequence a set of 
rules not a legal system. 
Indeed, this gives rise to the line of argument that occupies 
the first section of this dissertation: the attempt to provide 
answers for certain problematical questions that flow 
naturally from the above statements. 
I (a) The first concerns the applicability of Harts 
primary/secondary rule model to international law. 
(b) If it may be used, then does international society 
bear out Hart's description of it as a community 
I 
governed soley by a set of the most necessary 
.__, 
primary rules? 
(c) Or is Hart wrong in his assumptions, so that it may 
well prove possible ao discern evidence of secondary 
rules and in particular an ~mergent rule of recognition? 
It is with the establishment of a rule of recognition 
(or the impossibility of so doing) that the second 
portion of this research is concerned. 
It considers in detail the claim of United Nations 
resolutions to form in some way the content of such a 
rule. In the course of this process, academic opinion 
on the matter is taken into account, as well as the views 
of states as expressed within the international community, 
From tihis evidence a solution is sought to the many 
uncertainties besetting the rule of recognition. 
(a) Is it possible to construct a rule of recognition 
(whether in terms of United Nations resolutions 
or an alternative such as custom) for international 
law? 
(b) Or do the workings of international society bear 
out Hart's propositions that the sole factor which 
dictates whether or not a rule is a rule of 
international lav" is acceptance by the community 
of states as a whole? 
It is believed that by seeking an answer to such questions, 
there will eventually emerge a picture of international law 
whose details may or may not be compatible with that of Hart's. 
If this does prove to be so, then this does nothing to 
invalidate Harts primary/secondary rule model. Instead it 
merely alters the range of its applicability and enables us 
to speak of the international legal 'system' and its growing 
sophistication. 
(It may well prove helpful to read Chapter X of Hart's 
'The Concept of Law' as a necessary background to this 
disserta-tion). 
• 
I 
C H .A P T E R I 
INTRODUCTION 
Professor H.L.A. Hart, one of the twentieth century's 
leading positivists, published in 1961 his exposition 
of the conceptual framework of a legal system. It was 
entitled 'The Concept of Law'. The ideas contained in 
this book have been widely acclaimed as making a valuable 
and indeed an outstanding contribution to the sphere of 
legal theory. lo In particular, Hart's system of primary 
and secondary rules has served as a powerful tool of· 
analysis whereby the workings of a municipal legal system 
may be made clear • 
The study that follows takes as its starting point 'The 
Concept of Law' and the primary/secondary rule analysis 
that is its crux. No attempt will be made to undermine 
the standing of ~he primary/secondary rule concept as a 
tool of analysis re municipal law systems - a task, it may 
be added, that has already b~1undertaken. 2o Instead, 
the purpose of what follows is to ask whether Hart's concept 
of law provides us with a concept of international law. Or, 
to put the matter more precisely, what we are seeking of 
Hart is an answer to the following questions: 
(i) What does Hart have to say about international law? 
(ii) How relevant is it? 
1. See the host of reviews published cone erning this book. 
For example:- Bodenheimer, 10 U.C.L.A. Law Review. 
p.959(1962); Morris, 75 H.L.R. p.l460 (1962); Ross 71, 
Yale L.J. p.ll85 (1962) 
2. R.H. Dworkin, 'Is law a System of Rules? 'Essays in 
Legal Philosophy p.25. 
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(iii) Does Hart deal with international lm·1 in terms 
of the primary/secondary rule concept? 
(iv) If not, why not? 
(v) Is it possible to deal with international law in 
terms of the primary/secondary rule concept? 
(vi) What if anythinB does this add to our knowledge 
I I 
of international lav1? 
But such questions as these make little sense without some 
background information regarding Hart and 'The Concept of 
Law' • Moreover, it is this which our introduction aims 
to supply. 
The Positivist School 3. 
Initially, some explanation seems necessary of our opening 
description of Hart as 'one of the twentieth century's 
leading positivists'. Positivism is one of the blanket 
terms of jurisprudence used theoretically to cover all those 
legal theorists of a certain persuasion. Any discussion of 
positivism will almost inevitably contain references to 
certain leading members of this school such as Austin, 
Kelsen and Hart. It seems important therefore to examine 
the term 'positivism' as a term of classification which 
might denote certain attitudes and ideas that would to some 
extent colour anything w~itten in the positivist vein. 
Certain writers, of whom Friedmann is one, seem to believe 
it possible to trace the growth of positivism in the 
'displacement of a loosely or~anised secular 
or eccles•astical international order by the 
3. For a more detailed analysis of positivism, see 
Friedmann, 'Legal Theory' (5th edition), section 4, 
chapters 21-25, pps. 253-311. 
- 2-
modern national state.' 4. 
This led to the growth of state awareness and the increasing 
state orientation of important matters, resulting in an 
abandonment of natural law philosophies with their stress 
on the origin of law in a higher supranational system. 
Instead, positivism emerged with its placement of the state 
at the hub of legal activity and reasoning. 
Inter-related with this ability to indicate the origins of 
positivism, is the ability to describe certain features which 
serve to distinguish the positivist outlook:-
'The separation, in principle, of the 
law as it is and the law as it ought 
to be, is the most fundamental 
philosophical assumption of legal 
positivism.' 5o 
Thus, it is said to be an assumption common to positivist 
writers, that there is a need to distinguish law which has 
gone through the necessary law creating processes that exist 
within a particular society, and those values which underlie 
the life of that particular society. So, a positivist will 
contend that a law loses none of its validity even though 
it may infringe the current values of tbe day. Indeed, Hart 
has himself. defended certain Nazi ordinances whose validity 
as law was challenged in view of their patent immorality. 6o 
4. ibid. p. 256 
5. ibid. p. 257 
6. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 
71 Harvard Law Review 1957 - 8, pps. 593-629. 
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Though it may prove possible to make certain generalisations 
about the term 'positivism', the feasibility of so doing has 
been called in doubt. Robert Su~mers asked the oucstion 
What is positivism? •••• and reached the following conclusion 
'Today, this phrase is used to describe so 
many different things that it surely deserves 
) 
to be junked. 7o 
He goes on to list some of the divergent viewpoints that 
the term 'positivism' is used to cover. 
(i) Law as it is can be clearly distinguished 
from law as it ought to be. 
(ii) Force or power is the essence of law. 
(iii) Law is a self sufficient closed system 
which does not draw on other disiplines 
for any of its premises. 
Hart has also differentiated five separate meanings which 
0 • • 
are conmonly subsumed under this blanket term 'legal positivism'.S, 
Thus, to class Hart as a positivist may be both a constructive 
and a destructive move. On the one hand, it may shed some 
light on the influences to be seen at work in Hart's writing,. 
such as the separation of the 'is' and the 'ought' 9. Whilst, 
on the other hand, it may serve to obscure since positivism is 
notaprecise enough term. 
7. R.S. Summers, New Analytical Jurists, New York Univ. 
Law Review (1966), Vol.41, p.889. 
8. Mentioned by Friedmann, op.cit. at p.256. 
9. This is clearly seen at work in 'The Concept of Law' 
where Har~ rejects any attempt to invalidate a law 
v,rhich is dependent on its breach of moral rules. 
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Summers overcomes this problem by takinv, the various 'members' 
of the positivist fraternity, such as Austin, Grey, Hohfeld, 
Hart and Dworkin, and dividing them into the new and old 
schools. He admits that old and new have certain factors in 
common such as the separation of the 'is' and the 'ought', plus 
an analytical method of approach. The latter relates to 
the idea implied in the term"positivism" (positum ••. a laying 
down) that law is the product of some definite process or 
pattern of behaviour, which it is possible to isolate in 
order to achieve a proper appreciation of the law. Indeed, 
these factors make such writers dis.tincti ve from those of 
other schools. 
However, Summers believes that the term positivism has been 
misapplied to such a de~ree that he prefers to refer to 
such writers as Austin and Hart as analytical jurists, with 
a division into old and new analytical jurists. '10. The 
latter, including Hart, are distinguishable from the former 
in various ways. They include the participation by the new 
analytical jurists in 'a wider variety of analytical 
activities than their predecessors'. 1'1. They show an 
increased interest in the process of conceptual analysis or 
rather the analysis of the use of words. 
Moreover, the techniques of the new analytical jurists have 
gained in sophistication compared to that of Austin and his 
fellows. Various flaws in methodology have been corrected. 
--~----------------------~~----------------------==--------------~·--------~--~.~ 
10. Summers, op~cit. p. 865 et seq. 
ll. Summers, op.cit. p. 865 
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To give one example, the earlier analytical jurists were, 
in Summers) opinion, 'plagued by a reductionist impulse which 
tended to obscure important differences and even ignore some 
things altogether'. 12. Austin reduced all laws to commands, 
neglecting such phenomena as rules, principles and 
regulations. 13. Modern positivists, however, recognise 
these pitfalls and thus to a great extent avoid them. 
Thus it seems possible to list the 'pedigree' of Hart as a 
jurist, in the following fashion:-
Hart is a positivist; but in view of the many uses 
to which this term is put, it is probably more apt 
to describe him as an analytical jurist or perhaps 
an analytical positivist. Whichever term is used 
to describe Hart - analytical jurist/positivist, he 
is a member of that school of jurisprudence Which 
numbers among its members John Austin and among 
its basic ~enets the separation of the 'is' and 
'ought'. 
Hart's classification as an analytical jurist has been 
accepted by many writers including Hart himself. In an 
article entitled 'Analytical Jurisprudence in the Mid-
Twentieth Century' 14. he discussed some of the tasks 
that face the analytical jurist. 
12. Summers, op.cit. p.882. 
13. A fault that Hart himself is aware of, when he 
constructs his critique of Austin. See chapters 2 & 3, 
'The Concept~ of Law' 
14. Hart; Analytical Jurisprudence in the Mid-Twentieth 
Century, University of Pennsylvania Law Review (1957), 
Vol. 105, p.935. 
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~ 
'It seems to me that similarly in pursuing analytical 
inquiries we seek to sharpen our awareness of what 
we talk about when we use our language. There is 
no clarification of concepts which can fai 1 to 
increase our understanding of the world to which 
we apply them.' 15. 
The analysis of concepts such as 'law', 'right', 'duty', 
and 'obligation' is the very task which Summers noted as 
being the preoccupation of the new analytical jurists. 
Indeed, Hart has alaborated upon what exactly this task 
of conceptual analysis entails. 
'The position usually is that we can distinguish for 
any concept a standard case and then the phenomenon 
of vagueness shows itself in the fact that there are 
strains in our thought, and so in our language, 
inclining us to assimilate to the standard case 
those cases which have only some of these features -
there is also a counter strain inclining us to 
withdraw the concept in the absence of certain of 
these features. The analytical task here, having 
established the features which constitute the 
paradigm case, is to examine the various motives 
that may incline us one way or the other in dealing 
with the borderline case.' 16o 
This statement of Hart's is quoted at length in the belief 
that it is important in gaining some understanding of the 
background to analytical jurisprudence. For, if in 
describing Hart we seek to use the term 'analytical 
jurist' (as opposed to the broader term 'positivist'), then 
who better to tell us what this brand of jurisprudence entails 
than Hart? 
15. ibid. p.967 
16. ibid. p. 968 
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I 
Indeed, he has provided us with the valuable·informction 
that the main preoccupation of this particular 'school' 
is conceptual analysis - that is: 
(i) the elucidation of the standard case for any 
particular concept, 
(ii) coupled vJith a consideration of those insto.nces 
that fall within the penumbra of the concept; 
a thought to bear in mind as we move on to a closer 
consideration of his work. 
The Concept of Law 
It seems a necessary preface to any detailed discussion 
of Hart's attitude toward international laH to consider 
the line taken by his argument in 'The Concept of Lav1' as 
a whole, so as to put this more complex assessement into 
context. 
The task that Hart sets himself to achieve at the outset of 
his work, is 'e•e to advance legal theory by providing an 
improved analysis of the distinctive structure of a municipal 
legal system ••e'• 17o As a startine; poil't, he to..kes the 
Austinian definition of law as an order backed by a threat. 
His aim in so doing is to pinpoint the flaws in this 
seer!lingly attractive theory in the hope of constructing in 
its place a more accurate analysis of the term 'law'. 
The criminal law most closely bears out the characterisation 
of lmv as a command backed by a threat. Thus, one may have 
the command - do not kill - follov,Jed by the threat - or else 
17. Concept of Law p.l7. 
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you will be punished. However, as Hart makes plain, it is 
1·rhen one moves beyond the criminal law that the command 
theory is st!I:'e1ched to its limits. Rules \vh ich confer the 
ability to enter into contracts or to r.:ake a ,_.rill do not fit 
cor:tfortably into the mould· of the command, since the failure 
to comply Hith such rules results in the nullity or non-
effectiveness of the proposed transaction. 1Go As for 
customary lm1, here it is difficult to pinpoint the command 
in \vhich the custom originated, forcing one to speak in terms 
of tacit commands. Moreover, attempts to fit the 
spectrum of legal rules into the notion of the command 
produce so called explanations that have the air of being 
extremely contrived. The treatment of nullity as a 
sanction is but one example; the activities which the rules 
of contract, etc., are designed to promote are 1.•.rorthwhile 
activities (as opposed to those activities which the criminal 
law is designed to discourage) where the use of a sanction · 
seems particularly inappropriate. 20o 
Having dealt \•ri th the inadequacy of' the command to encompass 
the variety of legal rules that exist, Hart BOes on to deal 
vii th the concept of the Austinian sovereign. The sovereign 
is that entity within a state which issues the commands and to 
whom there is a habit of obedience. This, in its turn, begs 
an explanation of several phenomena of a legal system. These 
include the continuity of legal rules. The fact that rules 
su::--vive from one sovereign to the next \·Ii thout a fresh command 
defies exnlanation in these particular terms. 
18. 
19. 
20. 
ibid 
ibid 
ibid 
p 28 
p 43 
p 33 
et seq. 
II 
II 
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So also does the fact that the orders of a new sovereign may 
be regarded as lavJ from the very outset of his reign without 
the development of a habit of obedience to that particular 
sovereign. If Austin were correct, it would seem logical 
for there to be a hiatus bet\veen the departu.re of the old 
sovereign and the access ion of the ne\v, whilst it was adjudged 
whether a habit of obedience had been established. 
Having found the Austinian model of a legal system an 
imperfect tool for analysis, hart proceeds to put forward his 
own elucidation of the concept of 'law', based on the 
sho=-tcomings of Austins theory. For the command of a 
sovereign backed by a threat, Hart substitutes a system of 
primary and secondary rules designed to display with greater 
accuracy how exactly a legal system works. 21o 
Primary rules of obligation are characteristic of a society 
in the early stages of its develop~ent. The individuals 
\vho are ~embers of such a loosely structured society in its 
embryonic days, will concern themselves with the most basic 
of rules, such as prohibitions on the use of violence and the 
s&nctity of property. It is only when such a society expands 
that the inadequacies of primary rules alone become apparent. 
Such a system is static in that there is no indico.tion Hhether 
a tentative rule has or has not become a primary rule, other 
than its general acceptance among members of that g1~up. Nor 
isthere any authoritative means of determining tlhethcr a 
primary rule has been breached. Moreover, the existence of 
primary rules of obli~ution alone produces stagnatio~in that 
there is no one method whereby redundant rules may be eliminated 
and the ne\v ones take their place. To meet these inadeauacies 
21. ibid Chapter V entitled 'Law as the Union of Primary 
and Secondary Rules' . 
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\·ri thin the system, secondary rules eventually evolve. They 
contrast vrith primary rules in the following fashion, ridding 
the system of its previous flaws: 
'Under rules of the one type· which may \"Jell be considered 
the basic or primary type, human.beings are required to do 
or abstain from certain actions, VJhether they wish to or not. 
Rules of the other type are in a sense narasitic upon 
or secondary to the first; for they provide that hv.man 
beings may by doing or saying certain things introduce new 
rules of the primary type, extinguish or modify old ones, 
or in various ways determine their incidence or control 
their operations. Rules of the first type impose duties; 
rules of the second type confer pm•Iers, public or private. ' 22 o 
Once Hart has elucidated his 'key to the science of juris-
prudence, ' he goes on to discuss a n1_1mber of issues that arise 
out of !-:.is use o:f the primary/secondary rule model. These 
include such matters as the necessary requirements for the 
existence of a legal system and the open texture of legal 
language. 23o 
In conclusion, Hart spends time explorine the areas of 
relationship between law and morals, shedding some light on 
the characteristic features of moral rules as vJell as the 
minimum content of natural lavJ. 2L!- o 
22. ibid p 78, 79. 
23. For Hart's detailed discussion of these matters, with 
which this thesis is not directly concernedJsee 
Chapters VI, VII, Conc.Qpr o~ o!....CJ.u.J . 
24. Similarly, see Chapters VIII and IX. 
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d 
International Law 
The claims of internctional law to be regarded as 'law' 
have provided the subject matter for many a learned argument. 
Austin was led to classify the law of nations as positive 
morality, a conclusion that appears inevitable in th~ lip,ht 
of the definition of law that he adopted. 2~. Bentham also 
found international law 1:1anting in some of those inr:redient s 
which he co~sidered necessary to warrant the title 'law'. 
Yet it vms he v1ho termed it international la\'J on the following 
ground.!, that the analogy between it and municipal lm-J was 
sufficient to accord it the title. 26. 
Indeed, this is not to give the impression that 
international law is short of supporters of its claim to 
be a ~enuine legal system. Almost no ~reat treatise on this 
particular subject is without its justification of the 
title 'international law'. 27. Points of dissimilarity 
between the municipal and international systems such as lack 
of a legislature and a police force are rationalised end 
exnlained. In fact, there is a Great temntation to adopt 
the views advanced by Glanville Williams 28. Hho believes 
the ~uestion is basically one of semantics. A definition 
of lm·I \·rill either encompass interne.tional law or exclude it. 
Thus whether or not intern~tional law is law, is all a 
matter of the definition of'Jaw' chosen. 
25. This is so since Austin's definition of law is dependent 
unon a sovereign of some nature with noHer to command; 
a commodity \·Jhich intern.:=ttional 18\•J sadly lacks. 
26. Principles of Morals and Legislation, XVII, 25 n. l. 
27. See Oppenhei~s International Law (7th edition), Vol. I, 
Cbanter I, Sections l -10. 
28. 22 B .• Y.I.L.(l945)pl).s. 146-163. 'Internetional Le.1.·! and the 
controversy concerninrr the Hord. 'la\•T' ' 
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Thour;b this is e.n extremely j_ne;eY'ious solutioJl to the wnole 
controversy, it neBlects a vital fector - that law is a 
serious disinline. Hart himself makes this very point:-
'The short way su~~ested would indeed be 
appro9riate if we were dealing with a proper 
name. If someone were to ask whether the 
place called London is really London, all we 
could do vlOuld be to remj_nd him of the convention 
and leave him to cbide by it or choose enothe r 
name to suit his taste'. In contrast 'the 
extension of the general terms of any serious 
discit;line is nevr::r \·Ji thout j_t s principle or 
rationale, though it may not be obvious \'That 
that is • ' 2S o 
It is in this frame of mind that Hart in his fj_nal chapter 
approaches the stumbling block of interne.tional lavJ end its 
place within his theory of law. 
Now as has been seen, Hart has put forward a theory to 
explain how a legal system functions, a the6ry that treats 
of law entirely in terms of municipal law. However, be 
this as it may, it would be loBical to expect Hart to treat 
internG.tional law in those self- sume terms of primary and 
secondary rules. Yet, as can be seen from Hart's final 
chapter, this does not Drove to be the case. 
'Though the idea of the union of primary and secondary rules 
has these virtues, and though it would accord with usage to 
treat the existence of this charactistic union of rules as a 
29. Concept of Law p.210. 
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sufficient condition for the application of the expression 
'legal system' we have not claimed that the \•Io:rCI. 'law' 
must be defined in its terms. It is because we make no 
such claim to identify or regulate in this way the use of 
words like 'law' or 'legal' that this book is offer~d as 
an elucidation of the concept of law, rather than a 
definition of 'law', which might naturally be expected 
to provide a rule or nlles for the use of these expressions. 1 30o 
Thus, Hart has made it plain that he does not regard the union 
of primary and secondary rules as a definition of law. Nor 
does he intend to use this union to prOvide a means whereby 
the legal status or other ..... ri se of international law may be 
determined. Instead, Hart contents himself with the following 
task:-
'We shall enquire into the detailed character of 
the doubts which have been felt, and, as in the 
German case, we shall ask whether the common wider 
usage that speaks of 'international law' is likely 
to obstruct any practical or theoretical aim'. 3L 
With this as the task in hand, Hart proceeds to investigate 
various specific problems that have arisen vnth regard to 
international law. The first is expressed in the question 
'How can international law be binding?' This problem is 
stated in more precise terms by Hart as follo\vS:-
30. 
31. 
'This doubt would be more candidly expressed in 
the form 'Can such rules as these be meaningfully 
and truthfully said ever to give rise to obligations'. 
As the discussions in the books show, one source of 
doubt on this point is simply the absence from the 
system of centrally organised sanctions'. 32o 
ibid 
ibid 
p. 208 
p. 209 
ibid p. 212 -14 
That a sanction is not a necessary ingredient of the 
concept of 'having an obligation' or 'being bound' is 
an idea that Hart has elaborated at· length in the main 
body of the 'Concept of Lmv! Its basis lies in the 
distinction made by Hart between the external and 
internal views of obligation. Thus an outside observer 
may conclude after a study of a given society that an 
individual who infringes rule x will receive a punishment 
in the form of sanction Y. However, obligation also has 
an internal aspect. Individuals within a given society 
obey rules for a variety of mo'tives of which the fear of 
punishment may be one - bu~ it is not the sole nor the 
over-riding motive. 33. 
Hart also advances another reason why sanctions - vJhich 
undoubtedly do play some role vfithin a municipal system-
do not and indeed should not have the same relevance with 
regard to international society. 
'The answer to the argument in this form is to be found in 
those elementary truths about human beings and their 
environment which constitute the enduring psychological 
and physical setting of municipal law. In societies of 
individuals approximately equal in physical strength and 
vulnerability, physical sanctions are both necessary and 
possible. They are required in order that those \'iho would 
voluntarily submit to the restraints of law shall not be 
me.re victims of malefactors who 1r.JOuld, in the absence of such 
sanctruons reap the advantages of respect for law on the part 
of others without respecting it themselves.' 34. 
33. This idea of the internal and the external view of 
obligation is discussed by Hart at p. 79 onwards. 
3l.J-. Concept of Law p. 213. 
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In contrast, the structure of international society is in 
Hart's opinion so unlike that of a society made up of 
individuals that any attempt made by states to punish a 
breach of international law by the use of force is a very 
uncertain exercise. An erring state may have at its 
disposal such enormous potential as to render any attempted 
sanction on the part of other states completely ineffective; 
a situation that could hardly ever occur within a municipal 
system. 'Hence the organisation and use of sanctions may 
involve fearful risks and the threat of them add little to 
the natural deterrents' 35. 
Thus sanctions along the lines of those employed within 
individual state systems are inappropriate with regard to 
international society. Yet their lack does not in any 
sense make international law less binding. States may 
consider and in fact do consider themselves bound by 
international law. As has been stated their motivations 
may be various - be they economic or purely a matter of self 
interest. But there is no case - according to Hart - for 
that 
denying"international lav..r is binding. Nor does its lack 
of sanctions, given the nature of international society, 
allow any judgment to be made as regards its inherent legality. 
It has previously been mentioned how Hart found Austin's 
notion of sovereignty wanting in many respects. To Austin, 
the sovereign was above the strictures of the law. Now 
members of the international community are frequently 
referred to as sovereign states, thus leading individuals to 
speculate as to whether such sovereign entities may be above 
the law. BUt to Hart's way of thinking this is a distortion 
35. ibid. p. 214. 
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of the true issues. Sovereignty to him is a concept Which 
may only be evaluated in the light of international law and 
not as all entity apart. Indeed, sovereignty is that measure of 
autonomy possessed by a state insofar as it is not irrecon-
cilable with international law. However, the assumption that 
the sovereignty of a state was such as to put it above the law, 
led to the formulation of many ingenious theories designed to 
explain why states for the most part adhered to the rules of 
international law. These theories include among their number 
the concept of auto-limitation which regarded all obligations 
as imposed by states upon themselves. 36. Also prelavent was 
the idea that international law was based on the consent by 
sovereign states to be bound by a particular rule of law. 37. 
But as Hart points out these explanations fail to correspond 
with the facts as they stand. 
'A detailed scrutiny of the claim that all international 
obligation arises from the consent of the party bound, 
cannot be undertaken here, but two clear and important 
exceptions to this doctrine must be noticed. The first 
is the case of a new state. It has never been doubted 
that when a new, independent state emerges into 
existence, as did Iraq in 1932, and Israel in 1948, 
it is bound by the general obligations of international 
law including, among others, the rules that give binding 
force to treaties'. 38. 
The second case concerns the state whic"h acquires maritime 
territory after having previously been land-locked. It is 
clear that this is enough to make it subject to all the rules 
of international law relating to territoral waters and 
the high seas. 
36. The principal expon&nts of this view are Jellinek and 
Triepel. For a brief analysis of their theories see 
Fr~edmann op.cit p.575. 
37. For two outstanding cases on this point see The Lotus 
P.C.I.J. Series A. no.lO.; R.v. Keyn 1876 2 Ex.Div.63. 
38. Concept of law p. 221. 
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Nor is Hart alone in this opinion, support being forthcoming 
from Starke in his book 'Introduction to International Law'.39o 
In these circumstances it appears that Hart's notion of 
sovereignty as an idea whose bounds are dictated by 
international law rather than an absolute phenomenon is much 
nearer the truth. 
AnotheiT factor which has undermined the status of international 
law is the effort on ·the part of many academics to align it 
with morality. This process may be the direct line talc en 
by Austin who classified international law as positive morality. 
Alternatively authors such as Brierly have contended that 
underlying the international system as a Hhole is a conviction 
on the part of states that they have a moral obligation to obey 
the rules. 40o Hart faults this attempted minglinr; of lav.J 
and morality. To him international law is an entity apart 
from morality for several reasons. Initially there is the 
fact that states accuse one another of breaches of the law and 
not morality in the cases that come before international 
tribunals; plus the factor that.~ in Hart's opinion, the rules 
of international law are morally indifferent. To his mind, 
it is jnconceivable that the highly complex and technical 
rules of international law could ever be regarded as havin~ 
moral v.Jeight. 
'\rJe expect international laH, but not morali tv, to tell us such 
things as the number of days a belligerent vessel may stay 
for re-fuelling or repairs in a neutral port'. LJ-1. 
39. Starke gives examples of how a state may well be bound 
without its consent: see pps. 27-28o 
40. See Brierly '']he Basis of Obligation i.n International 
Law' Chapter 1 0 
41. Conce:nt of Lmv o p 224o 
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The final factor that weighs against any attempt to class 
international law as morality, is the possibility that the 
rules of international law might at some time in the 
future be the subject of legislative change. If these rules 
were indeed moral rules the very process of legislative change 
would be anathema to them. 
The final topics that concern Professor Hart in relation to 
international law are the various analogies that have been 
drawn between it and municipal law. Various scholars in an 
attempt to show how closely the two systems parellel each 
other, have tried to show how familiar municipal law 
institutions - such as statutes -have their equivalent within 
the international structure. L!-2. Hart is of the following 
opinion concerning such analogies. 
'Yet some theorists, in their anxiety to defend against 
the sceptic the title of international law to be 
called 'law' have succumbed to the temptation to 
minimise these formal differences Gnd to exaggerate 
the analogies which can be found in international 
law to legislation or other desirable formal features 
of municipal law~. 43. 
To prove his point, Hart concentrates on one particular 
analogy. 
'Kelsen and many modern theorists insist that, like 
municipal law international law possesses and indeed 
must possess a 'basic norm' or what v-1e have termed 
a rule of recognition, by reference to Which the 
va]dity of the other rules of the system is assessed, 
42. See Hudson 'International Legislation' - pp; xiii- 'JCI)( -
for the theory that multi-lateral treaties are a form 
of legislation within the international community. 
43. Concept of Law p. 226 
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and in virtue of Which the rules constitute a 
single system'. 44" 
To Hart this search for a basic norm is so much wasted 
effort in so far as international law is concerned. This 
is in vie1t1 of the fact that a rule of recognition, 
'is not a necessity, but a luxury found in advanced 
social systems Whose members come not merely to 
accept separate rules piecemeal, but are committed 
to the acceptance in advance of general classes of 
rule, marked out by general criteria of validity'. 45a 
Hart believes that international society has not yet reached 
the stage of sophistication that warrants the presence of a 
basic norm. Not that this makes international law any the 
less binding in Hart's eyes. Indeed the only tangible 
eonsequence of such a lack is that 'such rules'; that is 
those of international law, 'do not form-a system but a 
mere set'. 46. 
With these points, Hart brings his chapter on international 
law to a close. He stresses the innate danger of drawing 
formal analogies between the international and municipal 
systems. Instead he prefers to stress the analogies of 
content that eKist between the two systems. To him, this 
is a much more fruitful source of comparison. 
this note that Hart concludes his chapter. 
44. ibid p. 228 
45. ibid p. 229 
46. ibid p. 229 
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It is on 
'Bentham, the inventor of the expression 'international law' 
/ 
defended it simply by saying that it was 'sufficiently 
analogous' to municipal law. To this two comments are 
perhaps v1orth adding. First that the analogy is one of 
coF 
content not~form: secondly that, in this analogy of content, 
no other social rules are so close to municipal law as those 
of international law'. 47o 
47. ibid. p231. 
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C H A P T E R II 
Now that some of the necessary background has been given, 
an attempt may be made to examine the rationale behind 
Hart's chapter on international law. Probably the most 
pertinent question to ask at this juncture is Hart's 
purpose in writing this chapter. The aim of 'The Concept 
of Law' as a whole seems to be straightforward enough:-
'For its purpose is not to provide a definition 
of law, in the sense of a rule by reference to 
which the correctness of the use of the word (law) 
can be testedr it is to advance legal theory by 
providing an improved analysis of the distinctive 
structure of a municipal legal system o I 1 o 
This 'improved analysis' may be described as an elucidation 
of the word 'law', not a definition. 
Besides this central theme, Hart does have another less vi tal 
tasl;;: in hand:-
'At various points in this book the reader will 
find discussions of the borderline cases where 
legal theorists have felt doubts about the application 
of the expression 'law' or 'legal system' but the 
suggested resolution of these doubts which he will 
also find here, is only a secondary concern of the 
book. 1 2o 
This idea of the elucidation of a concept together with a 
discussion of its more dubious applications fits in with the 
description given of the working methods of the analytical 
l. 
2. 
Concept of Law 
ibid. p.l6. 
p .16, 17. 
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jurist. It is also a subject to which Hart has given some 
considerable thought. In a revie\11/ of 'Dias and Hughes on 
Jurisprudence', Hart pointed out that it was 'important in 
jurisprudence to notice certain cardinal features of 
language'. 3. One of these was the fact that 'words are 
vague'. Hart expanded this by adding' ••. they have only 
a eore of settled meaning, but beyond that a penumbra of 
borderline cases v1hich is not regimen ted by any conventions. • • :r 4. 
In the light of this, it appears that what is achieved in 
'The Concept of Law' is an analysis of the structure of law 
as it is epitomised within a municipal legal aystem. In 
addition, various secondary issues are considered including 
the aptitude of the expression 'international law'. This 
investig~tion is conducted on the basis of whether or not 
the 'common v1ider usage that speaks of 'international law' is 
likely to obstruct any practical or theoretical aim'. 5. 
All this is so since Hart believes it well - nigh impossible 
to pinpoint ce~·tain features and insist on their presence before 
the term2 'law' I 'legal system' may be employed. He justifies 
this belief as follows:-
. . . but I am not sure that in the case of 
concepts ao complex as that of a legal system 
we can pick out any characteristics, save the most 
obvious ·and uninteresting ones a·nd say they are 
necessary. I"luch of the tiresorne.k> gomachy over 
3. Hart 'Dias and Hughes on Jurisprudence' ~.S.P.T.L • 
. 'p. 144 (1957-8) 
4. ibid. p .144. 
5. Concept of Law p. 209. 
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whether or not 'international law' or 'primitive law' is 
really law has sprung from the effort to find a considerable 
set of necessary criteria for the application of the 
expression 'lefJal system'. Whereas I think that all that 
can be found are a set of criteria of which a few are 
obviously necessary (e.g. there must be rules) but the 
rest for~ a sub-set of criteria of which everything called 
a 'legal system' satisfies some but only standard or normal 
cases satisfy all'. 6. 
So whilst Hart regards it as a feasible task to elucidate 
the core or paradigm case of any particular concept - the 
task that takes up the bulk of his time in 'The Concept of 
Law' - he does not regard the characteristics of the standard 
case as dictating when or where not to use the expression 
'law'. So it appears that \.Yhen Hart "examines international 
law, it is not his intention to insist on the presence of pri-
mary or secondary rules in order to allow the use of the term 
'international law'. Instead, he concentrates on the 
practicalities of using the expression. 
Once Hart's underlying purpose has been decided then the 
issues that he touches upon in this final chapter become 
those that are usually raised vJhen the question arises as to 
the lee:al potential· of international la\.Y. They include 
such matters as:-
(a) the problem of sanctions in relation to 
the binding nature of international law; 
(b) the problem of sovereign states, including 
such theories as that of auto-limitation; 
6. Hart 'Theory and Definition in Jurisprudence' 
Prob~ems of Psychotherapy and Jurisprudence p.251 (1954) 
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(c) the analogies drawn between international and 
municipal law. 
The manner in which he disposes of such matters has been 
previously discussed. The conclusions that he reaches are 
as follows. Of greatest significance is what Hart does not 
say; that is, he never cate~orically asserts that 
international law is 'law! What he does say is that 
international society is such that sanctions are not factors 
which are necessary in order that international lavJ may be 
regarded as binding or a source of obligation. Hart sh Ov·l s P 
moreover,how the existence of sovereign states may effectively 
be reconciled with the existence of a regime of international 
lavJ., VJhilst the idea that the rules of international law 
are moral precepts is shown not to accoJ:>d with the facts, nor 
the nature of the rules which e;overn international society. 
Yet, even in the light of all this, Hart never asserts outright 
the legal nature of international law. Instead, he contents 
himself v\ri th saying that ' •.•. no other social rules are so 
close to municipal law as those of international law'. 7o 
How then does Hart. regard international law? He views those 
rules which govern the behaviour of states as a set of rules 
and not as a system, basing his conclusion on the fact that 
in his estimation, international law lacks a rule of 
recognition:-
' .... but it is submitted that there is no basic 
rule uroviding general criteria of validity for 
the rules of international law, and that the rules 
which are in fact operative constitute not a system 
but a set of rules.' 8o 
Concept of La\'J p. 231 
8. ibid. p.230, 231 
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If one accepts Hart'S categorisation of the rules of 
international lavJ as a set of rules, can one assume 
that such rules are bindinrr:? Hart seems to imply 
that this is indeed the case:-
'The rules of the simple structure are, 
like the basis rule of the more advanced 
systems 1 bindinr; if they are accepted and 
function as such.' 9. 
This also carries the implication that one must eouate 
the simple structure or simple social structu. -re with 
international society as it exists- at pres·ent~:,.,·i.Another 
refe:r<:;nce is made as regards the bj nding quality of such 
rules, again without a direct reference to international 
law. 
'Yet if rules are in fact accepted as standards of conduct 
and supnorted ui th appro nriate forms of social pressure 
distinctive of oblir;atory rules, nothine:; more j_s renuired 
to shovJ that tl'H;y are bind_i_np; rules, even thovgh, in this 
simple form of social structure, we have not somethine; 
which He do have in municipal la~:J, that is tbe rule of 
reco~ni tion. ' 10. 
So the picture that Hart r;ives of international lavJ j_s of 
a set of bindin~ rvles 1·1hose content is closely an2loguus 
to that of municipal law. 
9. ibid. 
10. ibid. 
p.230 
p.229 
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Whether or not the above description is an accurate 
representation of international law is the next matter 
to be investigated. In the critioues that there h2ve been 
of Hart's work, his treatment of international law is 
scarcely mentioned. In fact, one of the few exceptions 
is an article by Anthony D'Amato entitled 'The Nee-Positivist 
Concept of International Law.' 11o This article is 
particularly surprising in that it has several harsh things 
to say concerning Hart's opinions vis-~-vis international law. 
' 
The portion of Hart's argument that particularly irritates 
"' D'Amato relates to international law and the rule of 
recognition. 
' 
''.· o • • Professor Hart argues that there is no unifying rule 
of recognition specifying sources of international lavJ, and 
providing criteria for the identification of its rules. But 
how can international law then be termed 'law'?.' 12. 
Hart's answer to this problem is, as has been seen, simple 
enough. It is to regard international law as a set of rules 
not a system: a set of rules that e,~::-e ,how<'-VOr 
1 
binding. 
International law is merely regarded as approxj_mating to that 
simple form of society where a. rule of recognition has not yet 
emerged. 
To D'Amato such a line of reasoning leads to inescapable 
conclusions:-
' •..• international lavr becomes lau at tho price 
of conceding that it is a primitive kind of lavJ, 
lackin3 in rules of recognition'. 13. 
The suggestion is made that international law is'basically 
11. 
12. 
13. 
59 A.J.I.L. p.321 
ibid p. 322 
ibid p. 322 
(1965) 
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incomplete and thus deserving of less respect on the part of 
states than ordinary municipal lavr 1 • 1 Ll_ 
' 0 
So the stage is reached \\There it can be said of international 
lm"l, as Hart has, that it lacks a rule of recoe;nition and 
therefore becomes a set of rules. As a set of rules it 
becomes a brand of second class law, at least according to 
D'Amato. But though D'Amato roundly condemns Hart for what 
he has to say and the fashion in which he choases to state the 
rule of recognition, he does not attempt to investigate in 
depth whether what Hart has to say is true. 
To do so involves an attempt to find the solution to the 
following problems:-
(l) Does international law possess a rule 
of recognition? The claim by Hart that 
international law does not Dnd indeed need 
not possess a rule of recognition/basic norm, 
is by no means original. The self same 
attitude is taken by Gihl in an article 
entitled 'The Legal Character and Sources 
of International Law' :-
'International law is customary law, it 
is impossible to find any 'foundation' 
for thj_s la vJ, whether in the will of the 
state or in any 1 basic norm', which gives 
its rUJ.les validity as rules of law' 15. 
But it is the consec;u ences of such a lack, 
acco:rdLng to Harts scheme of things that mal{e5 
it so far reaching. 
14. ibid. p.322. 
15. 1 Scandinavian Studies in Law p.69 (1957). 
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(2) If there is no rule of recognition,does 
international lav-1 consist of a binding set 
of rules? This is how Hart describes 
international law; a logical conclusion 
once the presence of a rule of recognition 
has been discounted. Yet, is this a 
conclusion that corresponds to the workings 
of international lm·J as we knm·J it today? 
Therefore it is our intent ion to pursue these two lines of 
reasoning, at first in a general fashion, since they may 
offer an accurate assessment of the status of int erna.tional 
law. Yet if this arpears not to be the case, then the way 
is clear for a more detailed consideration. However, before 
we can so do, an even more important matter must be attended 
to; that is whether or not we may refer to international law 
in terms of primary and secondary rules. Hart refutes the 
idea that he has provided a definition of law. This may in 
turn lead us to surmise that the search for a rule of 
recognition, besides other secondary rules, is an inappropriate 
exercise. 
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C H A P T E R III 
Wit"t_9enstein in his treatise 'Philosophical Investigations' 1o 
provided what he described as a solution to the problem of 
universals. Universals are certain general expressions such 
as 'games' and 'beauty'. When dealing with general 
expressions such as these the tendency is to look for certain 
common characteristics that will enable us to subsume many 
/ 
/ r 
entities under the common term. To quote \1/itlSfrnstein:-
'We are inclined to think that there must be something 
in common to all games, say, and that this common 
property is the justification for applyinc; the 
general term 'game' to various games.' 2o 
However, Wi ~enste in refutes this idea as tending to 
create too much confusion. Instead, he substitutes 
his theory of family resemblances. 
vJithin a general concept such as 'g3.mes' there exist the 
various members of that family. Whereas it is not possible 
to isolate common characteristics, it may be the case that 
certain;' family resemblances' will exist making it 
approppriate that a certain item be included within a 
general concept:-
' •••• games form a family the members of which have 
family likenesses. Some of them have the same nose, 
others the same eyebrows and others the same way of 
walking; and these likenesses overlap.' 3o 
I Law I is a general concevt akin to that of I games I. Hart 
1. Philosophical Investigations, 2nd edition, Oxford, 1958. 
2. ibid., Blue Books, pps. 17-18 
3. ibid., pps 17-18. 
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• 
has chosen to analyse this concept in terms of primary and 
secondary rules in the fashion previously considered. The 
conclusions he reaches relate to those paradiGm cases of law -
municipal systems. Yet there are other types of law 
including international law. 
Now international law is undoubtedly very akin to municipal 
law. Hart himself admits this:-
'····no other social rules are so close to 
municipal law as those of international law.' 4. 
I"loreover, states in their dealing with one another constantly 
refer to international la\'1 as consisting of legal rules binding 
upon themselves. 5o 
Given this admitted affinity between municipal and 
international la""' and their undoubted resemblances, it 
appears that any analysis of law as a concept must take 
account of international lavJ. There are enough family 
resemblances betHeen the t\'i"O to make international law a 
necessary constituent of the concept 'law'. Even Hart seems 
tacitly to admit that 'international lav-1' falls within the 
genus 'law', given the fashion in which he rebuts those 
arguments which have been used to challenge the status of 
international law as law. 
4. Concept of Law p.231. 
5. For a demonstration of the \-Jay in which states regard 
international law in this concrete fashion see: Jessup 
'Modern Law of Nations; Chapter 1. 
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Yet what Hart does dispute is the validity with which his 
scheme of primary and secondary rules may be applied in order 
to establish whether or not the rules of international law 
conslitute either law or a legal system. 
• •••• though it would accord \·Ji th usage to treat 
the existence of this characteristic union of rules 
as a sufficient condition for the application of the 
expression 'legal system' we have not claimed that the 
word 'law' must be defined in its terms. 1 6. 
Thus, it seems wise to clarify the position and consider 
what exactly are the problems which face us. There exists 
initially the general idea of law of which it seems agreed 
that international law forms a part. This follows on 
' Wittenstein's idea of family resemblances si·nce international 
J 
lmv consists of binding rules and is considered as law by 
those who have dealings with it. 
But there is also a concept of law as postulated by Hart in 
terms of primary and secondary rules. Since international 
law is part of the general idea ''law" then it seems logical 
that it should also to some degree be encompassed b~~!Hart's 
concept of law. Hart has denied any attempt to define law 
in terms of primary and secondary rules, and this we accept. 
But we do have an analysis of law in terms of primary and 
secondary rules. It is reasonable to surmise from this that 
Hart's analysis can be aDplied to some degree to international 
law. 
6. Concept of Law p. 208. 
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Hart's consideration of international law in his final 
chapter seems to a great extent directed to asserting the 
right of international lavJ to be included v,;i thin the general 
idea of lmv. The lack of sanctions is shown not to destroy 
conclusively the family resemblanceto law. 
Yet given this, Hart does not try to deal \vi th what seems 
to be a separate issue, w~tich is> that p;iven that international 
.law is within the concept 'law' then it should also be 
accommodated within the concept of law. The fact that 
Har~s concept of law is not a definition does not, it seems, 
destroy the validity of this point. 
·So it seems lo~ical in view of what has been said to expect 
at sor:1e no:i nt that Hart will somehow fit international la~,;1 
within his frame-vJOrk of primar~v and secondary rules. 
Indirectly, he does this, :thou~):l his approach is far from 
straightforward Hart denies that international lavJ 
possesses a rule of recognition and as a consequence defines 
it as a simple social structu~·e with all that that entails. 
It appears therefore that a study of international lav1 in 
terms of primary and secondary rules is a valid tasl<:: to 
undertake for two reasons:-
(a) 
(b) 
because international law is part of the general 
idea of law and therefore should also be a part 
of the concept of lm,r. 
because Hart himself treats international law 
in terms of primary and secondary rule So 
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Before pursuinc this line of reasonino; it is just as vJell 
to establish v!hat exactly Hert has to say of international 
law in terms of his concent of law. His first assertion 
is that no rule of recognjtion exists within the international 
system. It will be recRlled that the rule of recoc;nit ion 
is the key secondary rule which makes it possj_ble to 
identify the rules of the system. 7. If no such 
secondary rule exists then this has implications for the 
vi hole of international law. 
Within the terms of Hart's concept of law, international law 
emerges as a set of rules of binding ouality regul2ting 
relations between states. Secondary rules are by implication 
totally lacking. Instead there exists within international 
society a legal structure which corresponds to that 
'simple form o·f social structUJi'."e, consisting only 
of primary rules of obli~ation, \'1/hich, vJhen we 
find it amon~ societies of individuals, we are 
accustomed to contrast with a developed legal 
system.' n Oo 
If this is an accurate description of the international 
t"hat 
legal syste~ it seems lo~ical to expectAit will exhibit, 
at least to some dee;ree, the defects of a simple social 
structure as listed by Hart. 
(i) 
(ii) 
uncertainty 9. 
inefficen cy 10. 
Those defects consist of: 
(iii) static character of the rules. 11 
7. Concept of Law p.92. 
8. Concept of Law p.209. 
9, 10, 11. These characteristic defects of a set of rules 
and their causes are discussed by Hart at 
pp. 89-91. 
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Therefore it ought to prove possible - r·iven the applicability 
of Hart's sy stern of primary and secondary rules to 
international law - to give some indication \·Ihether or not 
the international system does suffer from these defects. 
This presents us with one aspect of Hart's theory that is 
worthy of examination. 
If we pass over the question as to whether or not 
international law possess the characteristic defects of a 
simple social structure, then we are faced with the additional 
auestion of how accurate, or rather how appropriate, is 
Hart's description of international law as a set of rules. 
What makes a rule a rule of international law is in Hart's 
view its acceptance as such. 
'In the simpler form of society we must wait and 
see whether a rule gets accepted as a rule or 
not • . • • • 12. 
The practice or rather the behaviour of states in accepting 
a rule as a rule of law is all important in Hart's analysis. 
Yet this seems to simplify what may not be in every respect 
~ simplc·±ss~e. -. Given the basic premise that 
' . . • . rules of the simple structure are • • • • binding 
if they are accepted and. function as such •.•• ' 13. 
then difficulties begin to arise. The concept of acceptance 
is deceptively straightforward. There are various difficulties 
associated with its usage. For example, it is not made clear 
what breadth of acceptance is necessary v.Ji thin the internatj_onal 
community. Nor is it clear whether acceptance by the 
12. Concept of Law. p.229. 
13. ibid, p.230. 
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majority of states on a single occasion ••• such as might 
be forth coming in the United Nations is sufficient to 
create a rule of law. 
Another conseouence of this stress on acceptance is that 
it appears possible to list facets of international law 
where obligation does not originate in acceptance. For 
example, one rna~ refer to treaty obli~ations where the power 
to bind seems to rely more on the format of the treaty, than 
the element of acceptance. 14. The same may well be true 
of general principles of international law, ~ince how is it 
possible to show their acceptance p6 binding. 
Moreover, Hart dismisses in no uncertain fashion potential 
claimants to the rule of recoTnition in international law. 
) These include the following:-
'States shall behave as they have customarily 
behaved. ' 15 o 
NO\v the basic task of the rule of recognition is to enable 
the identification of other rules of the system. The rule of 
recogni tj,on, vJi th this end in mind, will as a conseou ence set 
out the criteria vJhich will allovi the existence of the rule 
of law to be ascertained. The example just quoted sets out 
no such criteria though it does refer to custom. This raises 
the ouestion as to whether it is possible to use those 
criteria which are re~arded as the basis of custom to form 
the content of a rule of recognition. 
14. Though states do undoubtedly show a certain degree of 
acceptance by putting their signatures to a treaty, the 
power to bind also stems from the particular form a 
treaty takes, its structure,as well as the customary 
rule 'Pacta sunt servanda'. 
15. Quoted by Hart at p.228 
formulated by Kelsen in 
and ~.State'. p. 369. 
of the Concept of LavJ, but 
tho 'General Theory of Law 
36 -
[7 
Again, if we accept Har~s premise that there is no rule of 
reco['.'nition within the international system, he does not 
assu~e that this is by any means a permanent state of affairs. 
Indeed, he i~fers that treaties may well provide the 
a rule of recognition if it could be shown 
that they were binding on states who were not signatories to 
the convention. 
'It is true that, on many important matters, the relations 
between states are regulated by multi-lateral treaties, 
and it is sometimes argued that these may bind states 
that are not parties. If this were generally recognized, 
such treaties would in fact be legislative enactments 
and international law would have distinct criteria of 
validity for its rules.' 16. 
But how are we to know when international law has reached 
such a stage of development that it may validly claim to 
possess secondary rules? Hart does not deny the pas si bility, 
but neither does be give any indication as to just how it will 
be achieved. The closest Hart comes to providing an answer 
is when he indicates that no rt~le of recoe;nition may exist 
until that rule's criteria have won the acceptance of the 
officials of a particular system. 
16. 
17. 
'In this more complex system, only officials might 
accept and use the system's criteria of legal validity.' 17o 
Concept of LavJ 
Concept of LavJ 
p.23l 
p.ll4 
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Hart seems therefore to have provided us with what seems 
at first glance an jnadeouate explanation of the workin~s 
of international law. 
(a) Hart describes international law as a set 
of rules. Indeed he infers that it is 
organised along the lines of a simple social 
structure. If international society is on a 
par with the. simple social structure then Hart 
explains the fact that it possess~binding rules 
of lavJ on the basis of acceptance on the part of 
states of certain rules as binding. Yet this 
leaves us vJith the problem of hov1 exactly it is 
possible to analyse this idea of acceptance. 
(b) Hart does concede that it ::i_s nossible for 
international society to acquli~e the cornerstone 
6f a more sonhisticated social structure i.e. 
secondary rules and more particularly a rule of 
recognition. But again there is the uroblem 
of just hovJ to assess whether or not a rule of 
recognition exists. 
(c) Among matters to be considered in the chapters 
that follow are whether or not resolutions of the 
General Assembly are bindinr and thus constitute 
a poteritial rule of recornition. But since 
Hart dismisses the claim of treaties to form the 
crux of the basic norm then it seems nossible that 
the same ~ode of reasoninq can be used to dismiss 
claims on the part of resolutions of the General 
Assembly. Hart states that treaties are bindin~ 
because one of the set of rules of international 
law is 'pacta sunt servanda'. Thus it seems 
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possible that Hart might say that resolutions 
of the General Assembly are bj ncli nn: because one 
of the set of rules of international law is 
'res sunt servanclaQ!.. Just how we may 
distinf,uish the ~eneralised concept of acceptance 
which adds another rule to the set from the 
acceptance of officials \·Jhich may r;enerate a 
rule of recosnition is far from clear. 
Thus, it seems safe to conclude that Hart's mode of analysis 
of international law seems to present, at least on first 
examination thesedifficulties of interpretation described. 
The prime difficulty is that of identifying a rule of 
recormi tion. 
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C H A P T E R IV 
The first of Hart's premises to be put to the test is that 
which equates international law with a set of rules. In so 
doing, it will be conceded at least for the purpose of this 
particular chapter that no rule of recognition exists within 
international society •. Therefore, it seems appropriate to 
expect international society to exhibit those defects which 
are described by Hart as a consequence of a set of rules. 
These defects take the following form:-
I uncertainty - which arises from the lack of an 
authority able to state categorically whether a 
particular rule is a rule of that set. 
II inefficiency - which arises from the lack of an 
agency which is especially empowered to ascertain 
with finality and authority whether there has been 
a breach of a particular rule. 
III static nature - which arises from the lack of a 
process whereby new rules may be introduced and old 
rules eliminated. 
Though it is easy enough to list these defects and indeed to 
attempt to evaluate whether or not they exist within inter-
national society, there is a general criticism that may be 
made of the whole process. This relates to the fact that 
Hart, when he described these defects which were the direct 
result of the existence of a set of rules, was concerned with 
the interaction of municipal law and individuals, not states 
and internat1onal law. Thus, the difficulty arises as to 
whether or not it is possible to draw a parallel between 
these two situations. Hart hims e·lf has pointed out the 
danger of expecting what is familiar on a municipal law level -
such as sanctions-to be reproduced within the international 
Gommunity, since the 'climate' and the demands of states are 
in a great many respects opposed to those of individuals. 
International law relies to a great degree on the extent to 
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which states are willing and able to curb their various 
activities, whereas within a municipal system with a strong, 
central goverrunent, the part played by individual compliance 
assumes a secondary character. 
The 'simple social structure' that Hart describes as governed 
by primary rules of obligation alone, is a society of 
individuals totally lacking in any variety of officialdom. 
Patterns of behaviour are regarded as acceptable or not 
within the particular grouping, but there is no authoritative 
way of ascertaining whether or not a rule is a rule within the 
particular grouping. Indeed, whether a particular rule has 
been breached, or whether a common process has developed to 
eradicate rules which are no longer pertinent, is also open 
to conjecture. 
These tasks are essentially those of officials vJi thin any 
organised community. So in order to achieve the transformation 
from a primitive set of rules to a legal system it seems 
that there must be in existence a class of officials in order 
to achieve the aims set out by the secondary rules. This ties 
in with what Hart has to say concerning the 'two minimum 
conditions necessary and sufficient for the existence of a 
legal system ' 1. They are the following:-
1. 
•on the one hand those rules of behaviour which are 
valid according to the system's ultimate criteria 
of validity must be generally obeyed, and, on the 
other hand, its rules of recognition specifying the 
criteria of legal validity and its rules of change, 
and adjudication must be effectively accepted as 
common public standards of official behaviour by 
its officials.' 2. 
Concept of Law p.ll3 
2. ibid. p.ll3 
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So the 'simple social structure' becomes identifiable in 
human terms with a loose r:rouping of individuals totally 
lacking any central organisation or official class. Though, 
as Hart admits, there may be a generalised pressure exerted 
by the 'law abiding majority' on the minority who mi~ht not 
\..d. sh to conform. 
But, cranted that this is the picture as it exists in human 
terms, may it be transferred on to an international level? 
May we expect to see:-
a. a loose ~rouping of states, 
b. a lack of officials, 
c. the three key defects of uncertainty, inefficiency 
and static tendencies, -
exhibited by an international society which is governed, in 
Hart's opinion, by a set of rules? Hart never ver.t ure s to 
equate the 'simple social structure' with international law 
in terms of a direct comparison, that is by showing a lack 
of officials or the inefficiency of its rules, he is merely 
concerned to show that the international structure might 
function perfectly well without a rule of recognition. In 
fact the nearest he comes to equating the two is in this 
manner:-
'The absence of these institutions means that the 
rules of states resemble that simple form of social 
structure consisting only of primary rules of obligation, 
which, when we find it among societies of individuals, 
we are accustomed to contrast with a developed legal 
system.' 7. :Jo 
Indeed, when Hart uses the word 'resemble' he is probably 
statin~ the case in as strong a fashion as possible. 
3. ibid. p. 209 
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There are undoubtedly facets where the two situations -
municipal and international - will not correspond at all. 
In a municipal situation Hart states that those items which 
the rules will first seek to control, are the use of force, 
and the infringement of rights over property. Undoubtedly 
the same c<m.not be expected of the rules of international law. 
Indeed, the use of force is probably one of the most ill-
regulated aspects of international law. 4o 
There are, hov.1ev2r, two aspects of Hart's model that it 
appears must be translated in some de8ree onto an international 
level. The first of these is the necessity for some kind of 
official. This is because officials see!TI a very necessary 
adjunct to the existence of secondary rules. This does not 
automatically mean that international law must posses.s some 
form of government since it is onlyata..municipal lavJ level that 
the term' official' has b~:come synonymous with ~overnme nt. ltJha t 
it does !nean is that there must be some class of persons (sjnce 
these are the representative voiJces of states) \.fuose authority 
is such that they as a group may be responsible for the 
formation of secondary rules. The states of which they are 
officials must then obey the rules which are valid according 
to the criteria accente~ by th~~officials. 
. As for the auali ties or rather the flaws said by Hart to be 
displayed by a society based on a set of rules, these too 
may be expected to be reproduced in some shape or form. This 
is so sine e the flav.Is are not inherent within the particular 
society, that is, they do not arise out of t_he very nature of 
4. For example the lack of clarity th~t surrounds the use of 
force by a State in self-defence (art. 51 of the Cha:rter of 
the United Nations) ; the seeminp: lack of rules anplicable 
in cases of civil war. A good discussion of the whole 
problem is contained in Chapter XVI -D.\~. Greig 
Internati6nal Law (1970)_: 
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human beings. A set of rules produces uncertainty basically 
because there are no officials to say what shall be adjudged 
as a rule. The differinr character of states and individuals 
may well effect the \vay the officials are organised, but it does 
not seem to alter the fact that without officials of some 
description, the set of rules will produce a condition of 
uncertainty, etc., within that particular society. Therefore, 
it appears perfectly feasible to investigate vihethe r 
irt ernational society dj_splays thqse weaknesses that Hart 
attributes to a society ~overned by a set of primary rules 
of obligation. Such an investigation will be on two levels:-
(l) an exploration into whether international society is 
plagued by uncertainty, inefficiency and a static 
nature arising from the existence of a set of rules; 
(2) an inquiry into whether international society 
possesses officials of any nat·ure, since the ou~stion 
may be posed whether officials and a set of rules of 
international law are compatible. 
-It seems at first-glance th~t international lnw is the epitome 
of a set of rules characterised by the above-mentioned 
Heaknesses. Since there is no international legj_slature, 
rules tend to be accepted within the framev . ro rk of international 
law in a random fashion so that at some junctures it is 
impossible to determine what the law is Hithin a :particular 
sphere. This is particularly true of those sensitive areas 
of international beha~iour - such ~s the law of the sea - where 
special interests of states are affected. 5o All this seems 
calculated to win international lm,I the description of being 
uncertain. 
5. Note the reluctance of states to commit themselves to a 
hard and fast rule regardj_n~~ the extent: n-r t~"(r.i torial 
waters: e.g. Geneva ConYQ..rrhon c.m the Te.rnf-onc:L.I -Sea vJhere 
states failed to reach agreement on thiS ooint. · 
(Official Records Vols I- VII.) 
- 44-
• 
It \vill be recalled that the charactl!?~§stic of uncertainty rests 
on there beinr;r no means of determin:i;ng what is and is not a 
rule of that particular set of rules. Becoming a part of 
that set of rules is dependent upon acceptance. Thus, it is 
not possible to ask oneself what it is that makes a particular 
rule binding or valid, instead the rule will merely gain 
acceptance and function as such. 
Now it can be said that international law is uncertain since 
at times it is very difficult to make out what the rule is in 
relation to a particular situation. But whether international 
law is uncertain in the sense that it is difficult to say why 
a rule is binding or valid, is a proposition that is onen to 
arrtument. \vhen asked why a particul~.r rule of international 
law is valid or binding the usual reply is that that rule is 
a rule of customary international law. It could be said that 
any uncertainty that exists vii thin the intern::ttional community 
arises not from the lack of cri terio. for determininp: whether 
a rule is.indeed a rule of nublic international lav, but from 
the scope fo~ uncertainty that lies within that criterion, 
that is, custom. In the 'North Sea Continental Shelf ease', Go 
the court vias asked at.:one stas:;e to deteT'mine 1:Jhether what is 
commonly known as the 'eouidistance method' of measuring ~e 
extent of the continental shelf 1tras a rule of customary 
international law. 7. There Has no arr:ument in the court 
that if the equidistance method was a custom, it would be 
binding. 0 Uo 
6. I.C.J. Re~orts, 1969, ~.3. 
7. This is exnlained in Act 6 (ii) of the Convention on the 
Cont;nental Shelf acl.opted in GenPVB in 1958. 
8. See I.C.J. Repo~ts n.28. (JQ69). 
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• The elements to which the Court looked in order to 
establish whether or not a customary rule existed 
were:-
(i) sufficient practice by States over an 
adequate period of time: 
'Although the passae;e of only a short 
period of time is not necessarily ••. 
a bar to the formation of a new rule 
of customary international law •.• an 
indispensible requirement would be 
that within the period in question, . . . 
State practice, including that of States 
whose interests are specially affected, 
should have been both extensive and 
virtually uniform ..• ' 9o 
(ii) belief that the practice concerned is oblir:atory: 
'Not only must the acts concern~d amount 
to a settled practice, but they must also 
be such, or be carried out in such a way, 
as to be evidence of a belief that this 
practice is rendered oblie;atory by the 
existence of a rule of law requiring it'· lOo 
On application of these tests, the Court decided that there 
\·Jas no rule of customary international lav1 in existence. 
9. ibid. p.43 
10. ibid. p.44 
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Therefore, if int.ernational law is said not to b.~tray 
uncertainty, then thj_f" is taPtnTJlOUT't to say~ :n,.,. th P.t 
international la~ is possessed of a rule of reco~nition 
framed in ter:rns of custom, a vronosition thnt Hart 
vigorously de~ies • A rule of recornition also seems to 
eliminate the :oossibility of there be~nr: a set of rules. 
This ouestion of uncertajnty raises two separate issues. 
If there is a set of rules then there should be some 
indication of the uncertainty which is a nece~sary 
characteristic of a set of rules. Since this appears to 
be in doubt then 2. second. issue arises - \'.Thich vlill be 
examined at a later sta~e - as to whether international law 
is a system and not a set of rules, possessinp; a rule of 
recognition. 
The second weakness that is characteristic of a set of rules 
is their static nature. Facilities are lacking whereby a 
rule which has outgrown its usefulness may be eliminated and 
a more suitable rule introduced. Once a~ain this seems to 
be characteristic of international law where there exists no 
central agency to control the introduction and elimination of 
rules- of international law. Instead, the situation j_s much 
less well defined, the process a lot more gradual. Brierly 
introduced his treatment of international vJaters end territorial 
seas in a fashion which reflects this situation: 'The law 
governing the delineation of these areas has been in course 
of formation during the past three centuries •••• 11. 
11. Brierly, 'The Law of Nations', p. 194. 
See also D'Amato 'The Concept of Custom in 
International Law' ~here the whole process of 
formulation and change in custom is discussed. 
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Though international law does have this aspect whereby 
~~y changes in the rules may only be achieved very gradually, 
it is a problem that is being increasingly alleviated by 
the use of international conferences and international 
orr;an isations. Nev1 situations that call for new or 
modified rules of international law are being met as they 
arise, and indeed even anticipated. During the nineteen 
sixties the exploitation of outer space was pionered by both 
the Americans end the Russians. There vias in the l ie:h t of 
this advance an immediate response on the part of the 
United Nations which initiated a committee to formulate 
rules governing the use of outer space. 12o The end result 
\ 1/aS a number of resolutions and multilateral treaties 
designed to regulate the behaviour of states. 13o Now, 
if international law is to be described as static, one would 
not anticipate that there vrould be a deliberate and co-ordinated 
attempt on the part of the majority of states to provide rules 
for a situation which actively involved - and this was likely 
to be the situation for a great number of years - only a mere 
handful of the international community as a vJhole. 
Nor is this an isolated instance of an international 
organisation takin~ the initiatave. The United Nations has 
been the instigator of restatements of the law in other 
spheres. 
12. General Assembly Committee on the Peaceful Uses of 
outer Space set up in 1958 by Resolution 1348 (XIII). 
13. These include Resolution 1962 (XVIII): Declaration of 
Legal Pri .~,ciple s Governing the activities of states in 
the exploration and use of outer space; the Outer Space 
Treaty, 1966. 
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I . 
I" 
The United Nations Declaration and Covenants on Human 
Rights 1 L!. 
-' 0 have been another venture where the aim has 
" 
been to achieve a statement of those fundamental rights and 
freedoms of the individual - instead of allowinp; them to 
develop piecemeal as would see~ to be more loBical if 
international society vJas infected by that static quality 
that is said to be part and parcel of a set of rules. Yet 
international law does seem able to produce rules to meet 
a snecific need. 
The international conference is another weapon VJhereby any 
tendency on the part of rules of international law to stagnate 
may be rectified. One of the most \·Jell knovm of these 
conferences was the nineteen fifty e~ht Geneva Conference on 
the!-Law of the Sea, 15o when four conventions were adopted 
on:- (I) teritorial \vaters, 
(II) high seas, 
(III) fishine;, 
(IV) continental shelf, 
Eighty-five nations attended this conference and the four 
conventions were the result of their deliberations. The 
Convention on the High Seas was said in its preamble to be 
'generally declaratory of established principles of 
international law'. The other three conventions may be 
regarded as indicating ~hat the law is, regard bein~ paid 
to the number of ratifications each has received. Nor is the 
international conference an isolated gesture that occurs once 
in a lifetime. Already pJans are under1·my for another 
international conference on the lavJ of the sea to take place 
in 1974, in .Caracas .. 
14e ,U,N. Doc. A/811, Dec. 16, 1948. For the text of the 
~Covenants, see 61 P ..J J. I .• L. p 861 et sea. ( 1967). 
15. U.N. Conference on the La\•/ of the Sea, Geneva, February, 
24th - April, 27th 1958, Official Recorc"'.s, Vols. I-VIIj_ 
U.N. Doc A/Conf. 13/37.-43. See also 52 AJIL & pps.834-~61(1958 
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Other matters have been dealt with through the medium of the 
international conference. In 1961 an international 
conference held at Vienna adopted a convention on Diplomatic 
Relations, 16. Whilst in 1963 a meeting of states was held 
at Tokyo to formulate the terms of a convention on 'Offences 
and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft'. 17. 
November, 1972 smv the conclusion of a 'Convention on the 
Dumping of \vastes at Sea' - designed to 'promote the 
effective control of all sources of Dollution of the marine 
environment', 13. ~hilst in 1969 an international conference 
was held under the aeg;is of the Inter~Governmental Maritime 
Consultative Organisation 'to consider the adoption of a 
convention or conventions on questions relating to marine 
pollution damage.' The result i·Jas an 'International Convention 
relatin~ to intervention on the High Seas in cases of Oil 
Pollution Casualties'. 19o 
Thoup;h it is T)Ossib le to Jjst these international conf.erences 
and thus illustrate that the international community is far 
from static in its outlook, a word should be said about the 
rules so introduced into the community. Any new law i·Jr ich is 
promulsated by Parliament is bindin~ on the co·""muni ty once it 
has passed th~ough its various stageso The international 
conference e.ncl its end product, the convention, may not in 
every circumstance ;be binding on the community of states as a 
whole. 
16. U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 20/13 April 16th, 1961; 55 AJIL 
p 1064 et seq. (1961) 
17. ICAO Doc. No. 8364 (1963); 58 AJIL p566 et se~. (1964) 
18. 11. ILM 1294 (1972), 67 AJIL. 626 et seq (1973) 
19. 64 AJIL p 471 et seq. (1970). 
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Thus, if we take as an examnle the four Geneva Conventions 
en the Law of the Sea, it will be recalled th~t the 
·convention on the Hi~h Seas ~as described as ·~enorally 
declaratory of established yriY'cinles of international lav.r' 
and thus mic;ht be said to be bindinp:: since it reflects 
custo~ary international law. As for the other three 
conventions, though they might reflect what the majority of 
states think is or should be the law, they are initially 
only binding on the states w~chratify them. It is only 
when they can be said to be reppesentative of customary 
l:f>. 
international law wrff those rules binding on all states. 
Thus, new rules are capable of being introduced, but the 
extent to \vbich they bind the community as a \·Jhole may vary. 
However, a degree of flexibility is present and to such 
extent as to render the description of the international 
community as static an extremely dubious proposition. 
The fact that the means of introducing change into 
international law are not on a par with that of municipal 
law may, it seems, be explained. The particular character 
of international law allowing as it does states a great freedom 
of action could not, it seems, tolerate a legislature. 
Therefore, the most convenient means of altering the law is 
thereby ruled out for use ~n the international community. Thus, 
though various states may co-ordinate their efforts to 
change the lavJ and may as a result become bound, there is 
always likely to be some state outside the ambit of this 
process v1hich will become bound, if at all, only by the 
operation of ext~rnal forces such as custom. 
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The final characteristic vJeakness of a set of rules is said to 
be the inefficiency that is rife \oJithin such a structure. 
This inefficiency is the result of a lack of a means 1r1hereby 
the breach of a rule may be authoritatively determined. 
Again this seems very true of intern:-·t ional law. There are 
constant vJranfjles between states as to "~:Jhether or not a 
state has contravened a rule of public international law. 
Bu~, it may be claimed that this charge can be rebutted 
simply by namin~ certain judicial bodies that do exist within 
international society. These include:-
(I) 
(II) 
(III) 
(IV) 
International Court of Jtilltice 
Permanent Court of Arbitration 
The European Court of Human Rights 
Court of Justice of the European Communities 
rn addition, treaties and international a~reements may make 
provision for other ad hoc tribunals to be instituted.' in the 
event of a disagreement or else for dn o.Tb,trc,·tor· to be appointed. 20 o 
Therefore, it is possible to produce evidence of judicial 
activity taking place viithin the international community, and 
yet still have a situation \.vhere states haggle over who is and 
who is not the law breaker. This is because there is no 
obligation on a state to submit its disputes to be determined 
judicially. A state may bind itself, for example, under the 
'optional clause' of the International Court of Justice, to 
accept some form of compulsory jurisdiction, but that is a 
decision for the state itself to take. If states do decline 
to accent any judicial solution of a dispute, then this 
condition of uncertainty does indeed result. 21o 
20. An example of this is a treaty concluded betvJeen 
Switzerland and the United Kingdom providing for peaceful 
settlement of disputes. Here there are provision~ for 
setting up an arbitral tribunal. see 4"I.L.M. p.949 (1965) 
21. e.g. Iceland in UK/FGR v Iceland. ICJ Reports p.l2(1972), 
where Iceland did not enter an appearance. 
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Having discussed the weaknesses w~ich appear to be inherent 
in a set of rules, it has become clear that international 
law possesses those weaknesses only insofar as ~s structure 
dictates that this should be so. The ver,v way the rules are 
ascertained within the system gives the law its air of 
inefficiency. Whilst the fact that it is not made 
obligatory on states to utilise the various judicial organs 
that exist, gives international law its air of uncertainty. 
But there is another matter to consider in deciding whether 
the rules of international law correspond to those of a simple 
social structure. This is the problem of whether a class of 
officials exists within the international community. It seems 
clear at the outset of any such inquiry that there is an 
organised band of officials that exist within most municipal 
systems whose co-ordinated behaviour maJ7 bri np; into being 
secondar~y- rules. No1·1 officials as they exist ;,ri_ thin a 
municipal law system are usually the judges and those \vho 
legislate. ~hether the description may be extended beyond 
these froups, Hart does not make clear; thou~h it is to be 
expected that such officials will be limited in number, Judges 
must apply agreed standards v1hen they administer the law as 
must legislators 1vhen they enact the same. As Hart states ••• 
'Its rules of reco~nition specifying the criteria 
of legal validity and its rules of change and 
adjudication must be effectively accepted as 
common public standards of official behaviour by· 
its officials.' 22o 
22. Concept of Law p. 113 
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But we are not concerned at this stage vJhether there is 
• this reguisj_te common acceptance - on an international level -
which in any event may be a hard thin~ to prove. Instead, we 
shall be content to investigate whether there are any 
international 6fficials at all, since the nresence of officials 
seems incompatible vr.i. th the existence of a simple social 
structure:- 'In the simple structure, since there are no 
officials ••• 1 23o Their existence mirht go some way to 
showing that international law is not a set of rules. 
Undoubtedly, international lavJ is not so uncoordinated that 
there are no individuals placed in positions of particular 
authority. Its courts each have their comnlemnt of judges 
whose task it is to c•p,.)ly ·t-ioQ llaw between states v1hen 
such a need arises. 
When necessary representatives are available to ne~otiate 
some change in the law or else to participate in the day to day 
running of international organisations such as the United 
Nations or any of the specialised agencies; tasks that 
seeminf,ly have the aura of officialdom. Eve~y state possesses 
a body of men - statesmen and lawyers -who are concerned with 
achievinf; the smooth running of inte~national law, in much 
the same way as municipal law officials. They are the 
negotiators when disputes arise, the representatives at 
international conferences. 
23. ibid. p. 114. 
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So, althou~h it is impossible to oofine 'an official' 
• there are undoubtedly certain connotations suroundinp; r --
the 1:1ord. These include the holding of some public 
office or position above the rank of the orili_nary citizen. 
If this is the idea in Hart's mind when he refers to 
officials of the system, then his suggestion that 
international lavJ possesses no such individuals seems 
hard to understand. There are individuals who hold offices 
in relation to international law and are responsible for its 
administration To them, it appears proper to give the title 
of officials of the system. 24. 
24. See Jessup, 'The Reality of International Law' 
118 Foreign Affairs (1940). 
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C H A P T E R V 
\iJhat folloHs is an examination of international society, 
aimed at deducinr whether or not the presence of secondary 
rules may be discerned. The need for such an investi~ation 
stems from the nrevious chapter where an attempt was made to 
see hm·J closely international society is on a par 1:1i t-,~ the 
simple social structure. The gaps in sucl:l an arr;ur.1ent were 
apparent. Yet it is felt that t~is is not sufficient to 
disprove Hart's characterisation of international law as a 
set of ru le s. If it may be s~own that not only ~oes 
international society lack the ChCJi'-lt-tQ,-tshc::. of a simple social 
structure, but in fact possesses the characteristics of a 
more sophisti_cated soci;'l .S'fSt"t)m , i. c. secondary rules, then 
it appears r:;rave doubts nust -:':lrtS\2.... re'"':ardinrr. the accuracy of 
. 
what Hart has to say "a pro]!os" international law. 
Therefore \·Je uill proceed with the task in hand, by ouot:i nr: 
Hart's de scription of that ;::roup of secondary ru 1 es, knovm as 
the rules of change. 
'The s~nplest form of such a rule is that which 
emnowers an individual or body of persons to 
int roc'1uce ne\·J ~rimar;r rules for the conduct of 
the life of the ~roup, or of so~e class within 
it, and to eliminate old rules •••••·•' 1o 
Such rulns of chan~e may be very simple or very com~lex; the 
pm·!ers conferred may be unrestricted or limited ir various 
vmys: and the rules may, besides sr1ecifyin~ the nersons who 
are to ler-j sle.te, define in n1ore or Jess ri.n-id terfl1.s, the 
nrocedure to be followed in legislation. 
---~-------- ----·. 
1. Concent of La':J :!!· 9?. 
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Included amon~ this category of seconc_ar;'" J:'1'les are 
:9ri vate law rules of co:ntract pncJ property 'l'Jh :i ch are 
considerecl by Hart "P.s a:n exercise of limited lPn::i slative 
nowers b~r j ndi vidual s" • 2. 
The rules of chanr-;e, it 1:Jill be reca.lled, are intendecl to 
rid the simple social structure of that static ouality ~,ich 
tends to be rife in a s:i.tuation where there is no a~ency 
emp·o,:Ierecl to jntroduce ne1:1 rules into the system. In rn.micina.l 
Jr=ni so ciet le s, the bo cl:v ,.rh ich most c·oJTlJTl.only fulfils tl1j s · t;u-:1r 
i_s R J.errislatv.re. So, {!1 EnrrlBncl., :it is the t1.•JO Honp.r--s of 
and l'non~-c.h 
PR:rl jarnpniJ '-Ih i.ch CFlT"ry out t~-.; s role. Theref'o:rP. ,._,r, 'ilust 
direct our efforts to~ards Jocatin~ the existence of a 
si rnilar ':i.nsti tution' in i.rte:t:>national society. The 
likelihood of this functi_on bejnp the ~rerorative of a sinrrle 
state ••• as .could be the case witb an individual seems to 
be hi~bly improbable, so much so that it may be ruled out. 
So the search will be for a body of states, ernnowe~ed to 
introduce new rules of international law. 
A promisin~ sphere of investi~ation annears to be that of 
multi-lateral treeties which also ~o under the title of 
'international le~islation'. This title is reserved for a 
narticular r;roup of treaties; those to v1hich a 13reat many 
states are party. Hudson, in a series compiled by him under 
the title 'International Lec;islation' \·Jh ich :L.s devoted to the 
study of such treaties, believed th~ term to be harmless enough. 
'The term 11 inte:t:>national ler;isla.tion" seems to describe, 
more accurately than any other, the contributions of 
international conferences at which states enact a law 
\vhich is to p,ovcrn their relations'. 3. 
2. ibid. p. 94. 
3. M.O. Hudson 'International Legislation ' 1 Volu1-rn.. \ 1 l<i!G - \~.2-1 1 
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So it appears that that increasingly common product of the 
international conference, the multi-partite agreement, may 
v·rell hold the key to the rules of change. Other writers 
are m·mre of the sir;nificance of such treaties. Starke calls 
them 11 law-makinr: treaties' and qualifies the use of this term 
by his insistence that a law making treaty must 'be adopted 
by almost all the r;reat states of the vJorld'. 4o 
In order to judge how successfully multi-lateral treaties 
might fulfil the reauirements of the rules of change, it is 
our intention to examine some examples. In 1958 the United 
Nations sponsored conference on the law of the sea was 
attended by 85 nations, the outcoE1e of vJb ich was four 
conventions, each concerned with a specific area of the law 
of the sea; 
(I) Territorial S:ea and Contir,uous Zone 1 
(II) High Seas" 
(III) Fishing and conservation of the Livjn~ Resources 
of the High Seas, 
(IV) Continental Shelf~ 
The rules in these particular conventions were intended 
to bring the rules relatin~ to the law of the sea into line 
with ··modern conditions. Those states wtJ,ch .-eh ~\.Q(l the various 
conventions were considered bound. For many this meant the 
acceptance of new obli~ations and an appropriate amendment 
of their municipal legislation. Thus the T>reamble o.:f the 
1964 United Kingdom Continental Shelf Act states its purpose 
to be·, •••. 
'to enable effect to be given to certain urovisions of 
the Convention on the Higb Seas done in ~eneva on 
29th April, 1958; ' 5. 
4. Starke 'Studies in International Law' p.S~ 
5 • 1964 c h. 2 9 • 
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Yet there are problems attached to associating international 
conferences and their end-product, the multi-lateral treaty, 
vii th the rules of change. It was established by Hart that 
the rules of change should be associated with a body, in 
this instance a body of states. Though it is admitted that 
international conferences do have a profound effect on the 
law, yet vJe are faced with the basic dilemma that the body 
of states which produces a multi-lateral convention on the law 
of the sea may well not be that same body of states which 
produces a multi-lateral convention on the use of outer space. 
The membership of international conferences does not remain 
constant. Undoubtedly there will be a hard core of states, 
such as the United States o.nd the U.S.S.R. 1 who 1fJill 
invariably be represented. But beyond this core, smaller 
states may or may not take part, as their interests dictate. 
Thus, though it a:,pears that a state which participates in an 
international conference may .well incur fresh obligations, the 
way in which such new rules are introduced does contrast sharply 
with municipal systems, so much so that it leads us to 
question whether or not true rules of change are in operation. 
The rules of change are concerned with a body empowered to 
in.troduce nevi primary rules. On an international level the 
body responsible for introducinc:; such chan~es in the lat-J as 
there are, uill not be perr1anent. It will be subject to 
constant changes. Contrast with this a municipal law 
legislature v1here the body or institution is permanent, only 
its membership will fluctuate. 
- 59 -
• 
Another difficu~ty which must be faced is that law-making 
treaties are binding only on those states ~·Jho ae;ree to be 
bound. This prh:c iple vJhic h has ahmys held good in 
international law, is repeated in the Vienna Convention on 
the Law of Treaties. Article 34 provides:-
'A treaty does not create either obligations or 
rights for a third state without its consent'. 6. 
Yet in municipal law systems, the idea that a new primary 
rule might bind only those individuals v1ho so consented, 
would be viewed as completely unacceptable. But this is 
so on an international level. Even those states 
participating in an international conference will not be 
obligated unless they are parties to the treaty that results, 
'Whilst non-participants are totally unaffected in their future 
behaviouro 
It follows from this, therefore, that the multi-lateral treaty 
falls short of the ideal envisaged by Har~s rules of change in 
various ways. Indeed it has been sugF,ested that the 
placement of the multi-lateral treaty in the role of "law-
making" treaty or "international legislation" is a retrograde 
and a misleading step. Jennings has the followin~ 
observations to make on the subject~-
6. 
7. 
'The use of the sou· briouet "international legislation" 
·/ -
for multi-lateral treaties is an example of vnsh 
fulfilment that h2s been allowed to become almost 
scientifically respectable. This sea~ch for the 
statute substitute has tended to obscure the true 
nature of treaties themselves. ' 7. 
U.N. Doc A/CONF 39/27, May 23, 1969; 63 AJIL p.875 et seq J 
- (1969) 
Jennin~s 'Recent Developments in the International Law 
Commission' 13 I.C.L.Q. p 388, (1964). 
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Hart is also mmre of the liberality of this term 'international 
lep;islation'. He is of the opinion that only when such 
treaties are binding on all states, and not merely -pc1 r.o~ +cdhos:-. 
)-i-Q.2Yho;;~ could they in fact be described as legislative 
enactments. 8o 
This statement by Hart highlir;hts the difficulty posed by any 
attempt to isolate secondary rules in international lav..r. There 
is the constant effort to find parallels bet\·Jeen municipal 
and international law. We are aware that a legislature 
satisfies the reauj_si tes of the rules of change, yet the 
international community possesses no such definite institution. 
Instead, we are presented with a number of alternatives none 
of which is entirely satisfactory. The international 
conference/multi-lateral treaty is an example in point. 
We must ask ourselves whether the divergencies that exist 
I between Harts description of the rules of chanp.;e and the 
multi-lateral treaty may be adequately accounted for; or 
whether this is merely an exercise in drawing parallels that 
do not exist. Faced by the situation where international 
society appears to be populated by a series of 'ad hoc' 
legislative bodies, an explanation may be offered. 
consists in a denial of the necessity of any of those 
This 
characteristics commonly associated with le~islative bodies. 
8. 
9. 
'It is certainly not necessary that a legislative 
agency be permanent nor that it be endowed with 
general po\·Iers, nor that it uroceed in any particular 
manner nor that it have authority over states not 
represented nor that the res·ult of its efforts ,._lb. en 
agreement is reached become immediately executory'. So 
Conce:pt of Lmv 
Hudson op.cit. 
p.231 
Introduction p. XIV 
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Notice may also be taken of the fact that Har~s description 
of the rules of change does not make it imperative that such 
a body be permanent. So it might be maintained that the 
particular demands made by states precludes the existence of 
any such permanent bodies, since any such institution would 
be considered incompatible with the sovereignty of states. 
There is the additional point made by Hart that the powers 
conferred by the rules of change might well be restricted in 
some fashion. So we surmise that this may well be the case 
with the international conference/multi-lateral convention. 
The power to change the law is restricted to those states 
parties to international conferences whilst the law is 
changed only for the states v1hich are parties to the convention. 
So thouFh it is indeed possible to take Hart's description 
of the rules of change and to fit its nrovisions in vJitll the 
functions of international conferences, the accuracy of such 
a move is open to debate. But \vhat cannot be denied is that 
international conferences do undoubtedly meet the demand for 
change to satisfy nevJ circumstances tl:l...a t exists in 
internatj onal lmJ, even thour;h that introduction of new 
rules may hold p:ood merely for states narties to the 
convention. Moreover, the process that is instigated by 
the treaty may be taken a step further. If a sizable number 
of states confer and a~ree that the law on a particular topic 
is o o •••• o •• o • o a A o o ••• a o • o o •• o B o o o o o o o o o o o o • C .•• o a a o o o o •• D , this 
is likely to influence the behaviour of other sts.tes o Thus tl:l e 
multi-lateral treaty t'Jhich is bindi :no; for the narties to it, 
may become ~enerally bindinr:- if its :nrecepts are so widely 
adopted as to be transformed into custom. This is the view 
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taken b~ Pollock:-
'There is no d~ubt that when all or most of the 
r:reat pouers l:eve deJ :LJ)erately a· reed to certe.in 
rules of ~P.ne ral 2Tnlj cot~ on 1 
by t~e~ ~ave ve~y preat weipht in ~ractice even 
arnon~ stAtes t~ich heve neve~ exnre~sly consento~ 
to them. It is hardly too muc~ to say that 
Cl eclarati ons of this kine may be ex,r.cted ill the 
absence of n:ror1pt P:nd effectj ve Cl.is!='ent by some 
pmver of the fj :r:-st rank, to become nFlrt of the 
universally recei.veo law of nations ~thin a 
• 
:m.oderate time' • 10 • 
Moreover, the operation of such a p:rocess is confirmed by 
the \vri ter D ,' Amc>to \'11: o snea1~s of ~ t in the foll01:d nn: fnshion:-
' •..••• ~enerali~able nrovisions in bi-lateral and 
multi-lateral treaties rcmerate custom8.r:V rvlc;s of 
law binoin~ upon aJJ states' 11. 
So ':!e may remHrJ.::: on the fact that al thoup;h the mul ti-latera1 
treaty js desi~ned p~ marily to chan~e the obJiration 
incumbent upon the parties to that agreement there may be a 
consecn.J. entiaJ. effect, j n that the behaviour of rion-n8.rtie s 
mav subsequentially be altered throuQJ. the perrne;ation of 
those treaty rules into custor1arv j_nterna tional lavJ. What 
we have said concerning this process wiJJ suffice at this 
sta~e in our ar~ument, until it can be discussed in c;reater 
detail at some later-point. 
1---------------------~----------·- -·· ... ·------· -- ----- -
10. Pollock 'The Sources of Inte-rnational Law' 2 Col. L.R. 
pps. 511-512 (1902) 
11. Concept of Custom in International Law p. 104. 
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To conclude this enquiry into the existence or non-existence 
of rules of change in international law, the following 
comments are offered as giving an accurate assessment of the 
situation. That it is indeed possible to alter the rules 
of international law by a process of conscious effort, must, 
it is believed, be admitted. But whether that process 
accords with the description of the rules of change, is, it 
appears, a ma·tter of conjecture. True, the shortcomings 
of international law may be rationalised, but there may be 
a degree of artificiality in such a move. 
There is the additional complication in that what was intended 
originally to affect the conduct of a limited number of states, 
may well have repercussions on the international community 
as a whole. The explanation offered was in terms of. custom .• 
The significance of such behaviour in terms of tbe rules of 
change may be such that we are forced to regard the whole of 
international society as that body which is capable of 
introducing new primary rules of obligation. Nor is this to 
concede Hart's argument that international society is a simple 
social structure. Since to regard international society in .-
this fashion, would be to regard it as behaving in a co-
ordinated manner. Not every rule that is set out in a multi-
lateral treaty becomes a rule of customary international law. 
Instead there is a conscious decision on the part of states 
as to the rules which gain this degree of generality. But it 
is our intention to pursue this line of enquiry at a later stage. 
If, however, one c~ses to regard states as a whole as 
constituting the agency whereby new primary rules of obligation 
are set on foot, then it is possible to assign a different role 
to the multi-lateral treaty. As was remarked at the outset of 
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our discussion, also included among the rules of change are 
the rules of contract. It is therefore possible to view the 
multi-lateral convent-ion as a form of international law 
contract. Indeed to do so has long been ·the habit with 
some international law writers. Gihl in an article in 
Scandanavian Law Studies stresses the resemblance between 
contracts and conventions. 12o The multi-lateral treaty 
as an international law contract would thus be a means 
whereby a state might vary its obligations under general 
international law. But according to Hart's description of 
the secondary rules of change, multi-lateral treaties would 
still be encompassed by the rules of change • 
RULES OF ADJUDICATION 
It has been demonstrated how the society of states as a 
whole, in addition to sizeable groupings of states, might 
be regarded as the agency of Hart's rules of change. The 
rules of adjudication are the next characteristic group of 
secondary rules relating to Hart's model of a legal system 
to be considered. These rules, designed to remove the 
inefficiences that dre the bane of a less sophisticated 
society, are to be recognized from the following description: 
They empower 'individuals to make authoritative 
determinations of the question whether, on a 
particular occasion, a primary rule has been 
broken.' 13. Morevoer such rules 'define the 
procedure' to be utilised in such a context. However, 
it is not the aim of the rules to impose a duty to 
adjudicate, instead they confer judicial powers and 
give judicial declarations about the breach of an 
obligation an especial status. 
12. See Scandanavian Law Studies Vol. 1. p. 51 (1957) 
13. _Concept of Law p.94. 
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The operation of these secondary r1·1G s rna~· easily be discerned 
within a municipal le~al system. Their hallQark is a well-
ordered system of courts enjoyin~ a well-defined jurisdiction. 
The contrast with international law is immediate. He:re there 
is no hierarchy of courts dosie;ncd to win respect fo-: the law 
to the higtiest derree. Instead we are faced with a 
haphazard arrangement whereby there exist a numbe~ of 
tribunals \vhose tasks may vary dr2..matica.lly, thou7:h '-!-1-;Q_ -~~!!c.w';j 
loose categorizations may be .uSo..d 
(I) 
. (II) 
' (II!) 
permanent tri bun&ls among these we may 
number such cou::ts as the Intcrna-~ional Court 
of Justice .. 
regional tribunals . . . . • these incJ ud e the 
European Commission nne Court of Human Ri~hts, 
in addition to th~ Court of Justice of the 
European Communities. 
ad hoc tribunals o••••• these bodies are set up 
on various occasions so as to deal with either 
a specific breach of obligation i.e., the 
Nurmember~ Tribunal, or~alternativoly to deal 
with a particuiliar class of dispute l'l- o 
Although the contrast \·Ji th municipal lav1 is considerable, 
it still cannot be denied that those courts vJhich do serve 
international society are fulfillinr· the functions envisaged 
by the rules of adjudication. They or rather their 
oi'fici2.ls determine whether or not tb ere has been a breach 
of a primanr rule of oblip.;ation. 
-----------~------~ 
14. e.,.,..u;_rexico.!' Claims Commission 
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The constitutional document of the best known of these 
courts, the jrrternationt-~1 Court of Justice, rwke s this plain: 
Article 36(2) 
"The States parties to the present Statute may at 
any time declare that they recognize as compulsory 
ipso facto and without special ar--reer:1ent, in relation 
to any other State accentinrr· the same oblir.r:ation, the 
jurisdiction of the Court in all ler-al disputes 
concerning: 
a. the interpretation of a treaty; 
b. any question of international lavJ; 
c. the existence of any fact which, if established, 
would constitute a breach of an internationol 
oblip:ation; 
d. the nature or extent of the renaration to be 
made for the ·oreach of an international oblircation. 
Yet this extrr:.ct fro:. the Statute also hir;hlir;hts the over-
\vhelminr-: d,ffo_r-Q..nc.Q.. between the practice of municipal and 
international c·urts, the need for consent. Before an 
international court may become seized of a dispute, it must 
secure the consent of the states concerned to the exercise 
of its jurisdiction. ·Thus the nrovision of Article 36(1) of 
the International Court of Justice. 
'The jurjsdiction of the Court comprises all cases 
which the parties refer to it and all matters specially 
provided for in the Charter of the United Nations or 
in treaties or conventions in force'. 
But this is not to deny the fact that a snecies of compulsory 
jurisdiction does exj_st in internatjonal law, Once a state 
of. institutions 
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such as the Europeim Cov~t of Hur·:an :~:Ufl'hts, or t,c.s tnade n 
StahJ~~~ 
declaration under the o:oti:.nal clause: of theA Interno.tj_onal 
Cour.t of Justice., then this.signifies its intention to 
accent the jurisdiction of the court on future occasions 
without the need for any additional consent on its behalf.l5o 
But no state can be forced to conclude such an a~reement. 
The need for consent freely riven i.s paramount. 
To those familiar 1vi th the municipal lm·T systel!l. of 
adjudication, this stress on the importance of consent may 
appear a retrograde factor. Yet within a state the 
predominance of centralised r:overnment over the individual 
ensures that breaches of the lavJ are brou13ht before the courts 
and punished. The nature of international law is such that 
there is no one central orr;o.nisation ·with the po\·Jer to do 
likewise on an international scale. Yet the concept of 
consent is by no means a stranger to municipal lavJ. In civil 
proceedinn; s cases are not automatically liti."';ated before the 
courts. Indeed,it is common for such cases to be settled out 
of court, at the discretion of the disnutants. r-toreover, it 
is common for a commercial a~reement between individuals to 
provide for the anpoint ment of an arbitrator, if any disnute 
should arise, with no initial recourse to the courts. 
Once the c;reater freedom allm·Jed to states in their deo.linr;s 
v1i th the courts is understood, then we may p;o on l·.d. th our 
consideration of the rules of adjudication. The whole matter 
rests on the paL"ticulBr nature of states Em.<'l their rcsj_stance 
to any move which mir·ht be construed as an infrinp;ement of 
15o Thou~h note that in the case of the International Court 
of Justice, a state may limit the Court's cornnulsory 
jurisdiction by means of reservations. 
For a case illustratin~ this noint see NorvJep.;ian Loans 
Case. ICJ Reports n.37 (1957). 
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the:i.r sovereio-nty. To this must be added t~e fact that no 
one state or j nsti tution :i.s stron,.,.. enoup;h to t2.!;;:e upon itself 
the nunisr'rent of so-called vvron'g!'doers. So OY' occasions 
breaches of international law mav well p:o unnunished as a 
conseouence. But once tre truth of snc~ remarlrs :is accented, 
then the rules of adjudication are seen to ouerate unimneded 
o~ those occasions uhen states a:re suscentible to their 
:nrovisions .... 
The ccurts can and do make dete-rminations on 1r1bether a 
primar:r rule of obl jr.ation has been breached. There do 
exist fairl:r comulex ?)-rocedural rvles l·Ih ich clictate the 
or~anisntional as~ects of such an ad~udicBtion. Thus 
Articles ;::> to 34 of the Statute of the International Cou-r::-t of 
Justice conce:rn thernsel ves 1:1ith such matte-rs as the number of 
jud~es the.t mu .. st be ~)resent, and the method of their 
appointrr.e nt. Whj_ls t Articles 39 to 64 set out the le.nc;uac_:es 
to be employed by thB Court, the reuresentation allowed to 
contest2,nt states, and the scope of the final :iudr:,ement. 
The value of a juo:i_cial oec~sio!1. in international la1·1 :is S;:l;_c_ 
bv soJTie t0 be ve-rv marP":i.nal in v:i e1•1 of the lA.cl<: of F1 svs ter1 
' I ..- ~ 
of bindin~ nrecedent. But the self-smne situation 1-rill 
prevail in a civil la~ system. In addition this is not to 
im:9l~' th8 t a decision ~ s only of siP:;n ific;m ce t.o tn e nart:i e s 
d~rectly concerned. Article 59 of the StatutP of the 
InternRt:ional Cou.rt of Justice mip:ht seem to imply this is the 
ca.se: 
'The decision of the Court bas no bindjnp: force excent 
betueen the :!Jarties a.YI<'l iE resuect of that :!Jart:i.ct<l.ar 
case'o 
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But this does not prevent other states from regarding what 
the Court, and indeed every such tribunal, has to say as 
a valuable indication as to the development of the law. 
An example is the North Sea Continental Shelf cases 16. 
Where what the Court had to say regarding the customary law 
relating to the extent and the delimitation of the continental 
shelf was of significance for every coastal state and not 
merely the parties to the dispute. Nor is it the custom 
for any international law court to deviate indiscriminately 
from what it has said in the past. 
Therefore it appears that the following conclusions may be 
drawn concerning the possession by international society of 
secondary rules of· adjudication. Such rules do appear to 
exist. There are some inconsiste.ncies surrounding this 
proposition such as the ability of a state to elude the 
court's jurisdiction if it so desires. But even such 
behaviour on the part of a state does not prevent its 
condemnation by states as a whole if they believe it to be in 
breach of an obligation under international law. 
16. I.C.J. Reports p.4 (1969) 
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C II A P T E R VI 
The focal point of Hart's i·Jhole scheme of analysis is the 
rule of reco~nition. It is the function of this rule 
to indicate the criteria necessary to constitute a rule, 
a valid rule of law within a particular leral system, thus 
eliminRting the uncertainty that will otherwise prevail. 
To g11ote an example, 'dithin the Enr:l ish lcr;al system, 
enactment of a rule by Parliament is a source of valid rules 
of law and in conseauence an element of the rule of 
recorr·nition. lo This is boybne out by Ho.rt Is description 
of tho kin12;pin- of his model of hovJ a ler;al system l,·Jorks. It 
'i·lill specify some feature or features possession 
of which by a su~gestad Dule is taken as conclusive 
affirmative iPdicataon that it is a rule of the 
group to be supported by the social pressure it 
exerts. ' 2 o 
l"!O\"! Hart does not believe that a rule of recognition 
automatically exists wherever bindinG" rules of law exist. 
lndeed, a rule of recor-;ni tion is not a necessary condition for 
the existence of rules of obligation. Instead, it ranks as a 
'luxury, found in advanced social systems whose members not 
merely come to accept separate rules :r:d ecemeal, but are 
committed to tbe acceptance in advance of ~eneral classes 
of rule, marked out by generul criteria of validity~' 
~ --·- ··- --------------~ 
1. Other elements incllde judicial decisions and custom p. 98. 
2. Concent of Lm·J D • 92 • 
3. ibid n. 229. 
- 71 -
• 
Therefore, a society may exist \·Jhere there is no rule of 
roco~nition. This will be reflected in the runnin~; of 
its affairs in that there t\lill be no positive , 'a~r of 
determining whether a rule is indeed a rule of the system. 
[''loreover, VJhat rules there are 'dill constitute not a system 
but a set. This is because the rule of rcco~nition provides 
the vital element of cohesiveness that binds rules to[',"ethcr. 
A prii~e example of such fai linrs is, accordinc; to Hart, 
international lav1. Here, the 1 rulc:s v1hich are in fact 
operative, constitute not a system but a set of rules, among 
1·1hich are the rule.s providing for the bindincr force of 
treaties 1 • L~. 
At an earlier sta::e in our ar0;ument, we undertook a survey 
of international lav1 in ardor to try to discover whether 
it betrayed those characteristics Hllic~l aro sc.id to be a 
feature of a society lackin~ a rule of reco~nition. It \'JaS 
concluded that this \'!as not the case. Thus, the logical 
sten is novJ to ask ourselves \·Jhether the coy:trary is true 
and that Hart has been mistaken in his evaluation of 
international law. To do so wjll involve an enquiry as 
to the existence or otherwise of a rule of recornition. 
The difficul t:u of tryin0 to j_solate such a feature has 
been co ~mented upon earlier. Thour;h H2.rt stressecl, 
the im:oortance of p;aininr-; offj_cj_al al)proval for an emerr-ent 
rule of recor;nition, he did not indicate ho\V it vms nossible 
to distin~uish this from the acceptance of officials of a rule 
of customary international law. The t~o nrocesses apnear 
to be very closely related. So if officials en masse 
4. ibid. p.23l. 
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Nations, there appears nothing to identify thj_s either as 
an addition to the set of customary rules or a rule of 
recornition. 
Frobabl~! the easiest way of discovcrinp; vJhether or not 
international law has a rule of recorr:nition, is to focus 
on a p:=trticular aspect of the rule, v1hich is the following. 
The analysis of a legal system in terms of pr:i_mary and 
s~condary rules v1ill alHays produce a bo.sic norm vJhose content 
is directly related to the content of the other secondary 
rules. t~Je shalJ. tske Rs 8.n exa.mple the Ent:,l ish lP. ::r:al system o 
HRre tbe rulcn of chanrr;e are embodied in the enactment by 
Po.:r:lie.rncnt and Qv.een of le("'_;isle.tion, \·Jhj lst the rules of 
adjudic~tion Rre de~endent upon the judicial system. This 
in itE"> turn :is :rr:fl ected in the rule of recoe;nition. This 
states that amonr; the criteria for identifyin: vo.lic1 rules 
of lav are enactment by both Houses of Pa~liament as well 
as 2utho:rjtative statenent in n ju~icial decision. The same 
-rroccss 1·iill Jl:rc;;·-'11e.bly b0 reflectec. in i:ntc~n:t.tj_onf'l.l lm-1. 
Therefore we ~ill now nroceed to examinc the succestcd 
fo:r:rnnJe.tj_ons of the secondary ruJ.es of chsnre 2.nd adjudicc-.t:i on 
~n order to see whether they ~ive rrny in~jcation ns to the 
content of the :r:nle of recoc~nitiono It 1·.r:i.ll no doubt be 
rccnlled tliat ':/hat chane;e there vJe.s in interne.tional la1:1 \·Jas 
for the most r>a-rt ac1l:i.evPcl tl!mun_·h nul ti-lateral trer>.t :i_e s. 
No1.·!, so th2.t the rule o·t· recoo_-:rd tion may fulfil the objcct:i.ves 
set fo~ it, jt ~unt of :necessity 
0 0 0 0 0 specify some feature or features nossession of 
which by a su~Gestecl rule is taken as a conclusive 
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affirmative indication that it is a rule of the 
group to be supported by the social pressure it 
exerts'. 5. 
Such a feature in the present example vrould be the setting 
out of the potential rule in a multi-lateral treaty. Thus 
any rule contained in a multi-lateral treaty might be 
regarded as a binding rule of international law. 
Now it is apparent that it is not possible to assert that 
any rule originating in a multi-lateral treaty is a valid 
rule of law. Besides the difficulty of deciding what is 
and what is not a multi-lateral treaty, there is also 
evidence that the rules that such a treaty sets out are 
regarded as binding only on the parties to that treaty. 6o 
The very object that a rule of recognition sets out to 
achieve is thus defeated since there is no certainty as to 
what is and is not a valid rule of law. 
Several writers 7. have noted that the multi-lateral 
treaty is often used as a vehicle to introduce what is not 
already law into the.system. The effect of such a move may 
vary. Sometimes the only entities affected are the states-
parties to that particular treaty. However it may be that 
a rule first set out in a multi-lateral treaty will have 
repercussions on a much greater scale. That rule may 
become a binding rule of international law. This is on 
account of the adoption of that particular rule into the body 
5. ibid. p.92. 
6. article 34, Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
U.N. Doc A/CONF. 39/27, May 23rd 1969. 
7. See. Baxter - 'Multi-lateral treaties as evidence of 
customary international law' 41 B.Y.I.L. p.275(1965/66) 
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of customary international law. In consequence it has been 
said of treaties that their pattern 'rather than their 
substance influences the law much in the manner of a trade 
custom in municipal law.' 8. 
Basically, therefore, the authority of a treaty rests on 
custom. It is a rule of customary international law that 
states • • • pacta sunt servanda (treaties are binding), 
~hilst the propagation of a treaty rule is, if not already 
binding, dependent on custom. Treaties are a valuable 
sounding board for state opinion, as D'Amato has so recently 
pointed out. 9. Moreover they are probably most akin to 
contracts in the way they operate. They provide the 
opportunity whereby a state may escape ·the inadequacies of 
existing international law, whilst paving the way for what 
may well be a new rule of customary law. But what is plain, 
is that the multi-lateral treaty is totally unsuited to play 
any part with regard to the rule of recognition. 
The other possible guide to the formulation of a rule of 
recognition ~s the rule of adjudication. Here the criterion 
for a valid rule of law rests on its pronouncement by a court 
of law within the international community. Hart says the 
following of the rules of adjudication: 
'Indeed, a system which has rules of adjudication is 
necessarily also committed to a rule of recognition of 
an elementary and imperfect sort. This is so, because, 
if courts are empowered to make authoritative determi-
nations of the fact that a rule has been broken, these 
cannot avoid being taken as authoritative determinations 
of what the rules are.' 10. 
8. Parry 'Sources and Evidences of International Law', p.54 
9. D'Amato 'Concept of Custom in International Law' p.l03 et.seq. 
10. Concept of Law p.94. 
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Here we have a problem regarding this expression 
'authoritative determinations' since there is no overt 
system of precedent in international law. Instead 
J 
decisions of the courts usually take effect only between 
the parties to the dispute. Thus the determination is 
bi~di~ between the parties, but not immediately 
on any larger scale. Any increase in the sphere of a 
rule's effectiveness. is usually attributed to custom. 
It is undeniably true that there is a much greater 
significance to be attached to judicial decisions than 
a merely bi-lateral effect. Other states will invariably 
adjust their conduct so as to bear out what the court 
has said. llo \vhether this should qe accounted for in 
terms of custom, or whether there is some rudimentary rule 
of recognition which allows states to treat the courts 
pronouncements as indications of valid rules of law, is 
hard to tell. If the latter is indeed the case then though 
a rule of recognition may exist it will be extremely 
circumscribed in its effect, if one has regard to the very 
few occasions on which the processes of the courts are 
utilised. If the former is more accurate in its 
description, then this leads to the inescapable conclusion 
that it is only in terms of custom that a rule of recognition 
may be expressed. 
11. See the Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case I.C.J. 
Reports p.ll6 (1951). The substance of this judgement 
is repeated in article LJ- of the Geneva Convention on 
the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone 1958. 
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Such a proposition as the one a1Jove j_s empJ1aticolly rejected 
by Hart. Indeed he has this to say of a rule of recoe;nition 
expressed in terms of custom:-
'States should behave as they have G~omarily behaved.' 
' •... it says nothin[ more than that those ~ho accept 
certain rules must also observe a rule that the rules 
ou~ht to be observed. This is a mere re-duplication 
of the fs.ct that a set of rules are accerted by states 
as b indi n;o; rules ' . 1? 
-. 0 
ltJhat Hart seems to be saying is that wb en one has a set of 
rules, as he maintains is the case with international law, 
then there is no need for an· additional rule vJh ich asserts 
the necessity to abide by the other rules. Indeed jt does 
not a~pear possible to ar~ue with such logic. But Hart has 
always described the rule of reco~nition as indicatin~ what 
is and •Hhat is not a valid rule. The basic norm quoted by 
Hart was never intended to serve such a purpose. 13. 
So ~e are forced to conclude that Hart has dismissed the 
need for a. rule of recor:·nition/basic norm v-ii thout cons j_derinp; 
vJhether or not a formulation in the terms of his description 
is a feasible proposition. As we have seen the only possible 
basis for such a formulation must be custom. This viould 
become the criterion of legal validity. Acceptance as a 
custom within the international law involves t\vO processes, 
according to orthodox scholarship: 
(i) practice over a period of time by the 
e;enerality of stntes. 
12. Concept of Law P.230 
13. It e;i ves no indication of the criteria v1h~.ch mark out 
a valj_d rule of la1t1. 
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( ii) opinio jl1ri s ~':J:actice b~7 states in t"h e 
belief that whot thc~r do is n~n:l.ll(l~(l by the len·!. lL~. 
f'lore recent research, narticularly tllat of D 'Amato has 
su~ccsted that the vital in~redients of custom may be more 
accurately described as:-
(i) articulation - which is the notice that a 
particular act ~ill have le~al implications 
(ii) action - which makes concrete what has prevjously 
been articulated. 15. 
Hot·!2Vel~ custom is analysed, there rema~ ns the are;unent that 
it is a lone-drawn out and imprecise process lacking the 
certainty thnt is a feature of municipal law. A notenti.al 
rule of lav that embarks on the uncertain journey of customary 
law formation may emerge only after a co~siderable period of 
tjne as a valid rule of law, c:ncl then r"Jerhil]'S not 1-r..L tb coml)lete 
certainty. Yet t~e sa~e is true, althou~h to a lesser ~ecree 
of a mu~icipal le~al system. If we tak~ as an exa~ule one 
of the cornponen.ts of the Er@.isb rule of recoe;nition i.e. 
en2ctrn0nt b~r bot!t Houses of Parlia;YJent, then t.'e "'ri 11 see that 
jt is not possible to sa•r the.t e. :!!Oten.ti'3l ru.le of lC!.\·I \•Ihich 
eMhar~s on the Parlia~entary ~rocess ~jll inevitably emc~~e 
as a valid r11. l e. It may suffer ~efeat i~ a divisj_on in either 
House; it may be deferred throuGh lack of time. Moreover, 
po.ssa~e throue;h Parliament mP..y be an extreme l~r tim e-consnJTJ~_n['; 
bu. sine ss. rrhe rule o:f.' rr:>co:>:ni t~ 011. rnr~ely enC~.hle s :it to be 
s~1 id of R rule that emere;e s success fully at the en c1 of tl• e 
---------------
14. See Hudson on Customary International Law 
U.N. Doc. A/CN. 4/l~ (3 Ma~ch, 1950) 5. 
D'Amato op.cit. n. 73 et.seo. 
of the Theory of Custom'. 
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Parliamentc:u:y process that j t rna'' be rer;arcled. as a valid 
rule of l_avr. In like fashion, it see~s to be nossible to 
maintain that custom is akin to the Parliament2ry ordeal 
from \•rrdcl• a valirl rule l!la:• eventuc.lly emerge. 
Custom may on occasions be an 8Xtremel '' unsatisfactory 
asency whereby to introduce ne\'I rules of internationc.l lrn·J. 
In this context, the lone debates surroundinc the law of the 
sea a~e a nrjme example. Yet international l<=nv is never 
so imprecise and unco-ordinated. as Hart seeJ.~s to make out. 
The idea that HR-r:>t seeks to foster that rules are absorbed 
into the internAtional system merely on the basis of 
accentance by tbo international co~munity en masse, is based 
on ~is charncte~isation of t~e society of states rrs a simple 
social structure. Yet the ~rocesn of law-formation is 
nothinc like as 'prtnitive' as Hart ~ould have us believe. 
States a.,..,e \·Jell av~a~e of the renercussions their ;-lchaviour 
may produce. rrhey are fu ~-lY co2:n i z. a nt of the fact that 
custom j_s the objectj_ve stc:mrb·~(! v;:;cd th-couzhout the 
internRtiona] co~~unity in order to Clctermine the ~xistence 
of a rule of latl. Acceptance of a rule is not sufficient; 
jnsteRd states consciously direct tbeir co~duct towar~ 
securinP the esteblishment of a particular norm, .?.no its 
mai~tenRnce once establisbeo. Thus,the State DepartMent 
of the United States refused to countenance the uncompensated 
appropriation of Cuban propert:" j_n America si nee th:i s '1d~ht 
h<=lvc been constrw.:::d. as a departure from traditional roli_cy 
\·!hich Cler'lands 'prompt; aclequc>te 2nd effective co:nr;cns2tion'.l6o 
16. For n Sumrnarv of this view sBe l~tter of State 
Department t~ House Committee on Foreicn Affairs 
14--I.L.~'J. Dol038 (1965)o 
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Therefore it appears that Hart's thesis, based on its 
chs.racte:risation of internation.ql lat··i as a set of rules, 
is not supported by practical observation. Not only are 
states capable of clirectinr: the 3:roNth of :international la\•J, 
but they also use custom as an ovel:'all test of legal validity. 
It is not sufficient that states 8.Ccept a certajn articulation 
of a lepal rule as Hart su~pests is the case. Nor does Hart~ 
explain tbose instances that occur j_n j_nternational lc.H 
vhere a state will be judf£d to be bound vit~out the least 
shov.J of acceptc:mce on its :9art; particulPrl~r 1'rhere r::eneral 
rrinc :i.:r:le s of J.aH are concerned. Thus j t a.ppe;=q-:·s undeniably 
true that there is a rule of recognition in interna_ti anal lm'l, 
whose content js based on custom and to a lesser degree, 
judicial decisions. Nor j_,s this an j solated observation. 
D'Amato, in his evaluation of the concept of custom nlaces 
it in a simjlar ~ole. 
'We must bear in mind that custom is indeed a 
sccondal:'Y rule of law-formation. It can account, 
in Hart's uord s Cluoted previousl:r, for the intro<luc tion, 
ascertainment, VP:rin.tion, or eliTJ1:i nation of ;?rimary 
rv.les.' 17. 
I1oreover he also observes thRt ~eneral pr:i_ncirlcs El.nd judicial 
decisions have 2 :ncu:t to play in constn_,cti.n:=- tbe rule of 
reco,r::;ni tion s :i_nco the~r mny to a very limited dec;ree 
inciica te \·.rhe.t is and is not a. valid rule of laH. 
17. D'Amato op.cit. p.44 
- 80 -
• 
C H A P T E R VII 
Having discussed the feasibility of custom constituting 
the content of the rule of recognition, it is our intention 
to consider the part of one other candidate. If it could 
be shown that those pronouncements that emanate from the 
United Nations are in fact immediately binding upon States, 
then there would exist an unimpeachable content for a rule 
of recognition lo resolutions of the General Assembly. 
Before embarking on a consideration of the possible form 
such a rule of recognition might take, it must first be 
decided whether any case may be made out as regards the 
legislative potential - limited or otherwise - of the 
United Nations. At first sight the prospects in this 
connection seem far from promising especially in view of 
those talks which preceded the esta~lishment of the United 
Nations. For among the many proposals received was o~ by 
the Philippines to this effect:-
'The General Assembly should be vested with the 
legislative authority to enact rules of 
international law which should become effective 
and binding upon the members of the organisation 
after such rules have been approved by a majority 
vote of the Security Council. Should the Security 
Council fail to act on any of such rules within a 
period of 30 (thirty) days after submission thereof 
to the Security Council, the same should become 
effective and binding as if approved by the Security 
Council'. 2o 
l. D'Amato op.cit. Suggests at p.44 that General Assembly 
resolutions may well be acquiring the status of 
secondary rules. 
2. 9 UNCIO Docs. 316 (1945) 
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This proposal was rejected by twenty-six votes to one • 
Yet any belief that this must put an end to speculation 
as regards the potential legislative force of United Nations 
resolutions is not well-founded. Indeed over the years 
since the inception of the United Nations, discussion in 
relation to the status and effect of United Nations 
resolutions has increased, until it has become possible to 
discern three main bodies of opinion as reg~rds their working. 
These are the following:-
1. General Assembly resolutions are valuable 
items of evidence in the development of a rule 
of customary international law • 
2. Certain resolutions of the General Assembly are 
binding - a variety of reasons which vary from 
resolution to resolution conspire to make this so. 
3. Certain resolutions of the General Assembly are 
binding - there is a factor (consensus) wh~h is 
common to certain resolutions and makes them binding. 
Thus such binding resolutions are a new source of 
international law. 
We will now consider these views in greater detail, noting 
the support that each of them has attracted. The view which 
accords United Nations resolutions an evidentiary role is 
fairly widely supported. Professor Johnson in an article 
entitled 'The Effect of Resolutions of the United Nations' 3o 
is a typical exponent. Resolutions, in his opinion, have 
a purely marginal role to play in the shaping of international 
law. 
3. 32 B.Y.I.L. p.97 (1955/56) 
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Such resolutions are in no sense t~ be regarded as a 'source' 
of law. Instead, they are proof of the content of law whose 
'source' rests on a totally different· basis. 
'In our view, while it would be true to describe 
resolutions of the General Assembly as a 'subsidiary' 
means for the determination of rules of law' within 
the meaning of article 38(l)(d) of the Statute of the 
International Court of Justice, it would be wrong 
to ascribe to them a higher status than that or to 
imply that they are in themselves sources of 
international law'. 4. 
By far the leading exponent of according evidentiary status 
to:: General Assembly resolutions is Rosalyn Higgins. She 
has demonstrated very ably how the process of discussion of 
various issues among states and the passage of resolutions in 
the General Assembly may help to formulate a practice that 
may emerge as a rule of customary international law. 5. 
Indeed, there is no denying the fact that when the majority 
of states meet and give their opinions on a particular matter 
in addition to formulating a resolution on the topic - this 
appears to be very pertinent evidence as t9 what exactly the 
law is or will be in the near future. This will be so even 
though no so-called legislative power is vested in the 
particular body. 
Thus Rosalyn Higgins says of United Nations resolutions ~hich 
concern us, as opposed to the evidentiary value ~ttached to 
a states speeches, voting etc •.•• 
the Assembly certainly has no right to legislate 
in the commonly understood sense of the term. 
4. ibid. p.ll6 
5. Higgins 'Development of International Law through the 
Political organs of the United Nations' Introduction. 
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Resolutions of the Assem~ly n~e not yet per sc 
bindin~ though those rules of c;eneral :i:nte:Pnntional 
lm·I Hhich they 1:1ay embocl;y are bi_nding on member:' states, 
\·Jith or vdthoL~t the help of the resolution. 
But the body of resolutions as a vJhole, talc-en ns 
indications of a c;ene rRl customa:r:'--' lavJ, und oubterlly 
provide a rich source of evidence'. 6. 
Ahother adherent of this attitude is Clive Parry. In his 
boo~ 'Sources and Evidences of Intern2tional Lav' he rejects 
the need 'to ponder on the b~_nc1ing force of resolutions of 
Instead, to his ~ind, 'it all falls 
adequately into place as part of tho practice of States'. 7. 
We shall now consider that approach which re~a~ds some 
rese~lutions of tbe General Assembly as bindin:3; thoue;h for 
a variety of reasons. This is stated at its most basic in 
an article by Blaine Sloan, J. ill Hhich he isolates certain 
:=:t-reas of United Nations business 1.1l]here resolutions have the 
r.oHer 'to bj_nd states. These inc Jude th<=: esta1Jlish rnent of 
subsidiary or~ans (Article 22) an~ the power to approve 
a3reements (Articles 63 and 85), the power to bind bein~ 
inherent in the terms of these art:i_clcs and the Cl<arter itself. 
This idea has been researched in great detail by the 
jurist Castaneda. 9. He has set out ~roups of resolutions 
possessed of common characte~istics such as 'resolut:i_ons thet 
deterrr1ine the existP.nce of facts or concrete le•~<ll situations'. 
6o ibid o P• 5o 
7. Parry op.cit. ~;.113 
8. Blaj_ne Sloan 'Binoj_nfT Force of a 'recommendation' of the 
General Assembly of ihe United N8tions'. 
25 B.Y.I.L. y.l. (1948). 
9. CastaDeda - 'Lee;al Effects of Unit eel Nations Resolutions'-
Colurnbja ,Un:i_versity Press (1969). 
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As for the binding CJualitir-s of e<'1.ch particulE!.r ~rou:r~ of 
resolutions, each tdll probably depend on varying factors 
and circumst<1nces that are particular to thc.t group, 
1:d_thin \·.rh ich the juridical value of a T'C sol uti on ma: 7 var~'. 
The followins extracts fro~ Castaneda's book seT've to 
illustrate his [>Oint of vie,,r:-
'The mul ti-forn diversity of resolutions <md their 
unecu al juridical vallw have made it difficult to 
~valuate tbeir ~1nction as 2 source of intern~tional 
law.' 10o 
Yet ' •...•• ce·l'tain .3roups or types of 1.:cnolutions 
Here identified 1t1h ich ~ o hserva tion shO\·!S, }Jrodnce 
for a variety of reRsons anrl circumstances, concrete 
jur~~jcal effects of very different· kin~ nn~ ~e~ree 
that SOJYJ.etimes may be chrrracteT'ised as mn.n08.tOI"J '. 11. 
The 1:Jo:r:-kinc: of thj s tfho1e theory br::comes much more comprehensible 
; 
if made with refer-ence to o. specific examDle taken from 
Castaneda's book. One of the e;roups of resolutions mentioned, 
is that group '\vhich contains declarations or other 
pronouncements of a ~eneral nature'. 12. The resolutions 
encompassed \·Ii thin this e;roup include the fo llowi ne; :-
a) Resolution 95(i) 
The General Assembly affirmed without reservation 
the Nuremberg princi~les. 
b) Resolution 375 (iv) 
Draft ~eclaration on the Ri~hts and Duties of States. 
The Generi'lJ_ Assembly cons:icl_erecJ th:i s 'a Eot~tble and. 
subst~mtial contribution to1·1arc1s tbe rro· TCf:si ve 
10. ibid. p.2. 
ll. ibid. p.l6. 
12. p.l65 om·JPrrls. 
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developPlent of :intcrno.tionP.l 1avJ Cl.Dd its codific:;_t:i.on~ 
8-ncl as such CO'~nended it to the contiT1ll:i.ne; attention 
of membc:r:- stc-.tcs and of jur1sts of nll no.t:i_on;,'. 13. 
Cc-· st.qnec1 a considc,-.s it :")os si ble to cone luc'l.e 'tbe ertrmt to 
uhjch thej:r:- rrov:isions constitute existin~ law'. Their 
co-.-lteYJt c:m_ nnc1 cloc.s :r:-efiect fo:r:- the J'1ost Jle-rt custortc?.J:'~r 
l en·Ci.J Ve.lPC 1 1~-. - thet is t~ey are persuasive.nvidence that 
Castanec'l.::>.' s th :=:o:r~r ,'l_,s to the bj_nc'lin~ (1Ualit:i_es of ce:r:-tain 
crouys of United Nations resolv.tions is to a certail• extP-n.t 
sup~orted by other u:riters. Thus Rosalyn HiBEins a~mits the 
pOI·Ier O:f rP-soJ.utions to bj no. 1:!hen they refer to internal· and 
other matters:-
'It is necessc.l~-;_,- nt this pn:i.nt to 8.slc ourselves if 
political or~ans do in fact have the authority to 
prescribe rules of Jaw, or may they only recom~end 
l .L.. ? so __ u ulons. That they have authori t-J for internal 
prescription is not in doubt .•.. similarly it may be 
observed that roli ticnJ. or=P.ns sometimes neke 
declarations of consciously legal content - the 
declaration on the Nurembe.-.p :nrincirles ru!('l the 
resolutions of soverei~nty over natural resources may 
bot~ be cited as examples'. 15. 
Finally, ue m~st invbst:i~ate a recent and ve:ry radical 
8.-·,p:r:-oach to the problem of the status of Uni tecl Nat:i.ons 
13. ibid. p. 173. 
14. ibir1. p. 17?. 
15. Hi~~ins on.cit. p.4. 
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resolutioils - an aT'p-r:-o~.cl:-1 \·Jhich o.cco::-ns theTTJ in certain 
circumstances a limited lesislative competnnce. The 
o:ris:i nator of thj_s theor;:r ':re..s Blaine SloP!l '·ibo concllJded 
after an eyamins.tion of the San Fr<'.ncj sco :reco:-r:-cs ;:--nc'l a 
stuc'ly of }Jre-U:r1.i ted Hat ions practic~, th::J.t it ,_.!<'l.S not 
ations' Rs usPd in international latl. 
2. :t:>()2so:nahle clouht o:-.-1 the s.ssumptj_on that 'recomm()ndation' 
unc'ler Articles 10 - 14 of the Chc_T'tc~,~ can o'bvionsl;y ltave 
no Je[al effect'. 16. 
This is im::ortant in tb"t 'T!ahy \·!ho clen~,r rr-~oJ.ution.s o:r the 
BlRine Sloe.ne , .. e.s ; nc'l epcl ~ :!:'X'C"'Pr~c. to 2.cl v~ "1Ce h j s v:i_ C'.·!S a 
'Althou~h a lar~e najority su~nort thr vic~ that 
:i.:n fl UPJ1_Ce a 0 0 0 0 0 
16. Bla~ne Sloon o~.cit. n.lO. 
17. For exa~ple Op~0~h~i1TJ's 'Intern~tional Le.~', 7tt edit:ioTI, 
Vo~. l. p. ?1C:? (J.9L~P) '.··b_e.," it :in assertE'Cl -:;hat thn 
As~emhJ.y h~~ ~o nower to ~~o9t ~0cisian~ hi"1(1in~ nn 
''1"P'be:-r:-c ( e:~C()~t 1·Jhr:" "'i~rr;n ~'"'':'P-r:>). 
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t''"!i_;:; :-;oVP.T'cirr-:nt-- bar> bee:n o_iyricl,.,..r::;c~- tl•P.T'e 
·- . -
'the General Assembl~ 2ctin~ ~s 2EP.nt nf the 
f'ntor tbe le:-::;al V2Cl1.1)TTl 'ln(l t.'l_lr(' 8. l!i n(l_~ n_rr 0ec:i SiO!"! 1 0 20o 
Notions T'P.Solu.t::i.ons h0.s beRn chamrionc.d 11:'' the JiJTlC'T'~_can 
• Hjs views 2re set out i:n the mn~n :in 2D 
V::':'ticJc ent:i.tJ.ed 'Tho OuP.s:i.-Lec_;j.slo.t:i.ve St<rtPs of UJlitN1 
Nations ~esoJ1;tj.o:ns'. 2lo The rec>soni n;; n:r l·rJ!.-i ch FPlk 
bases tbe cl~:i~s of General Asse~bly resolutions to he - in 
certfl.:i_'1 c:i_:rcn!fl.c.tfl.nces - lec~'lJ.y b::i ncljn~, is ver~r much akin 
to thPt of Blaine Sloan. Fo:r :i.nasnmch as the.t 1·J"'i teJ:-
fores2.\·r the e:rosion of sovr.rei.0:TJty, Ft:1.l 1r br'l ir.vPcl thCJ.t this 
concent hros nm·J br. on so r<'l.cl icHlJ~r cncroHchecl upon, ns to 
occasion a shift in the bnsj.s of obli,.,..~tion. :in :internRtional 
No lancer does Fal~ consider it accurate to refer to the 
conse:nt of states - whether ex~ress or tacit - 2s the 'fo:nc 
et or~io' of the nower of international law to bjnd. The 
I - .L 
tradj.tional viewpoint as ex~ressed in the Lotus, hns ceased 
to hold ~oo~ ~n Falk's eyes. This l'!aintc:d.ned that •••• 
'The rules of lm'J bindine; upon stntes there:foT'e e'Te>.na.te 
from their own free wjll ns expressed in convP.ntions or 
19. ibid. p. ~3 
?0. ibi0. p. 24 
21. 60 A.J.I.L. p. 78?. (1966) 
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by usaGeS generaJly accepted as expressinF pr:incirles 
of le.\"! sn.d established in oroer to ::rec1'l.?tc -relat~_on.s 
between these co-existinG in~ependent communities or 
with a view to the achievement of common aios, Restrictions 
upon the :i.ncl2:nenc1.ence of States ce.n:not the-r:efore he 
presumed. ' 22 • 
Instead, the situation of international society as :i.t stands 
2t pre.sent ::is rnv:i_f3nsecl as Cler:Iancl_in~ a P'O''e flexible Pnd 
-re;!_J::i.st:i_c con.ceilt fror'l \·'h~ ch to 0 erive bind inc; lep;al force. 
This need is answere~ by the concent of consensus, ~~ich Palk 
beJieves is bein~ rcnc'lily acknowled~ed by the community of 
nations as a ouch ~ore accentPble basis of legal obli~~tion. 
There ~s ~ c1iscerniblc trcnc'l f-r:om consent to consensus as the 
basis of inte~nntional letal obli~ation. As to what eyactly 
is entailed by the notion of consensus FRlk never rna~es 
narticuJ~rlv clear. ~ ~ T~ou~h be ~oes iMply that the ide~ is 
r comnlex one which encompas~cs mnny variable factors 
incluc1inE political overtones. 23. 
'Unless a consensus formulated in a claim to ?"OVern 
national action transcends the fissures of the cold 
v1ar and f:i.nds a basis for a.r-reement anonc: the; r·r·i ncipal 
states, it does not satisfy pre-conditions for 
le~isl11.t:i. ve act:i.on in the United l\fat ions settinc;. ' 24. 
There must be nolitical consensus to support a ouasi-
le~islative claim . 
F.C.I.J. Ser. 4., No. 10, p.l9 (19~7). 
For a better ioea of the factox·s involved, see Fal 1::' s 
an;>J.,rs~s of' snedfie rP.soJ.Ft:ions e.r;. Res. ]Ji53(XVI) 
conc~rninr th~ use of nuclear wea~ons: op.cit. p.786 et se~o 
C.F. D'Arwto op.cit. :r.:z,3 on,_!Pcrds, \·!he-,-.e he Cliscusses the 
probleM of ~efj~~ng consensus. 
24. ibid. D. 788. 
- 89-
• 
• 
I"loreover, the:r:-e j_s the problen1 of \•!hat evidence c<m be 
proctv.cec'l. b~v Falk to justify his as;;crt:i_on t11at the::· b:-sis 
of obligation in internationnl law hns s~j_ftcd. It 
appears that Falk relics on the actual natu~o of internatjonal 
soc:i.cty in orclc:r to justify his claims. 
'If inte:rnationul societv is to function effectively 
it requires a limited legislative authority, nt 
minimum, to translate an over-ridin~ consensus among 
states into rules of order and norms of obliGation 
cles~ite the opposition of one or more soverej.~n states'.25. 
Additional vvei~ht is r.:i ven to Falk' s are;umcnt by a.n opinion 
reco~ded in the United States Supreme Court in the Sab~otino 
case. ~h. Here the Court hclc that 
t:.1c t:r.-~.'~_i·i:;ic·nc.l :rulc·s of interna:tion::..l l:J..vJ 
ir.1pos:i..nc:· u duty Ol! . .::.n cx)ropriat~ n;:; :-overn.r:1ent tc pay 
an alien investor 'prompt, adequate and effective 
compensation' were no longer supported by-the 
consensus of sovereign states and as a result the 
validity of such rules 1·ms in sufficient doubt o.s 
to make them inapplicable to the disnute.' 27. 
Given the truth of what Falk has stated, then various far-
reaching conseouences result. S:i.nce the binclin[': nature of 
inte:rnational laH rests on the notion of consensus vJhilst 
General Assembly resolutions may on certain occasions be 
expressive of the consensus of opj_nion that exists among 
states, then it seems possible to claj.m a limited le~islative 
25. ibid. n. 785 
26. 
27. 
Banco Nacional de Cuba v Sabbatino. 
Falk op.cit. n. 785. 
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competence in relation to the latter • 
'It does not, however, seem extravagent to claim 
that the Assembly is in a position to play a 
crucial role on a selective basis in adapting 
international law to a changing political 
environment; that is, to participate in the 
essence of the legislative process at work in 
rudimentary form in international society.' 28 • 
-----------------
28. ibid p. 790. Though note that this legislative 
process will only be seen at work in certain areas 
of international behaviour where the claims of 
sovereignty are weakest. 
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CHAPTER VIII 
Reference ~ns na~e i~ tbc previous chapter to those bodi8s 
of academic opj_nio!l current] y expressed in -rel~tion to 
United Nations resolutions. To recaD, three distinct 
lines of thou~ht emerged with re~a~d to the roJ.~ rlRyed 
by suclr resolutions. Th8~r were creclj_tecl 
(l) With a purely evi.clentiary fuPctjon; 
(2) \..1/j_th a circumscribed no1:.rer to bi.nd; 
(3) With a power to bind based on the premise that 
United Nations resolutions 1:rere a ne\·' source 
of lBw - in certain circumstances. 
However, the task we set ourselves was to attempt to evRJuate 
whether tbe posjtion of United Nations resolutions is such 
that they mi~ht provide the content for a rule of r~co~nition 
of international law. On the basis of each of the above 
opinions, the following may be said vdth regard to the 
existence of a rule of recofnjtion: 
(l) If the resolutions of the GenerRl Assembly merely 
have an evidentiary role to play, then this merely 
serves to stress the roJe of custom in interPationnl 
law. In addition, it lrinrrs us bark to the question 
already posed as to whether custom may constitute 
thf) content of a ruJ e of reco.-·nition in j nternationA.l 
law. 
(2) Thoue;h certaj_n Gene:raJ Assembly resolutions may 
be bindinG, the factors to wbjch can be attrjbuted 
the source of sue~ a bindin~ cuality rnny vary 
consj_clerably. Thus, no single element 1'10..~' be 
isolated, the rresenco of which vill invariably 
indicate a bindin~ resolution. 
- 92 -
• 
(3) Certain resolutions of tbe Genern.l Assernhly 
are b:in(linrr. The fActor ~hich in(ljcates 
that a ~csolution may be re~ar~ed as bindin~ 
js consensus. 
Our initi2l task Nill be to ascertain, if this is ~oss:ible, 
Hhether any of the above bodies of opinion is ce."able of 
rrovid.ing the substance for a rule of ~eco~nition. This 
\·'i.ll be achieved by examininp· each vievJ in the J i rht of 
those factors which accordin~ to Hart prove the existence of 
a rule of reco~nition. It will be recalled that Hart 
described h:i.s rule of reco~nition in the foJlo~in3 f~shion: 
that it \·.roulo ••• "specj_fy so:ne feature or features possession 
of ~hich by a su~gestcd rule is taken as a conclusive affirmative 
jndication that :it js n ~ule of the ~roup to be supported by 
the social pressure it exerts. •• lo Moreover, ac societies 
Erow more sophisticated so too, in Hart•s view, docs the rule 
of reco;r·nition. 
1 In a developed lee;al system the rules of recognition 
are of course more complex; jnstead of identifyinB 
rules exclusively by reference to a text or list they 
do so by reference to son1e general characteristic possessed 
by the primary rules. This may be the fact of their 
havinp: been enacted by a specific body, or their lon~· 
customary practice or, their relation to judicial 
decisions•. 2o 
Indeed, to summarise what has been said at an earlier stage 
\•!i th Ten:ard to the rule of Tecoe;ni tion, the followinr; criteria 
must be discernable in order to prov~ i.ts existence: 
(a) There rrust be a feature ovhose presence is taken 
as incJicatinr: that a rule is a vaiid rule of law 
of thP. particular societiYo 
l. Concept of Law 
?. Ibid. p. 9~ 
p. 92 
- 93-
I 
I 
(b) There must be acceptance of the rnle on an 
official level. This must be a concertid 
acceptance by the officials of the system 
concerned. 3. 
When the necessary features of the rule of reco~nition have 
been outlined, :it can be seen that thn isol~tion of t~is factor 
may well prove a~ onerous task. Indeed, within the 
munici:?al system of a developed soc:i.ety one ma~r •.-:ork on the 
premise that such a rule does exist n:nd that ~ts cUscovcry 
\·:ill prove a fairly er1sy task. In contrast, Ha~t has raised 
(';rave doubts over vJhether suer a rulr ex:i sts ui tri!' +;he 
in-l::;ernatione_l scl·,eme. Moreover, the chances seem tn be 
that even j f tlt:i s r~oves r,ot to he the case v!ith i nternat:i onel 
leY, r1-r:17 such rule of reco:rn:i.tion may ,·ell be in its forJllative 
;;ta::_-es 2nd as a rcs1Jlt nxcr.ed:inc;ly hare t') rletect. L~. 
nea:r:-i ncr this in m·i no, it seems ser>si_ble to d iscus,s e.T1other 
arproach tllr:>.t mip:ht be taken t0\'!8TC s tl1i s 1-•roln probleT'1. 
This alternative ~pp~oach concerns the nuc~-l::;:ion of 'sources' 
of' J,~,_ •• The term 'source of la~' 
refer to 'one of' i-ltr=' cr:i tey>~ P of le"';el ve.Jidi t~T nccnnted 
in the ln~al system in nuestion.' --jO Since, therefore, the 
rnl e of r~corrrit:i_ on 1 spec i f'ie s thr. cr:i tr::ria of lepel validity 1 , 
tl~en it seems th2 t the rule of recor ni tion is 2. s~·e.te· ·ent of 
those sources of lP~ ~ithin a particular s~stem. 6. Once a 
cert::.:i n :recess is c:cce:rtcd as a sonrce of ln1:1 ~ t b~c-;rn.es 
~~~thy of inclus:ion ~ith:in the rule of recornition. 
jv~iciaJ a~cision Rn~ cu~tcM a~r n2id to be sources of la~. 
L:.. Jr.dcec_, it Ma=r ':!fCll b0 th;:-t a!l. o::-mer~cnt rllle of' reco~nition 
is ino.istin~uishable fm"1 CllStom. Sec ;;.~s 
,• 
'SouTcez of J.,:'l,_._,' i_D trc: srns n of formal sou:r9es rofu~ ;kB-10.-If: ij_ae, .. ,. 9 ,_ th0 rrocesses wfie~eby R ~uJe ~n~ t;e createu a ~ ~ 
----------------------------------
• 
They aJ so ran.J:;:: for inclusion vii thin the rule of recoe:nit 4 on • 
So :if ~t ~s rosr:ible to rrovo that rcsolvtio~s of the General 
Asse'"'lhly are a 'source' of Ja1.•!, t"~,en rresnrnably a. convincin~ 
case rne~ be ~ade out for thei~ constitutjn~ the noss:ible 
cn:nte:r1t of a rule of reco::rnition. Yet it arrBars that ~e 
EJ.:re once rn.ore faced 1:!ith an impPsf:e ir:. the sh2:re of t>o1-r t:' 
rrove the ex:i.stence of a new sourc~ of law. 
This ~)roblem \•ras recently considered by Onuf in his article 
entitled 'Profe~sor Fal~ on the Quasi-JeEislative Competence 
of the General Assembly' 7o 
Two factors emer~e fro~ his ar~ument as necessary in order 
to prove the authenticity of a new source of law. These are:-
(1) leEitirnacy 
(2) effectiveness. So 
Of these, le~itimacy is stressed by Onuf as the more important 
factor, by t'!hich he understanc'ls the follo,,Jing :-
'The legitimac7 of a new source of law ~ust be prcv:i.dcd 
for in a rule of law aris:i ng from an Already ler:itimate 
source' • 9 o 
Onuf then goes on to elaborate this idea. 
'The requisite endowment of le~itimacy mirht come in 
the fotm of a rn~ltilateral treaty or Charter amendment. 
It mipht come in the form of Foreig:n Office statements 
and speeches by major offiqials of virtually all states 
proclaiming or acknowledging General Assembly lee;islative 
corr1petence. It could come j n the form of a General 
Assembly resolution or resolutions, unanimously accepted 
7. 64 A.J.I.L. p.349 (1970) 
8. Onuf considers Falk to have dealt satisfactorily with this 
element and so d~clines to discuss it in any detail. It 
appears to involve an examination of the factors that go 
tm·rards consti tut:i nc;. 1:·he rules in question, rules ·that. 
9. ibid. p. 354. are acted upon. 
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and subsequently und is put cd, s:recifically providi nz 
• for the lep:al effect of future resolutions meetin!:': 
various reo u.irelT'ent s. But most likely it wo ulCl. come 
in the form of ~eneralised community acceptance of the 
clain a~vanccd by v2~ious co~munity ID2mbers th~t a 
e;oodl3• number of rcsol ut ions meet:i ncr certe in conditions 
a~e in fact binding on all members. More specifically, 
if overwhelmjn~ly adopted resolutions are subse0uently 
referred ann resDonded to e.s b~ndine; :in themselves and 
if these references and responses are not disputed or 
better 2:re ackno1:1ledc;ed in later resolutions, lccitimacy 
can be :infer-r:·cd f:r:"om eo11sensus 1.::i.thout form<Jl expression 
of consent'. lC. 
The passa:';e just QUoted is intended to do no more thAn stress 
Onuf's contention that in order for there to emere;e a new 
'source' of lm·!, it f'1Ust trDce its orirr·in fT'o:-1 an aJ.~eaoy 
established srurce of law, such as custom or trePty. 
So :in order to ascertain whethsr any of the three arproaches 
outlined can r-rovide a possible basis for distinc;uish:inr.; a rule 
of T'ecot:snition 1·1e r"ust examine eac11 of thr views expressed in 
the terms set out both by Hart and Onuf. 
The vie1·JS or these t1·.ro inch viduals do to some extent parallel 
each other. Both involve a degree of off:icial ecceptancA of 
a certai11 rule - thou~ht Hart \vould probably construe accentaitECe 
in a rnuch stT"ictr:;r fC'lshion than Onuf - still there ~ s a 
I 
resemblo.nce. 
To make this l:i ne of enC1u:i.ry clr:-are~, l;:;t us P.:T\Y the 
necessary criteria in relation to that body of opinion which 
views resolutions of the Uni.ted Nations as valuable evidentiary 
factors as rer;ar0 s the c'levelopment of a customar:' ruJe of 
10. ibid. p.354. 
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international law. The~e is no claim that ~esolutions are 
bindinG in their own ri~ht, jnste2d t~ey contr:ibute toward 
creatjng a binding rule of law. 
To regard resolutions in this fashion is to satisfy neither 
the criteria of Ha~t or Onuf. To amplify this somewhat, 
it \·Jill be recalled that the task of a rule of reco[ni tion 
is to specify some feature or features vJhcse possession wi 11 
indicate the existence of a valid rule of law. HeJ:·e the 
expression in a resolution does not give its content the 
force of lavJ. Instead,. it merely indicates that b:indine.; 
force may be aco1·ired by the opinions expressed in the 
resolution - if they acquire by constant adoption. and repeti-
tion the force of customary jnternational law. Thus, leEal 
validity in this instance will be acquired not by the passage 
of a resolution but by its acceptance as a statement of custom. 
The factor which indicates the presence or absence of le~al 
validi t:r is custom, \vhose claim to form the content of the 
rule of recoBnition has been considered previously. 
Nor c'l oes this f'l.ethocl of reEard·: ng resolutions of the United 
Nations as of an evidentiary character fare any better vlith 
reBard to Onuf's criteria for- constituting a source of lawo 
Such resolutions a :'e repprcled merely in the e;uise of affirming 
what is regarded as an established source of law-custom. 
So it appears that if vve are to regard resolutions as servine; 
an evidentiary roJe within the s~hcre of international law, 
then all clojms to their constitut~ng e~ ener~Bnt n1,e of 
recognition o~ source of law Must be disregarded. Instead, 
this view}'oint merely strene;thens the claim of custom as the 
content of any rule of recocnition. 
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used cs the standard by offici~·ls foT' assessine; a rule's 
lerral :not0ntir'l and the fC'lct that it :is contained in 2. 
resolution me:r:-ely p;ives e.n R.dded wei3;ht anc'l imretus to this 
process. 
The view that resards certa:i_n resolutions of the General 
Assembly as bindinG, a~pears initially H much more ~romising 
prospect. 
Groups of resolutions have been pinpointed by writers such 
as Casteneda - which share certain common features, inclueine; 
the· power to bind. ThouEh perhaps to state that such 
resolutions are bindin~ is to strte the nos:ition ·a trifle 
too baldly. Indeed, Castaneda contents rimself 1·1i th statj_ne; 
that ce:r:-tain croups of resolutions Droduce 
concrete jud ciical effects of ve-r'· different 
kind and de~ree that sometir'Jes ma.y be character:i sec_ 
as mandatory'. 11. 
Moreover, the bPsis from wb~ch this juric'licsJ effect emanates 
var:i es l·!i th thr=: !'articular e;roups of resolutions 0elim:i ted. 
Castaneda, ~ho has made a~ exhaustive ~nvcst:irration into this 
partj cular theory sets out the folloviinc; sj x disti_nct ?;roups 
of resolvtions -
(a) Resolutions that rertain to the structure and 
operation of the United Nations. 
(b) Resolutions (certain) concerninrr internRtional 
pea.ce ond security. 
(c) Resolutions that determine the existence of 
facts or concrete legaJ situations. 
(d) Resolutions whose bindinc force rests on 
i nstruJllents other then the Ci•Rrter. 
11. Castane~a o~.cit. p.l6. 
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(f) 
Resolutions that express and register agreement 
among the members of an organ • 
Resolutions that contain declarations or other 
pronouncem~nts of a general nature. 12. 
Of the circumstances which combine to produce the juridicial 
effects of each of these groups, the following is of 
necessity a brief account. 
(a) These resolutions may be categorised as internal 
since they relate to the structure and operation 
of the Organ~ation. They are said to account for 
almost four-fifths of resolutions adopted. They 
relate to those everyday matters of the running 
of the United Nations. Examples include the 
appointment of a new Secretary-General or the 
admission of a new member state. 
The basis on which the mandatory character of such 
resolutions is founded, is as follows:-
. . . . . The Charter expressly established the mandatory 
character of the majority of resolutions that pertain 
to the internal activity of the organisation'. 13. 
(b) This group of resolutions and indeed the remaining 
groups may be characterised as 'external', since 
they relate to the achievement of the aims of the 
Organization - the maintenance of international 
peace and security in this particular instance. 
The binding force of this particular group of 
resolutions if they emanate from the Security 
12. For a detailed analysis of each of these groups, 
together with examples of their contents - see 
Castaneda op.cit. 
13. Castaneda op.cit. p.24 See chapter 2 for the whole 
of the discussion relating to 'internal resolutions'. 
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Council js derived from art:icle ?5 of the Charter • 
This rends as follows:-
1 Membe~s of the Unjted Natj_ons a~ree to accept and 
CElrry out the decisions of the B ecuri ty Council 
in accordance \'!i th the :!!resent Charter. 
\rJhere a resolntion relatinr>: to i:r>ternati onal peace and 
secvrit~· emanates fron'l the General Asse!I1bly CJ.njtjnr; 
for peace procedure) Ce.str:medn seei:Is J:ess syre 0f :hits 
ab:iJity to bind. H0wever, he concejves that in t~::is 
connection a Cll.St'JPl.ary rule has br:en en~enclerPCl •ri thin 
the orpanisation a:i. med at enlar:dnr- the competence of 
the Ur:iterl Natinns. l4o 
(c) Trese -r<'1rticuJ"r T'f"'solutions n.~c concerned •_-·ith conc-rete 
~~r'ications of thP rules of the Ch2rter. For exfl.m_nle 
Resolution 1542 (XV) established the non-self-r-overnin~ 
flrJtl,.,.,e of certa.in Portu-:::-ese terri toJ'Y, 2.ne! i!'_ conser~t~ence 
['Y1 Ob]_jrr·c_t~OD_ tO trC'TJ.Sfer jnfO-r:'ffi2tiOD ['_f' C8Jl1~l1C80_ l)~T the 
Charter, Here e b:i.mli_ nc: obJ j_--,·pt:i.on th::>t ~ s im-nlici t in 
the Charter ::is a-iven aDD] :i cr-tt:i on :i.n P_ n.ef:i nit e s i tuationo 
T110 r2solution that P;jves it application :i r; in itself 
bindinr-;. 15 o 
(d) The TT1_Rndatory force of tbis narticular C':roup of 
resolutions ori~:inates not in tho ChQrter, hut ~ests 
on somP othe~ j~ternational instrument such os a t~eatyo 
llJ.o Fo-ro "'~sc,_,ssjon of t;f1is oncl othe-r_, f'l:=tttcrs -reJ.pt:in:" to 
thi ~- ""'<'rtiCJlJ nr catc,.,.or:" of rcsolution_s - see Granter 3 
I Certr: in T{p so lut :ions concerninr- In tern Clb orLJ.l 'l='cpce enc. 
Secur::i t~r 1 o 
1:;. See Cr<stanecl8. op.cit. p. 117 et.seC2_o 
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by the GenerAl Assembly • 
ind0ed conta~re~ in Resolution 289 .IV~ And ~ere 
subseouently 2~opted by t~e parties. 15. 
(e) The resolutiors whic~ ~e~e u~ this ~~our ere in 
Costenada's oryinion si~nifica~t in that they have 
Rs their content 
'an. informal 0~reement, c:xr2.icit or tacit, 
arnonr; the members of on o-r~an o~ 8.n int ernfl ti_onal 
or~anisation'. 17. 
Indeed, to the extent that a resolution is the•·result 
of an aEreement, ~iving it forM, the redolution can 
have bjndin~ force. To shou resolPtions of this 
partjcular nature in operatjon r~ference s~oul~ be 
made to those resolutions ':!hich c<.re concerned ~·Iith 
such matters r<.s the Clistribution of vice-presiclencie s 
of the or~anjsstion. Here the a~reernent is to the 
allocation of a number of rosts amon:::; vr>rious re~ional 
c.;ro ups. The tcrminolo~;y of these resolutions indicate 
that they are ~ ntended to be b:i ncUn~. 
should be borne in m:i.nd that resolutions '.'i thin this 
particular classification enjoy a status that occurs 
merely in exceptional situati.ons. 18. 
(f) Resolutions incJuded 1·Iithin this fina' catee;or~r e.re 
best described in the terms chosen by Castaneda. 
16. ibid 
17. ibid 
18. ibic'l_ 
'The essentic:l nature of the resolutions under 
study here, no matter how they are desi~nated, 
iS that they clo not create law, but the~ recoEnise 
and declare it. Their basic content consists of 
either customary rules or general pr~nciples of 
lm·J. The purpose of incorpornting these customary 
p. 139 et.seq. 
p. 150 
p. 150 et.seo. 
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rules or general principles into resol~tions is not to 
attribute legal value to them in the same way of 
converting into a rule or binding principle something 
that was previously neither, but rather to fix, 
clarify and make precise their terms and scope. Stated 
suscinctly, 'Assembly resolutions do not create law, 
but they may well authoritatively prove its existence.' 19o 
From this it appears that Castaneda takes the view that the 
General Assembly·may well give that stamp of approval which 
in many instances converts a practice into a custom, though 
the situation is far from clear since the United Nations may 
well be the originator of certain expressions of a legal 
situation. 20. 
Probably the follov1ing is the clearest represent at ion of how 
Castaneda views the situation. 
(1) Where a resolution expresses a widely accepted rule 
of customary international law, then the binding force 
of that resolution rests on that rule. 
(2) Where the content of a resolution has yet to achieve 
the status of customary international law, the role 
of the resolution is as follows:-
'The General Assembly does not possess legislative 
competence universally committing the states 
concerned. A certain amount of law - creating 
power cannot be denied to the General Assembly 
because in those cases which might give rise to 
doubt whether a rule belongs already to international 
law or is still 'ius cons .i. ti taandum' , a formal 
declaration of the General Assembly might make the 
rule concerned enter into the recognised sphere of 
19. ibid. p.l71 
20. Note tha part played by the United Nations in creating a 
legal regime for outer space. This has sometime~ been 
characterised as creating 'instant customary law'. See 
Cheng 'Instant International Customary Law'. Indian 
Journal of International Law'. p.23 (1965) 
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positive law'. 21 • 
From the foregoing analysis, it can be seen that the 
majority of the categories of resolutions classed by 
Castaneda as binding rest their effect on some concrete 
agency, usually treaty. This is true of categories a - d. 
As for group e, the exceptior..al status of an implied 
agreement is given to a resolution. Whilst group f 
relies - albeit not exclusively- on the binding force of 
custom. Bearing in mind Hart's requisites for a rule of 
recognition, groups a- d give no indication of United 
Nations resolutions' suitability for this role, since the 
mark of legal validity originates in treaty. The group e, 
does admit that resolutions may possess some independent 
capacity to bind of their own accord. Yet the actual sphere 
of operation of this group is so small and its dependence on 
agreement so stressed as to eliminate almost entirely the 
competence of the Assembly to bestow legal validity.·.~:- As,;·fJ?ir 
group f,here some of the power to bestow legal validity rests 
on custom , whereas any power that a resolution itself may 
have to endow a rule with legal validity is very indeterminate 
indeed - as is shown by the language employed by Castaneda. 
To summarise, therefore, it is clear that group e and to some 
extent group f appear to some degree to advance the role of 
the resolution to allow it to enjoy some independent operation. 
Yet this does not appear to be sufficient to satisfy Hart's 
criteria for the rule of recognition though it may indicate 
some progress in this directi9n especially in relation to group f. 
21. Memorandum of Dutch Government quoted by 
Castaneda op.cit. p. 169. 
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Here the evidentiary role of the resolution is advanced 
so that it may be a deciding factor in the process of the 
creation of rules of law, though we cannot thereby 
contend that statement in a resolution of the Assembly 
invariably allows a rule to be considered as part of 
international law. 
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C~H A P T E R IX 
The chapter which follows, will be devoted to an evaluation 
of that final body of opinion put forward in connection with 
the role played by resolutions of the United Nations. This 
attributes binding force to certain resolutions. However, 
here the source of that binding force is constant in each 
instance - it rests with one factor - consensus. It is 
asserted that consensus is the new basis of obligation in 
international law taking over this role from the traditional 
basis of obligation - consent. Thus resolutions which are 
backed by the consensus of states, may be said to be bindirg. 
It is acknowledged by Falk that General Assembly resolutions 
backed by consensus probably have a more positive role to play 
in selected areas of international law - for example matters 
relating to outer space - rather than those spheres more 
traditionally associ a ted with international law 1 o - such 
as the law of the sea. 
'It does not, howeve~, seem extravagent to claim that 
the Assembly is in a position to play a crucial role 
on a selective basis in adapting international law to 
a changing political environment'. 2o 
What is important to note as regards these particular views 
is that a 'limited legislative competence' is being claimed 
for resolutions of the United Nations. Resolutions are to 
be regarded in certain circumstances as binding in their own 
right and not because of the operation of some intermediate 
agency such as custom or treaty. Whether or not a resolution 
may be regarded as binding is dictated by two factors, 
1. 
2. 
This is so because where the vi tal interests of states > 
such as economic or territorial interests, are not 
impinged upon states are likely to be a great deal more 
accommbdati:[lg. . 
Falk 'On the quasi-legislative competence of the General 
Assembly' 60 A.J.I.L. p.790 (1966). 
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(i) 
(ii) 
the fTns~nce or absence of co~sensus o~ 
hehA.lf of trc Staten vot:i.n2; . 
the particular area of behavinm:' to tJhieh 
the resolutjoD relates. 3a 
Our ei1\l'':i.ry !"lust nov! be c'!irectec. e_s to hov! \"'elJ tr~s t.,eor~r 
s~t:isfics tho2e criterja 1P:irl cown for the existenee of 2 
:rese:rce '"jP_'' he i_I10:i_ce_t~ ve of Jer:<1J V:-'J ici ty 0 
not seem nossi_ ble to corclun e th2.t cons en '"'ll s ~-nev:i t2.bly 
Moreover, hn s the:rc been Pn y 
:inclieati on O'' the -ra:rt of offjc:i.8J s of tbf' :::-.~rstr.M t"hnt 
conscrsus as a b~ndj n~ source ~f ohl:ir~tion rRs received 
HoH8ver, :it P.:r-J!eG.rs thc.t by fc:r the most nrr_;ent task j s to 
8I1CJU:i re hm·r precise ~ concr:r-t is consersus on 1-r}lj ch to h8se 
...,_ rul_e of l:'P.CO[':n:i_tiono It is l1 rt:lativt:l~' easv taf'k to 
the 
decide whetherArule hRs been enacted in P statute cnf thus 
This is one of t.,~ crite:r~a 
o·:· the En(CJ_i sh rnunicipa.l 18.\'J ::r:'11Je of r"co;::nit:i.o:n o The 
s:i t112.ti.oT1 seems to "beco'Tic: s} j rhtly less clecr c;,t t!r.en O!lP. :is 
ceol:i_n~ ':!ith a conce-rt ~uch 2s consensuso There is I10 
Clifficult:r :in conc:Jt,Ciinc; Hhether or not a resolution hes 
successfully passed th-rouC':h tht=: Generol As~emblyo Yet not 
ev"T'Y such reso 1 ut ion \·Jill b:i.nd, merely those that cl :i_srlay 
the additionel element of consensus. Therefore, :in order to 
cone lucl.e 1_-ih ich resolutions 8.re b:i no in~, it must be established 
~hat exactly is entr>:iled by the notion. 
Onuf commenting on the idea of consensus brands :i_t as 11 an el1_1sive 
concept" a '1-o 
3a There are no rarticula:r ~uidelines, other than those 
mentioned, as to t!hat those areas \·rill be. 
4o Onuf op.cito p. 350) \-Jloere he com:':"larcs it t'd.th consento 
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An jnvesti~ation into Fal~'s analysis of the term bears out 
this evaluation. It 2ppears that a cons en sus in order to 
bestow le~al vaJjdity ~ust 
e;ein at least t1:10 thirds of tbe votes in the 
General Assembly. 
(ii) 'overcome the fissures of th8 Cold \'Jar' i.e. 
c;ain the suppo1t of the Greo.t Povrer~> ::mn the 
majority of the members of the major p01.·Ier 
blocs within the United Nations. 
An analysis of consensus in these terms raises various 
problems: 
(a) may the o~position of a Great ~ower 
effectively destroy a consensus? 
(b) is the opposition of lesser States of any 
relevo.nce Hhen assessin~: 1vhether or not a 
consensus exists ? 
(c) how does absention on the part of a 
Great Power rank in these circumstances? 5. 
The situatjon is even further complicated by an inference on 
Falk' s ~art that the actual (luali ty of lep;j_sla ti ve P.ffect JTlay 
va -r~r. This js implicit in his reference to certain resolutions 
PS en j oyine; a 'weak lerrislat:i_ve effect' • 6. 
From the fore~oine; discussion jt seems possible to reach 
various conclusions recardin~~ the concept of consensus 3Ilcl 
the ruJe of reco~njtion. Consensl- s, of nll the vj e1.·!s e~~aJTtined, 
comes closest to satisfyinc the reQuisites for a rule of 
recoe:nition. 
5. For a full eli scussion of th cse and other problems 
surroundine: the term 'consensus' s0e D'AMato 'On Consensus, 
C.Y.I.L. ::).(4-1 (191c) 
6. Falk op~cit. p. 787. This is saic1 in relFJ.tion to 
ce-rtain resolutions concerned with nuclear testing 
and non-proliferation. 
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He:rE': is an elerne nt vJh.osP :rresence is snid to :indicate bind ine: 
lec:Rl effect. Hm·Jever, a closer exarninat ion o.f the conceiJt 
sho1.-rs that the situation js not So straj_~htfor·t-rard. The 
difficulty of arrivin~ at precise evaluatjon of consensus 
has been shown. Even when a resolution is ~asred unnnimously) 
\·Jhich 1.-JOuJCl RIJ}'ear to be j_ndication enou~~h of the consensus of 
states, jt ~oes not appear to he ,ossible to classify that 
resolution as b~ n(lj_n[j. There is the additional rroblem of 
whether consensus is effective merely in selected areas of 
international lcP·J v!h ic~ seems t6 be the suge;e stion. !"lore over, 
it also appears conceivable that the actual Jee;:islative effect 
may vary in nuality. 
In view of the jmprecise nature of consensus and its anparent 
difficulty of applicntion, the case that ~ay be made out for 
its consti tut:i_nf" tho content of the rule of recosni tion anpears 
to be veJ'y weol~. A more balanced vieH may possibly be obtai ned 
by takin~ ~nto account one of those truisms that ~s so often 
usee. in relctj on to internl'ltional la;_,!. t·Jhen examinj_ nc: 
custom as a possible candidate for the rule of recognition, 
the imprecision that is inherent in its very nature ~as 
refllarked upon. If consensus is indeed a new bnsis of -· 
obli~ation in international law as Falk asserts - then the 
liJ<:elihood is that it also vJould share this lack of precision 
which seems to be a necessary feature of international law. 
The contrast betv.Jeen this and the certain content of municipal 
Ln·J is extreme o' Yet it raises the basic dilemma of \·Jhether 
or not it is fair to expect the same de~ree of nrecision from 
both systems. The very fact that intrrnatjonal law is 
conferned with states ~~o are jn their turn ea~er to nrotect 
their freedom of actjon seems to arc;ue a::';ainst anytbing like 
tbc deEree of ri~i~ity on an i.nte~national scale as can be 
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perceived on a municipal level. It also jndicates that 
there will be certa:in areas where states aPe much more 
1n 
zealous ~uardians of thei~ ~osjtion thanAotho~ less 
co:ntl:'oversjal SJiheres of behaviour. 
The imprecision tbrt hr-s boen remarked with rec;aro to 
consensus may be to some extent e:x:!_>la-i ned upon another 
basis. It has been remarked that consensus as a source 
of obli~atjon in international law is a new denarture. 
Traditionally, the binding ouality of ~; nternatj anal la1•J 
\·Jas thouc:ht, and i ncl.eed in r1any j nstances :i_s still thouch t) 
to rest on consent. If consensus is emer~in~ as a conce~t 
to cl•allen~e the position of consent, then it seems fair to 
expect that those elements included within the ambit of 
consensus may still be in the process of development and as 
2 consequence uncertain. 
Thou~h t~is ~a~· 30 some ~ay towaPrl settlirig those doubts felt in 
relation to the notion of consensus, there does appear to he 
a pract:ical solution to the ~roblem of ascertainins- the validity 
or other1·rise of resolutions of tbe General Asser1.bly be.d::eCI by 
consensus. This t8.s1<" can be t.qc 1 -le0 in t~·_ro ciistinct fRshio!1G:-
(l) this involves the secon<'i limb of Hart's test for '"-
rule of reco~nition - ac~eutance b7 officials of 
the systPm. If :it C8.:n he shm·rn that tbe-.2. wl1o 
the internet~onal Je~al system, 
recornise ~1o lecnl v;lidtty of resolut:ions hac~ed 
by consensus, then tl1is is very persuasive evidence 
that a rule of reco~mi tion to th:i s effect may b!ell 
exist. 
(2) AJternativcly, it has been asserted b7 Fal~ that 
consensus is a new basis of obli~ation insofar as 
the j nternstional system is coneerneo ?Tit in their 
turn resolutions backeo by consensus are a new 
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SOUJ:'Ce Of lmv o The truth of this assertion may 
to some de~rre be ascertained by means of those 
t~-:sts set out by Onuf v-Ii th a vievJ to detecti11[" 
tht-: evolution of a new source of law. The c:rmx 
of these tests is 1:rhethc:r:' a nr'l·' source of la,,r hns 
. . t " d . l . . n'OS bQ:Q.tl OJ:'J.~lna ,e~.._ nn 1ts _ eP"l tlmac-, \'...,-rovJd r:Cl for j n an 
- ' I 
al:r:-eacl.y_ acceT'tPo sotrr ce of ~ ,.,_ternat:i onP.J. lal·J i. c. 
cur> toP o: .... treat;~r. In orde-r to concl uc1 e lvhether 
or not this is the case offici2l ~ractice ~ust be 
examined :: s :r:-e:,&rds consensus 2.nci an effort l"lade to 
evaluate whether or not a customar~r rule of 
international law OJ:' t~eaty exists to thjs effrct. 
resolutions of the General Assembly backed by consensus, some 
embryonic lerislative effPct, does, on injtiaJ examinatjon, at 
J.east,g.o sane ww to satisfyiDrr the cr:i teria of Hart Pnci Onuf. 
The star·e has novJ been Teached \'!here it is l_)ossible to draw 
the followin~ tentative conclusjons es :r:'eca:r:'cis the suitahjJity 
of resolut:ions of the General Assembly to form the content of 
a rule of :r:-ecoc;nition for the :i.nt ernational system. 
( l) Resolutions rer;e.rded as a valuable factor in the 
development of customar~ international law. Here 
traditional concepts of :intcrnat:ional law have been 
adapted and evolved in order to cope with a new 
f::.ctor - resolutions of the GenerFil .n.ssembly. 
This view admi.ts the im!)ortnnce of the United Nat:i ons 
in that it nl:'ovides a convenient fo~um vrhere the 
majority of states may express their opinion. 
HovJever, its res~·,lut:i Ol1S h"ve valioit:v only'lry30-
far as they P'la.:v hcl;; to accelerate the development 
of customar:r international J.m-J. Therefore since 
resolutions of the General Assembly have no separate 
ic'l.entity as such, their usefulness as means of 
asce-rtainin('f' the val :i.dit~r or othe r\·_rj_ s e of c. lec;~l 
rule is non-existent. Instead, internr=J.t ional lf;n·r 
is still dependent on custom as the mar~ of a lefa]_ 
rule. 
- no -
• 
• 
(2) Resolutions regarded in certain circumstances as 
binding. It is possible for a variety of factors 
to conspire in order to make a resolution of the 
General Assembly binding. This has been amply 
d-emonstrated by Castaneda. Indeed, it is probable 
that the binding nature of many of these groupings 
would be accepted without any dispute by a large 
proportion of international lawyers - for example 
those resolutions relating to the internal functions 
of the United Nations. 
Yet once again the independent valdity enjoyed by 
resolutions is minimal. Instead their bindirg nature 
relates to traditional factors such as custom or treaty. 
However, in his treatment of one particular group of 
resolutions - those that contain 'declarations or 
other pronouncements of a general nature' - Castaneda 
puts forward an interesting po~nt of view. It was 
seen in an examination of this particular grouping 
that much of their va]dity can be found to originate 
in the area of customary international law. Yet it is 
possible for a resolution of this nature to be indicative 
of emergent customary international law. In these ·, 
circumstances, Castaneda suggests that the statement 
of such rules in a resolution can mark their trans-
formation into the full status of customary international 
law. Admittedly, it is not suggested that resolutions 
have the power to make law. They may be regarded as 
the official stamp whereby a rule of law becomes binding 
and as a consequence so toodoes the resolution in which 
it is contained. Though this may advance somewhat the 
evidentiary. role assigned to resolutions, it does little 
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to displace the importance of custom, and very 
little to advance the candidature of resolutions 
of the General Assembly as a suitable subject for 
a rule of recognition. 
(3) Resolutions regarded as binding if backed by the 
consensus of states. Here resolutions - backed by 
consensus - do enjoy an independent validity of 
their own. They possess the power to bind states 
in their own right. As such they come closest to 
fulfilling the role of rule of recognition - subject 
of course to the flaws noted in the prec e diqs 
analysis of these views. 
Of these three bodies of opinion, two stress the role of 
custom, the third the independent power of resolutions to 
bind; two seem inadequate to meet the demands of the rule 
of recognition, the third apparently has some potential. 
What must now be ascertained is which of these is closest 
to the realities of the situation, if any indeed is. In 
order so to do, it is intended to proceed in the follov.,ri ng 
fashion. 
It is intended to deal initially with those views Which 
stress the independent power of General Assembly resolutions 
to bind and to constitute a new source of law. How far does 
this represent the truth of the matter? 
The emphasis laid both by Hart and Onuf_ on the need for 
acceptance on behalf of officials of the international 
system whether of the rule of recognition or the new source 
of law, is the key factor here. 
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So can it be established 
(a) whether international officials accept as a 
standard for the assessment of legal validity 
the approval by a resolution of a rule - a 
resolution backed by the consensus of states. 
(b) or whether a customary rule has emerged which 
recognises such resolutions as a new source of 
law. 7. 
If the position is not that suggested by Falk, then is it 
indicative of either of the two alternative viewpoints 
considered. Both of these stress the part played by 
custom to a greater or lesser extent and if they appear 
to be more indicative of the situation, then once again 
we are thrown back on the view that custom is seemingly 
~1b pro>t• d.o.. 
the only possible candidate f the content of a rule of 
recognition. 
7. Though we are seeking to find some degree of official 
acceptance in order to constitute United Nations 
resolutions as part of the rule of recognition, we 
are still faced with the following dilemma. Any 
evidence that may go toward the proof of this point may 
also be regarded by Hart as a mere addition to the set 
of rules that make up international law. see p~% 
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C H A P T E R X 
In the light of all that has been said, we will now 
proceed to examine the views expressed by states in 
relation to the nature of United Nations resolutions. 
One of the most fruitful sources of opinion are the 
debates which take place within the United Nations itself. 
Here States are often led to make statements regarding the 
fashion in which they treat resolutions. Obviously it is 
not possible to examine all those debates which have taken 
place within the Organization. Instead, our research has 
been confined to the General Assembly itself, together with 
the Sixth or Legal Committee. I1oreover, as has been seen, 
the great majority of resolutions that are passed relate 
to procedural matters which are internal to the workings of 
the Organization. Indeed, the areas of debate that 
particularly c~ncern us relate to those areas - specifically 
pinpointed by Falk - where development of international law 
would be suited to the practices of the United Nations. 1. 
These areas include the law relating to outer space and its 
exploration, self-determination and ~inciples relating to 
frie.ndly relations bet\veen States, \"here the political 
sensitivities of states might be expected to be at a minimum. 
It should be stated at the outset of this examination into 
those views expressed with regard to the nature of General 
Assembly resolutions, that no state credited such resolutions 
with no effect whatsoever. Undoubtedly they carry some weight 
with virtually every state though to what extent and of what 
nature remains to be seen. 
1. See p. 105 
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The manner in which states regard resolutions falls into 
certain classifications. This became particularly clear 
when the Sixth Committee was considering the principles 
of international law relating to friendly relations 
between states. These particular debates stretched over 
a period of eight years and provide much useful i~rmation 
as to how exactly the opinions of states are ranged. 
Though as the debates progressed it could be remarked that 
states did not always remain constant to their views - but 
this was true only of a small minority. 
Before an analysis is made of the bodies of opinion expressed 
by states with regard to the status of resolutions, the 
following point should, it is believed, be made. Much of 
what states said in this particular context was directed 
toward·· a specific form of resolution - the declaration. 
The declaration is usually regarded as enjoying an authority 
greater than that of a resolution plain and simple; though 
what exactly this authori~ is, is far from clear. The most 
that can be said is that declarations were not originally 
intended to be legally binding - though it is feasible that 
this position may have altered somewhat, as our investigations 
may reveal. 
The main categories of opinion that emerged on analysis of 
debates within the United Nations were as follows:-
(a) 
(b) 
(c) 
Those states wbicr1 accorded certain resolutions (in 
particular declarations) some 'psychological' value. 
Those states whic.h accorded certain resolutions (in 
particular declarations) some legal value. 
Those states whi.c.r.regarded resolutions as not legally 
binding. 
(d) Those states wh(c.h.expressed the opinion that the content 
of certain resolutions v,ras such that it might be 
expected to be obeyed. 
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Nhat procea~Z..s .is an attempt to amplify these views with an 
indication of the amount of support they attracted. 
With regard to (a), it should. be made clear at the outset 
that the number of states who actively supported this 
viewpoint were relatively few in number. They included 
Brazil and France. Moreover, the actual significance of 
this 'psychological' value and what exactly it entailed 
never became very clear. 2~ The Report of the Sixth 
Committee for the Seventeenth Session contained the following 
statement: 
'Some representatives made the point that a declaration 
though lacking in any obligatory force, would have 
great psychological value, it would be a guide and a 
source of inspiration for States, peoples and individuals. 
To spread knowledge of the declaration and instruct 
the public in its contents could not fail, in the 
long run, to form opinion.• 3e 
Another affirmation of this state of affairs was given 
f@rceful expression by the French.delegate to the Sixth 
Committee: 
. . . . . a declaration which technically speaking was 
merely a recommendation by the General Assembly 
could have no great legal value, no matter bow 
important its subject or bow large the majority 
by which it was adopted. To argue that it could 
acquire binding force or become a source of 
international law was to make a mockery of the 
~les governing the creation of international law. 
For all its psychological value, such a declaration 
would of necessiiPy be devoid of any binding force ••• '4o 
2. Perhaps a comparison might be drawn between it and'opinio 
juri~s:the psychological element in custom. 
3. Report of the 6th Committee, 17th Session, Document 
A 5356. para. 43. 
4. 6th Committee, 17th Session, 767th meeting, para.4., 
Mr. Patey (France) (A/C6/SR732-777) 
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The state representative of Brazil, Mr. Amado, gave his 
support within the Sixth Committee to a statement of 
opinion along similar lines. 
'A declaration on the principles of international 
law concerning friendly relations and co-
operation among states, while having no binding 
force, would have great psychological value, and 
would do for relations among States what the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights did for 
individual rights: it would guide and inspire 
states, peoples and individuals. Its dissemin-
ation and teaching would be bound in the long run 
to mould opinion.' 5B 
It seems fair to conclude that the 'psychological' value 
that certain states consider that resolutions of the General 
Assembly enjoy in certain circumstances may be rationalized 
in this fashion. Resolutions,or more especially declarations/ 
are not considered to be legally binding; yet neither are they 
completely worthless. For what the majority of states agree 
to be a common expression of their views on a certain matfer 
is bound to be persuasive in guiding a state's future behaviour. 
In such a situation, a declaration is a statement of aims, an 
ideal with which a state may be expected to act in accord -
inasmuch as this may be feasible. Hence the references to the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights which in its original 
form as a resolution of the General Assembly did not bind 
states. However, such has been the 'psychological' value of 
this declaration that states have adhered to the ideals stated 
therein to such effect that many consider them to have evolved 
into rules of customary international law. 6o 
5. 6th Committee, 17th session, 756th meeting, para 13 
(A/C6/SR732 - 777) Mr. Amado (Brazil) 
6. Hence the highly persuasive, though not legally binding 
nature of such resolutions c.f. the distinction between 
legal and material sources of law. See Parry, Sources 
and Evidences of International Law pl. 
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Another line of argument that attracted its fair share of 
support from among interested states was that of proposition 
(d); that declarations are of such a character that they 
may reasonably be expected to be obeyed by states. Yet 
even so,declarations were not regarded as legally binding 
per se, albeit that their passage might raise such an 
expectation of obedience. This is clear from the views 
.of the Ukranian representative to the Sixth Committee. 
'Although a declaration did not bind states as an 
agreement bound parties, United Nations experience 
had shown that its adoptiog was a solemn act and 
that it had much greater force than a mere 
recommendation. The organ adopting a declaration -
in the present case the General Assembly - expected 
the signatories to meet that declaration's 
requirements.' 7o 
Insofar as these views go they seem to a certain de@ree a 
statement of the obvious since it appears reasonable to 
expect a state which has voted positively in favour of a 
measure to obey its terms. The majority of African members 
of the United Nations gave their support to Resolution 
1514 (XV) against colonialism and have continually insisted 
on adherence to its terms. However, since a declaration is 
credited with no power to bind states legally, then must ~ 
be concluded that those states who abstain or cast a 
negative vote do not expect to be bound.. This seems to be 
the inference that may be drawn from the behaviour of those 
states who opposed Resolution 1514. 
However, it is probably true to say that the body of opinion 
which most accurately conveys the role of resolutions - if 
6th Committee, 17th Session, 757 meeting, para. 16, 
Mr. Nedbailo ~Ukranian Soviet Socialist Republic) 
(A/C6/SR732-777) 
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accuracy may be assessed on sheer wight of numbers -
is proposition (c). The majority of this support was 
drawn from the moderate faction of the United Nations 
including such Great Powers as the United Kingdom. 
Proposition (c) accords resolutions of the General Assembly 
no positive legal force. However, it does allow them a 
position of influence with regard to the development of 
international law by more traditional means - i.e. custom. 
'His delegation therefore did not accept the 
proposition that General Assembly resolutions 
could by themselves create international obligations, 
even for those states which supported them. They 
could not therefore be regarded as in themselves a 
separate source of international law •••• They might, 
however, in appropriate circumstances provide positive 
evidence that a 5iven principle or rule of law was 
regarded by the international community at large as 
binding upon it •••• ' 8& (New Zealand representative) 
Emphasis is given to the supposedly non-binding nature of 
resolutions of the General Assembly, and such statements 
are made frequently in the reported speeches of representatives. 
Somalia :-
'Although General Assembly resolutions did not 
constitute rules of international law •••• ' 9a 
But accompanying such a denial of the inherent legal nature 
of resolutions is more often than not the affirmation that 
such resolutions do have a role to play - usually that of a 
secondary and evidentiary nature. 
8. ibid 766th meeting, para. 21, Mr. Brady (New Zealand) 
(A/C6/SR 732 - 777) 
9. ibid 766th meeting, para 54, Mr. Darman (Somalia) 
(A/C6/SR 732 - 777) 
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Australia~-
'The utmost that could be said on the effect of a 
declaration of legal principles had been said in 
the passage quoted by the Indonesian representative, 
at the 809th meeting from Philip C. Jessup's book 
'A Modern Law of Nations' in which such declarations 
were described as 'persuasive evidence of the rule 
of law' . . . . . 
Austria;-
~To be sure, neither the Sixth Committee nor the 
General Assembly could create new rules for such 
rules could only obtain their legally binding force 
from a treaty or international custom •••• ' 11. 
Probably the position is best set out in the Reporn of the 
Sixth Committee to the General Assembly • 
'Although a declaration set out in a General Assembly 
resolution does not bind states in the same way that 
an agreement binds the parties to it, the adoption of 
such a declaration nevertheless would have much 
greater force than that of a mere recommendation. 
It might not be considered, prima facie, as a formal 
source of law, but it might become one if recognised 
by states as a rule of international law and adopted 
by them in practice, in Which case its provisions 
would become provisions of customary law.' 12. 
The final proposition (b) expresses the views of those states 
which accorded resolutions of the General Assembly - usually 
confined to declarations - some positive legal value. The 
number of states involved were comparatively few in number 
and usually belonged to that sector of the United Nations 
which included emergent African states and the more radical 
entities. 
10. 6th Committee, 18th Session, 817th meeting, para. 17, 
Sir Kenneth Bailey (Australia) 
11. ibid 818 meeting, para. 22, Mr. Kirchschlaeger(Austria) 
12. Report of 6th Committee, 18th Session, Doc A/567l.para.38. 
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India - to give but a single example - expressed the 
following opinion. 
. . . . the various General Assembly resolutions 
adopted by a very large majority could obviously 
be a source of international law. Indeed, that 
law was the expression of the will of the majority 
of states and the progressive development of 
international law prescribed in Article 13 of the 
Charter, could be nothing but the formulation of 
new rules of law.' 13. 
The delegate from Iran to the Sixth Committee also 
suggested an argument along similar lines. 
'It was difficult to see why a General Assembly 
resolution approved by an over-whelming majority 
should not constitute a source of international 
law ••• 1 14o 
Th0ugh :.tl}ese states argue that resolutions may be a source 
of international law, various issues are left uncertain. 
These include the size of the majorit,y necessary in order 
for a resolution to become binding. Moreover, it is not 
made clear why such resolutions are a source of international 
law. A connection with Article 13 of the United Nations 
Charter is hinted at, but its actual scope is not made clear. 
In a discussion which took place in the Sixth Committee on 
Resolution 2131 (XX) on the Declaration on the Inadmissibility 
of Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of States, 15. 
13. 
14. 
15. 
6th Committee, 17th session, 770th meeting, para 9. 
Mr. Mishra (India) (A/C6/SC 732 - 777). 
ibid 762 meeting~ para. 29, ~1r. !1irfenderesk, (Iran) 
(A/C6/SC732 -777J 
Passed at the 1408th plenary meeting of the General 
Assembly - 21st December, 1965. 
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there emerged the dichotomy that exists between those who 
attribute legal force to certain resolutions of the General 
Assembly and those who do not. Various African represent-
atives were quite prepared to accord Resolution 2131 (xx) 
binding force with little explanation as to where this 
power to bind originated. 16o 
Whereas the Norwegian delegate, Mr. Motzfeldt, speaking with 
reference to Resolution 2131 emphasized the importance of 
resolutions as an element of State practice. He then went 
on to state:-
'That import, however, should not be exaggerated. 
The General Assembly was not - at any rate not yet -
an international legislative assembly. Despite their 
great political and moral value, its resolutions were 
not immediately binding as rules of positive 
international law'. 17o 
These ideas are reflected in the opinions of Sir Kenneth 
Bailey, representative of Australia. He reaffirms that 
'··· recommendations of the General Assembly, of 
themselves, could not create general international 
law'. 18e 
But this is modified somewhat by the fact that 
••• a virtually unanimous recommendation might 
constitute such cogent evidence of the practice of 
states that it could, of itself, provide substantial. 
proof of the rules of general international law.' 19o 
16. See speech of delegate from the United Republic of 
Tanzania - Mr. Maliti - 6th Committee, 21st session, 
934th meeting, para. 43. 
17. 6th Committee, 21st session, 934 meeting, para. 49, 
Mr. Motzfeldt (Norway). 
18. ibid. 935th meeting, para. 5, Sir Kenneth Bailey (Australia) 
19. ibid para. 5. 
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This places the resolution in the role of an evidentiary 
instrument operating within the traditional modes of 
development of international law; that is the position 
stressed by proposition (c). 
Before concluding this presentation of those bodies of 
opinion expressed in relation to the status of resolutions 
of the General Assembly, some mention should be made of the 
value attached by member states to the process of 'consensus'. 
The business of the Sixth Committee is on certain occasions 
conducted on the basis of 'consensus'. It was employed when 
formulating declarations relating to Outer Space and the 
matter of Friendly Relations between States. The process 
operates ... in the following fashion. The Sixth Committee or 
else one of its sub-committees will discuss the views of 
states on a particular area of international affairs. Where 
there is agreement between states, there is said to exist a 
'consensus•. No vote will be taken on the matter. 
It will be recalled that Falk att·ributed to consensus - as 
understood by him - the role of a new basis of obligation in 
international law. But consensus as it operates within the 
United Nations seems to deviate from Falk's own conception. 
It is feasible or at least appears to be so, for a consensus 
to exist with the active opposition of some states. This is 
according to Falk. Yet 'consensus' as it is understood within 
the Sixth Committee requires unanimity, that is total consent 
on the part of member states. 
Perhaps this divergence is best explained in the following 
fashion. Consensus as employed by Falk relates to the 
passage of resolutions within the Assembly. Enough 
affirmative votes will evince a consensus and thus create 
the power to bind. 
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In contrast 'consensus' as it is utilised by the Sixth 
Committee is a process whereby agreement is reached as to 
the international position on a certain matter. Its use is 
in the process of the formulation of the resolution. 20. 
Though there is this basic divergence between the usesof 
the term 'consensus', it seems worthwhile to quote from the 
reported meetings of the Sixth Committee the particular 
fashion in which 'consensus' is regarded. The Italian delegate 
is led to point out that 
'••• by adopting the 'consensus' method, the Special 
Committee had acted in such a way as to give any 
Declaration adopted on the basis of the Special 
Committee's work a particular legal value'. 21. 
Other states such as Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the 
United States of America chose to express themselves in a 
somewhat more moderate fashion. This is bo.rne out by 
extracts taken from the speech of the New Zealand delegate to 
the Sixth Committee. 
'··· texts which were achieved by consensus which 
expressed the views of the international community 
as a whole had real value as evidence of international 
law'. 22 e 
There appears to be an inference that a text adopted by a 
process of consensus within the Sixth Committee may enjoy 
a particular status - either legal or evidentiary - which 
does not accrue where the method of consensus is not used. 
20. 
21. 
22. 
Its use is in indicating the area of agreement among 
states rather than the measure or degree of agreement. 
6th Committee, 20th session, 88lst meeting, para. 35, 
Mr. Sperduti ~Italy). 
ibid. 887th meeting, para. 49, Mr. Beeby(New Zealand). 
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Whether or not this reasoning may be extended so that a 
resolution accepted byilievast majority of states or else 
the unanimous vote of states may be regarded as a source 
of law remains to be seen. 
Undoubtedly special value is attached to 'consensus' as 
employed by the Sixth Committee - though what exactly 
that value is remains uncertain. In these circumstances, 
how certain can one be about the role played by consensus 
(interpreted in a different fashion) within the General 
Assembly? 
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INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE 
An attempt was made in the prec e .:ling pages to analyse the 
behaviour of states in order to arrive at some conclusions 
concerning the status of resolutions of the General Assembly. 
In order to supplement these views a review was undertaken of 
opinions expressed outside the United Nations. More 
specifically reference was made to the various South-West 
Africa cases which have come before.the International Court 
of Justice, in order to see whether any additional opinions 
on the status of General Assembly resolutions were forthcoming. 
The reason for cb~~ing these particular cases was as follows. 
One of the arguments advanced by the applicant states, Ethiopia 
and Liberia, in their submission to the Court was breach by 
South Africa of a norm of universal applicability condemning 
apartheid as illegal. The norm had originated in numerous 
resolutions of the General Assembly which had outlawed 
apartheid. South Africa had consistently voted against such 
resolutions, but not so the majority of other states. 
In their pleadings before the Court the following contention 
was made by the Applicant~, • 
'The Applicants contend that the Court should confirm 
the role of international consensus as a source of 
international law within the meaning of Article 38 of 
the Statute of the Court and within clear practical 
limitations. 'Consensus' is used by the applicants to 
refer to an overwhelming majority, a convergence of 
international opinion, a predominance of view; it means 
considerably more than a simple maj?rity, but something 
less than unanimity'. 1. 
This would result in those General Assembly resolutions 
backed by consensus being declaratory of international law. 
1. 1966 I.C.J. Reportsf4• 
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The actual issue contained in this claim was never decided 
upon since the Court ruled against the applicants as not 
enjoying a proper interest in the subject matter of the case. 
However, this did not prevent various judges from commenting 
on the matter. Probably the most cogent reasoning was that 
of Judge Jessup in his Dissenting Opinion. 
'••• I do not accept Applicants' alternative plea 
which would test the apartheid policy against an 
assumed rule of international law ~'norm') ••• (T)he 
argument of Applicants seemed to suggest that the 
so-called norm of non-discrimination had become a rule 
of international law through reiterated statements in 
resolutions, of the International Labour Organisation 
and of other international bodies. Such a contention 
would oe::open to ••• (the) attack ••• that since these 
international bodies lack a true legislative character, 
their resolutions alone cannot create law ••• ' 2o 
Rejection of the claim of international organizations to 
create legal norms was forthcoming from Judge Van vJyk in his 
Separate Opinion. In an examination of the relevant pronoun-
cements he considered them as unable to create at law 
'any rules of conduct binding upon the Respondent'. 3o 
Judge Tanaka in his Dissenting Opinion adds his weight to 
these views though wtth some modifications 
'Of course, we cannot admit that individual 
declarations, judgements, decisions, etc., 
force upon the members of the organization. 
resolutions, 
have binding 
VJhat is 
required for customary international law is, the 
repetition of the same practice;'. 4o 
2. South West Africa Case (second phase) 1966 I.C.J. Reports 
p.441 (Judge Jessup- dissenting opinion). 
3. ibid. p. 171 (Judge Van Wyk - separate opinion) 
4. ibid. p. 292 (Judge Tanaka - dissenting opinion) 
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What can be gathered from these various opinions 
expressed before the International Court of Justice 
is that 
(l) No individual resolution of an international 
organization is binding per se 
(2) Neither will the constant repetition of a 
resolution give it some 'legal qua1ity'. 5~ 
Other South West Africa cases seem to bear out these views. 
The 1955 case concerned with Voting Procedure on Questions 
relating to Reports and Petitions concerning the Territory 
of South West Africa is relevant in this context. 6o Here 
both Judge Klaestad and Judge Lauterpacht concluded that 
resolutions of the United Nations are not legally binding -
though there may be exceptions. 
Lauterpacht states his position in no uncertain terms. 
'The absence, in general, of full legal binding force 
in the resolutions of the General Assembly is a 
proposition so fundamental and rudimentary that an 
attempt to apply and circumscribe it need not be 
regarded as dangerous or unhelpful. ' 7. 
Though this is qualified at a later stage by Lauterpacht 
who emphasises that this is not to say such resolutions are 
completely worthless. He considers that an obligation exists 
on behalf of each and every state to study and act in good 
faith as regards the terms of a resolution. 
5. Though if States modify their practice to fit in with 
what the resolution/or resolutions demand then this may 
give rise to a rule of customary international law. 
See Tanaka supra. 
6. 1955 ICJ Reports P.68 et seq. 
7. ibid p.92 (Judge Lauterpacht - separate opinion) 
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Similar views were expressed by Judge Klaestad when 
considering whether the Union of South Africa was subject 
to more 'bnerous obligations under the United Nations than 
under the League of Nations. He considered this was not the 
case since resolutions of the General Assembly were not of 
the same character as those of the' League. Of the former, 
he said that they 'are, in my view, not of a legal nature 
in the usual sense, but rather of a moral or political 
character •••• But a duty of such a nature, however 
real and serious it may be, can hardly be considered 
as involving a true legal obligation and it does not 
in any case involve a binding legal obligation to 
comply with the recommendation.' 8 • 
It is however, conceded by Klaestad that an obligation 
exists to consider the recommendation in good faith. 
Another important case outside the line of South West Africa 
cases where the status of a resolution was involved was that 
of Certain Expenses of the United Nations. 9. Here the 
International Court of Justice was considering Whether or 
not certain resolutions authorising expenditure by the United 
Nations were indeed concerned with legitimate expenses of the 
Organization. 
The Court eventually gave an ~ffirmative reply to this ~estion, 
but not without several dissenting opi~ions being recorded. 
The prevailing view as regards the resolutions concerned was 
that they were operative even in relation to those states Who 
voted against them. Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice in his Separate 
Opinion stated that there was an 'intention to impose a 
definite financial obligation on Member States,' and that 
'this intention must be deemed to have extended to covering 
the payment by member States of their apportioned shares, 
8. ibid p.88 (Judge Klaestad - separate opinion) 
9. 1962 ICJ Reports p.l51 
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irrespective of how their votes were cast on any given 
occasion, at any rate as regards all the essential 
activities of the Organization ••• ' lOo 
Yet since this case concerned the financia~ obligations 
of the members of the Organization, and so relates to the 
internal functions of that body, this may explain 
Fitzmaurice~ treatment of the resolutions as obligatory. 11. 
However, among the Dissenting Opinions some judges disputed 
the stand taken by Fitzmaurice. For instance, Judge Koretsky 
took the view that 'the resolutions under assessment by the 
Court were not mandatory.' 
'The General Assembly may only recommend measures. 
Expenses which might arise from such recommendations 
should not lead to an obligatory apportionment of them 
among all members of the United Nations.' l2o 
If a conclusion is to be drawn as to the status of General 
Assembly resolutions, then it would appear from the evidence 
above, that one point is certain-that no binding force is 
attached to these resolutions (with the possible exception 
of resolutions relating to the internal functions of the 
United Nations). 
10. ibid p.2ll (Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice - separate opinion) 
11. See back p.99 
12. ibid p.287 (Judge Koretsky - dissenting opinion) 
- 130 -
• 
C H A P T E R XI 
It is proposed at this juncture in our argument to pause 
and attempt to assess what conclusions - if any - may be 
drawn from the preceding discussion. It will be recalled 
that our examination was undertaken with a specific aim in 
mind. That aim was as follows:-
To discover 
(a) whether international officials accept as a 
standard for the assessment of legal validity 
the approval by resolution of a rule - a 
resolution that is backed by the consensus 
of states 
(b) or whether a customary rule has emerged \vhich 
recognizes such resolutions as a new source 
• of law. 
Various sources of evidence have been examined in the 
preceding pages in an attempt to reach some conclusions on 
the matter. As has been indicated, there appears to be a 
great deal of similarity between the typesof evidence needed 
to establish either proposition (a) or (b). The former calls 
for proof of official acceptance, whilst the latter, in seeking 
to prove the existence of a rule of customary international law, 
will also rely heavily on pronouncements by individual officials, 
speaking on behalf of their states. 
In seeking confirmation of one or other of these propositions, 
the following areas have been examined in the hope that they 
might yield some information on the subject. 
(1) Academic opinion, 
(2) Official opinion as given in the United Nations, 
(3) Official opinion as given in the International 
Court of Justice, 
These sources - though by no means completely comprehensive -
were considered to be areas where any indication as to the 
status of General Assembly resolutions might be expected to 
evolve. 
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The results of the analysis may be stated as follows • 
Academic Opinion 
As was seen, academic opinion inclined towards assigning 
resolutions an evidentiary role. This vie""' is qualified 
some what by the fact that the bulk of jurists are prepared 
to concede that certain categories of resolutions,_ such as 
those concerned with the internal workinc:;s of the Organization, 
may be binding. But the reasons for their binding quality 
may be traced to those more conventional sources of 
international law and do not rest with the resolution per se. 
There did occur some exceptions to this generalisation of 
academic opinion. The most notable of these was Falk whose 
views have been set out and extensively discussed. Views of 
this nature, however, certainly appeared to be in the 
minority. 
True, certain writers such as Castaneda too~ a more ambivalent 
approach to the matter and hinted at a potential for certain 
General Assembly resolutions whose operation was never made 
completely clear. 
In the light of these statements of academic opinion, it is 
suggested that the following conclusions may be drawn as to 
the status of General Assembly resolutions - that the bulk 
of opinion assigns to them an evidentiary and not a legislative 
role. 
The Opinion of States as given within the United Nations. 
As was seenfrom our analysis of individual state opinion, there 
emerged four main bodies of opinion expressed on this partic-
ular matter. Though all those states who gave an opinion 
were agreed that resolutions were not totally without value, 
those who considered them to be legislative in effect were in 
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a considerable minority~ Indeed, it was clear that none of 
the Great Powers took so radical a view; instead its chief 
exponents were the 
Nigeria. 
emergent states such as Tanzania and 
In addition, the importance enjoyed by the process of 
'consensus' was the subject of divided opinion among states. 
However, those states who considered that a pronouncement 
backed by 'consensus' might bind states were in a definite 
minority. 
It appears from this that the bulk of state opinion was such 
as to assign resolutions of the General Assembly an evidentiary 
and not a legislative role. 
Qfficial Opinion as given in the International Court of Justice. 
The International Court of Justice has never explicity given 
its views as to the character of resolutions of the General 
Assembly. The matter has, however, arisen indirectly on a 
number of occasions, allowing Judges who feel so inclined to 
express an opinion on the matter. The position is once again 
far from clear. It does seem true to say that the majority 
view is that which does not consider resolutions as binding 
on members of an international organization. Exceptions are 
made to this proposition as was seen in the Expenses case where 
it was the opinion of some that even dissenting states might 
be bound by such a procedural resolution. 
Most Judges seemed to consider that resolutions were fo~ the 
most part not binding on dissenting states nor, it seemed, 
those states who voted in their favour. Yet this did not as 
a consequence produce a situation where resolutions were 
completely without worth. States were under an obligation, 
so it appeared, to act in good faith as regards their terms. 
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Thus the bulk of official opinion seemed to regard 
resolutions as lacking in legislative effect. 
From tl:ea3 individual conclusions it seems that a general 
conclusion may be framed to the effect that 
(a) official opinion does not indicate - nor for that 
matter does academic opinion- that those 
individuals who are responsible for the 
functioning of the international system have 
accepted as a test of legal validity - passage 
in a resolution of the General Assembly, 
(b) nor does that opinion indicate the emergence of 
a rule of customary international law which 
credits those resolutions backed by consensus 
as a new source of law. 
In an article on 'Consensus' Antony D'Amato reaches similar 
conclusions in this respect. 
'There is in short no metarule of the legislative effect 
of declarations of consensus. Thus, since consensus 
itself is not a metarule but merely a definition of what 
we mean by the expression 'international law', we are 
forced to conclude at the present time that a dissenting 
state is not bound by·c;a General Assembly resolution. 
Whether the assenting states are bound inter se will 
have to await the consensual development or rejection 
of a meta-rule to that effect.' le 
Our investigation into the status of General Assembly 
resolutions has forced us to conclude that they enjoy no 
independent legal value. Instead, we seem forced to conclude 
that their value lies in the contribution such resolutions 
make in influencin@ the behaviour of states, and ultimately 
toward the development of customary international law through 
1. D'Amato 'On Consensus' 8 Canadian Y.I.L. p.l41 (1970). 
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the practice of states. This attitude is summed up in a 
statement made by Sir Kenneth Bailey, Australian delegate 
to the Sixth Committee. 
'Recommendations of the General Assembly, of themselves, 
could not create general international law; ••• But a 
virtually unanimous recommendation might constitute 
such cogent evidence of the practice of States that 
it could, of itself, provide substantial proof of tbe 
rUleS Of general international laW o I 2 e 
This is so given the fact that certain resolutions - most 
importantly those described by Castaneda - may for various 
reasons be described as bindhg. 
If this is an accurate statement of the position, then it 
must be concluded that if a basic norm does exist within· 
the international system, it must and can only be custom. 
On all the evidence considered, no other conclusion seems 
possible. 
In view of this, we are once more placed in the dilemma as to 
whether or not custom may provide the content of a rule of 
recognition of the international system. Hart believes that 
this is not a feasible proposition and prefers to think of 
rules of international law being accepted piecemeal within 
the system. So the question occurs as to whether or not it 
is possible to glean a solution to these problems. What 
follows is an attempt so to do. 
It is intended to concentrate still on resolutions of the 
General Assembly. It has been shown that it is not possible 
to discern a general rule within the international system that 
gives resolutions of the General Assembly power to bind - and 
thus creates a rule of recognition. Instead, we shall now 
2. 6th Committee, 21st session, 935th meeting, para. 5., 
Sir Kenneth Bailey (Australia). 
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concentrate on individual resolutions of the General 
Assembly relating to specific areas of international 
behaviour. These areas are as follows;-
(1) Space -with particuliar reference to Resolution 
1962 (XVIII) 3o which was passed unanimously by 
the General Assembly~ 
(2) Self-determination - and the leading resolution on 
this particular topic Resolution 1514 (XV) 4e passed 
with nine abstentions. 
(3) Friendly relations between states - and Resolution 
2625 (XXV) 5o passed unanimously. 
The fact that each of these resolutions attracted virtually 
whole-hearted support from the Assembly is important in that 
it indicates that seemingly the terms of the resolution 
accord vrith the opinions of member states on the particular 
matter. 
We shall then examine the resolutions with a view to findir.g 
an answer to these following questions. 
A) Was the resolution binding on states when passed 
by the General Assembly? If so, why was this the 
case? This may appear a strange question to pose in 
the light of the preceding investigation. However, 
it is feasible that although a general rule of the 
type envisaged by Hart does not exist, individual 
resolutions might in particular circumstances be 
binding immediately on their passage through the 
Assembly. 
3. Passed at 1280tq plenary meeting of the General Assembly -
13th December, 1963. 
4. Passed at 947th plenary meeting of the General Assembly -
14th December, 1960 
5. Passed at 1883rd plenary meeting of the General Assembly -
24th October, 1970. 
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If this is indeed the case, then an isolation 
of the factors which produce such a result is 
called for, together with appraisal of what 
exactly their significance is for the 
international system. 
B) Has the resolution become binding since its 
passage? If so, why is this the case? An 
attempt will be made to discover whether the 
resolution has acquired its binding nature merely 
by a process of individual acceptance on the part 
of states - as Hart suggests is the case. 
'The rules of the simple social structure 
are, like the basic rule of the more 
advanced systems, binding if they are 
accepted and function as such. 1 6e 
Alternatively, have the terms of the resolution 
come to be regarded as binding since they 
accorded some overall criteria operating 
within the international system - that is 
custom. 
It is hoped that such questions will give us some 
indications into the workings of international law and 
an ultimate solution to the problem of whether or not a _ 
rule of recognition exists. 
The first set of resolutions to be considered are those 
concerned with the exploration and use of outer space. 
The most important of these are generally regarded as 
Resolution 1721 (XVI) 7o and Resolution 1962 (XVIII) entitled 
'A Declaration of Legal Principles governing th~ activities 
of states in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space.' This 
latter resolution is the culmination of several years of 
effort on the part of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of 
Outer Space. 8a 
6. Concept of Law p.230 
7. Ado?rodat the 1085th plenary meeting of the General 
Assemoly - 20th December, 1961. -
8. Committee was established by Resolution 1348 (XIII) in 
1958 - 792nd plenary meeting of the General Assembly -
13th December, 1958. 
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Resolution 1962 (XVIII) was passed unanimously when 
presented to the General Assembly and was hailed as a 
major step in the development of international law. But 
the problem that first confronts us is whether or not this 
resolution \'Jas immediately binding on those states who voted 
in its faviour; in this particular instance, all those 
states represented within the General Assembly. 
we· have seen that there is no general rule to this affect. 
Yet various statements made on the passage of this resolution 
indicate that this may indeed be an exceptional case. 
Particular attention should be paid to those attitudes 
displayed by the representatives both of the United States 
of America and the U.S.S.R. 9. 
A statement was made in the First Committee by the American 
prepresentative to the effect that the United States of 
America 
• • • • considered that the legal principles contained 
in the operative part of the draft declaration reflected 
international law as accepted by the members of the 
United Nations. The United States intended to respect 
them and hoped the conduct they recommended in the 
exploration of outer space \I'Iould become the practic·e 
of all nations.' 10 .. 
\vhereas the Soviet Delegate, though he declined to comment 
on the legal potential of the resolution did undertake the 
following pledge on behalf o·f the Soviet Union that it would 
'··· respect the principles enunciated in the draft 
declaration ±fit were unanimously adopted.' 11. 
9. Important because at the time these two countries were 
the sole space powers. They alone were concerned with 
the expl~ation of space. 
10. First Committee official Records, 18th session, 1342nd 
meeting, para. 4, Mr. Stevenson (.U.S.A.). 
11. ibid- para. 17, Mr. Fedorenko (U.S.S.R.). 
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In contrast, the reported speeches of other delegates on 
the terms of the resolution show that the American view is 
by no means universally held. The French representative 
stated that 
'(I)n as much as it will only be the subject of a 
General Assembly resolution and not of international 
agreements, it will, in point of fact, merely 
represent a declaration of intent ••• ;' 12o 
Whilst the Australian delegate referred to the resolution 
as 'not creative of legal duties'. 13. 
Indeed, the Polish Chairman charged with preparing the 
terms of the resolution characterized it as 
'a guiding document.' 14e 
Indeed, if regard is had to the tenor of the debates leading 
to the formulation of Resolution 1962(XVIII) the American 
view seems to be~minority opinion. Sir Patrick Dean, the 
United Kingdom spokesman stressed at a First Committee 
meeting in 1961 the importance of establishing a legal regime 
for outer space. Yet he regarded this as a gradual process 
which the United Nations might aid by laying down 'certain 
broad legal principles' which should be viewed as 'injunctions 
of great weight and as useful steps towards such a legal 
regime.' 15o 
12. Committee on the Peaceful uses of Outer Space , 
24th meeting, 18th session, November 22, 1963, 
Mr. Arnaud (France). 
13. ibid Mr. Hay (Australia) 
14. ibid Mr. Lachs (Pol~nd) 
15. First Committee official Records, 16th session, 1210th 
meeting, para. 30, Sir Patrick Dean (United Kingdom). 
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I"'oreover, in the First Committee debate which preceded the 
submission of the draft declaration to the General Assembly, 
it was stressed that the declaration was merely a 
declaration of principles and \'Jould require a more effective 
statement in order to be considered binding. 1'1r. Forthomme, 
the Belgian representative, was echoing the sentiments of 
many delegates when he said 
'(I)f the General Assembly approved the draft declartion, 
however, it would thereby be assuming the obligation to 
continue the work and ensure that the general principles 
contained therein were elaborated so that they could be 
put into practical effect through specific legal 
procedures.' 16 • 
From this we are led to conclude that on its passace by the 
General Assembly Resolution 1962 (XVIII) was not binding on 
the members of the Organization. This accords with Fawcett's 
view of Resolution 1962 (XVIII) as 'for the most part a 
declaration, not of rules of international law, but of 
directive principles.' 17a 
But we now have to consider whether there have been any 
subsequent developments which have altered the status of the 
principles contained in the resolution. In this context, 
it is worth considering resolution 1963(XVLII). 18o Herethe 
General Assembly 
16. 
17. 
18., 
'Recommends that consideration should be given to 
incorporating in international agreement form, in 
the future as appropriate, legal principles governing 
the activities of states in the exploration and use of 
outer space. ' 
First Committee Official Records, 18th session, 
l344th meeting, para. 3., Mr. Forthomme (Belgium) 
Fawcett 'International Law and the Uses of Outer Space' 
Chapter 1. p.l6. 
Passed at the 1280th plenary meeting of the General A 
Assembly- 13th December, 1963 A/RES/1963 (XVIII). 
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This is what various delegates had hinted was necessary in 
order to create principles which were legally binding. 1966 
saw the creation of such an agreement with the conclusion 
of the Outer Space Treaty. 19. Its terms closely parallel 
those of Resolution 1962 (XVIII) and indicate slight or no 
advance from this position. For this reason, among others, 
it has been criticized by Fawcett as a 'retrograde step'. 20. 
Be this as it may, the Treaty stands as a teiteration for 
the most part of Resolution 1962(XVIII). It creates binding 
obligations for those states who become parties to it, but 
does it make any more universally applicable the principles 
it conta~ns? This is unfortunately a very difficult question 
to which to frame an answer. The only fashion in which those 
principles goveFning outer space might operate with regard to 
all states is - according to the international system - through 
the medium of custom. In order to establish a customary rule 
of international law, two factors are necessary, usage and the 
belief that such a usage is demanded by law. In relation to 
6umrspace, the matter of usage poses a number of problems, not 
the least of which is the fact that very few states engage in 
space activities. This makes it difficult to establish any 
consistent pattern of practice on the part of the majority 
of states, though it is probably true to say that the 
minority of states which engage in the exploration of space 
do adhere to those principles which have been pronounced on 
the subject. 
19. Signed 27th January, 1967, Entered into force 
lOth October, 1967. 
20. Fawcett, op.cit., Chapter 1, p.l6. 
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It therefore appears far from clear whether the directives 
set out in Resolution 1962(XVIII) have acquired the character 
of law or have remained the guiding principles that they were 
initially judged to be. We have seen how by employing that 
traditional standard of international law - custom - there 
appears to be inadequate evidence on which to reach a 
conclusion. On the credit side, we have 
(1) the overhwhelming support given to the General 
Assembl:y resolutions on space 
(2) the conclusion of a treaty on the matter 
(3) the adherence by the existing space powers to 
these principles. 
But balanced against all this is the lack of actual usage on 
the part of states. The problem is whether acceptance on 
such a scale as has occurred with these General Assembly 
resolutions can be said to constitute 'law' without any 
basis in the form of usage. 21. 
It will be recalled that when Hart dealt with the adoption 
of rules into international society he denied the existence 
of a rule of recognition. Instead, he stated that 
'The rules of the simple structure are, like the basic 
rule of the more advanced systems, binding if they are 
accepted and function as such. ' 22. 
This implies that it is open to states to say that they 
accept Rule X .••• as binding and as long as its terms are 
kept then that rule is a rule of international law. 
Yet we have witnessed an instance where the states repres-
@nting the majority of mankind showed their acceptance of 
certain principles set out in Resolution 1962(XVIII). 
21. See D'Amato 'The Concept of Gustom in International Law' 
Chapter 3, p.56 et.seq. As has been seen he has adapted 
the traditional criteria used to discover a customary 
rule of international law. On the basis of what he Sc'"lJ"'.s 
the scarcity of practical examples would, perhaps,appear 
not all that important. 
22. Concept of Law. p.230 _ 142 _ 
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That acceptance, however, was not binding on those states; 
and this lack .of binding force· cannot simply be traced to a 
decision of the states not to be bound. Reasons were advanced 
and above all was the recommendatory nature of United Nations 
resolutions. There seems, indeed, to be a basic inconsistency 
between what Hart says is the case and what states do. 
The idea is present in connection with Resolution 1962(XVIII) 
that ih is not open to states to accept a rule as binding -
and it will immediately be so regarded. True, states can make 
such statements on th~ own behalf as did th~ United States of 
America. But the reaction of the majority was more guarded and 
pervaded by the idea that some format had to be observed before 
a rule might be binding. This is particularly marked in the 
stress on the need to conclude a treaty. 
Faced by the Space Treaty of 1966, it might appear that Hart's 
standards have been satisf1ed. The signatories to the 
treaty have accepted its principles and will consider 
themselves bound. They will keep the terms of that treaty 
and thus its principles will function as binding. But still 
we have not e.sta6\~\-\~ binding rules of international law, 
though it cannot be denied that the parties to the treaty 
are bound. In order to prove a rule of international law 
what we were searching for was proof of custom and since the 
evidence does not appear ~onclusive then we were unable to 
reach any firm conclusions. 
So it appears that in relation to those principles guiding 
the use of outer space, there have been two opportunities 
for states - if they behave as Hart believes them to do - to 
create for themselves rules of international law and on ne.i ther 
occasion does this seem to have occurred. Instead there appears 
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to be the inference that some outside criteria exists by 
which potential international law must be adjudged • 
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C H A P T E R XII 
The reasoning applied in the preceding pages will now 
be tested in relation to a particularly controversial area 
of international law - that of self-determination. The 
leading resolution in this context is Resolution l5l4(XV) 
which asserted the following rght to have universal operation. 
'All peoples have the right to self-determination; by 
virtue of that right they freely determine their 
political status and freely pursue their economic, 
social and cultural development.' lo 
Resolution 1514 (XV) passed by a vote in the General Assembly, 
recorded 89 favourable votes together with nine abstentions. 
Those member States abstaining included the United States of 
America and the United Kingdom - two of the so-called Great 
Powers whereas those member States from emergent areas 
such as Africa were whole-hearted in their support for the 
measure. 
The background to the eventual formulation of the resolution 
is interesting in that it illustrates the feeling that surrounds 
this topic. All the relevant discussion took place - not 
before one of the specialised committees of the United Nations, 
but tbe General Assembly. Indeed, the topic was put before 
the Organization by the Russian premier. 2. 
The whole tone of the debates that occurred is emotional 
in the extreme. African delegates denounced the rigo~s of 
colonialism, whilst the former colonial powers attempted to 
defend their records. 
l. Resolution l5l4(XV) , para. 2. 
Resolution l5l4(XV) grew out of a proposal presented to 
the General Assembly by Nikita Krushchev Premier of 
U.S.S.R. in his address to that body on 23rd September,l960. 
2. 
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In consequence, there is a marked absence of reference to 
the legal standing or indeed legal potential of those 
principles which were to form the content of Resolution 
1514-(XV). The whole emphasis is political - or indeed 
propagandist. 
Therefore, we find ourselves hard-pressed to answer whether 
those principles contained in Resolution 1514-(XV) were binding 
after their approval by the General Assembly. The few 
~elegates Who considered the matter seemed of the opinion 
that the resolution ranked as a statement of aims. The 
Libyan delegate referred to 'the moral effect of such a 
declaration',3e a sentiment Which was echoed by the 
Pakistan spokesman's reference to the 'moral command which 
will issue from this Assembly.' 4. The New Zealand delegate· 
considered that the task of the resolution was to place 'on 
record an optimum standard of attainment' 5., whilst the 
Swedish representative understood its terms to be a 
'statement of general objectives' not an 'act of legislation'.6o 
The view that Resolution 1514 (XV)was not binding immediately 
on its passage by the General Assembly is strengthened in 
the light of the American and British abstention. It seems 
unlikely that measures which do not attract the support of 
two of the most powerful members of tbe Organization, can be 
regarded as law. 7. Indeed, Miss J.A.C. Gutteridge, the 
one-time representative of the United Kingdom before the 
Sixth Committee, asserted that Resolution 1514-(XV) was in its 
terms inconsistent with the Charter, a fault which reduced it 
in her eyes to 'essentially a political document', an opinion 
4-. 
General AssemblyA 15th Session, 929th plenary meeting 
30th November, 1~60 para. 25. p.l035. 
ibid 930th plenary meeting, 1st December,l960, para.65,p.l059 
5. ibid 932nd plenary meeting, 2nd December,l960, para.l3, pl074-
6. ibid 94-6th plenary meeting, 14thDecember,l960, para.l6, pl266 
7. D'A~:1ato 'On consensus• Candanian Y.I.L. p.l4-l (1970) _ 146 _ 
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which re-iterated an earlier view taken by Professor 
Jennings. 8. 
All this evidence suggests that the right of self-determination 
did not rank as a legal right either prior to or after tbe 
passage of Resolution 1514 (XV). Yet this is not to 
under-estimate the role played by the principle of self-
determination. Mention is made of it in the articles of 
the United Nations Charter. 9. Among the list of Purposes 
of the Organization set out in Article 1, is the admonition 
to members to 'develop friendly relations among nations based 
on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-
determination of peoples.' 
Moreover, on various occasions during the history of the 
Organization the right of self-determination has been asserted. 
During its Eighth Session, a resolution came before the 
General Assembly which recognized 'the right of the peoples 
of Morocco to complete self-determination is conformity with 
the Charter.' 10. This failed to gdn the requisite two-thirds 
majority. Support for the right of self-determination in 
Tunisia also failed to muster the necessary support. 11. 
However, by its fifteenth session, the General Assembly was 
prepared to recognize - with the necessary two-thirds majority 
the right of the people of Algeria to self-determination. 12. 
8. J.A.C. Gutteridge - The United Nations in a Changing 
World - Chapter IV p.63. 
9. See Article 55 of the United Nations Charter. 
10. G.A.O.R. 8th session, agenda item 57, p6 (A/2 526), para.ll. 
Rejected 455th plenary meeting of the General Assembly. 
li~ Once more a draft resolution failed to obtain the necessary 
majority. See G.A.O.R. 8th session annexes, agenda item 56, 
p.5. ReJected 457th plenary meeting of the General Assembly 
(A/2530) para. 7. 
12. Resolution 1573 (XV) See also Resolution 1724(XVI) which 
affirmed the right to self-determination,basing itself on 
Resolution 1514(XV). · 
- 147 -
• 
• 
All this is indicative of the fact that support for the right 
of self-determination was growing, together with an awareness 
of its potential as a legal right. Resolution 1514 was yet 
another step in this direction. Indeed, Rosalyn Higgins 
takes the view that although this resolution was not bin~ing, 
it has done a lot to develop international practice. 13o 
It appears therefore that the weight of available evidence 
must lead us to conclude, that Resolution 1514(XV) did not 
crystallize the principle of self-determination into a legal 
right - though opinions do differ on this point. Probably 
Resolution 1514(XV) may be regarded as a water shed in the 
development of state practicre. Indeed, it was after this 
statement of principle that the right to self-determination 
in Algeria was affirmed. 
It now appears logical to enquire whether self-determination 
has subsequently achieved the status of a legal right. Because 
of the controversial nature of self-determination, this is an 
exc~edingly difficult question to answer. But various pieces 
of information have been forthcoming which do at least 
provide some valuable indications of how the situation has 
developed. 
The first of these is the frequency with which Resolution 
1514(XV) is cited within the Organization. In an analysis 
conducted into the re-citation of General Assembly resolutions, 
this particular resolution topped the list, with a total of 
95 citations. 14. 
13. 
14. 
See Rosalyn Higgins op.cit. Chapter 1, p.l04. 
See Bleicher 'Legal Significance of re-citation of 
General Assembly resolutions' 63 A.J.I.L. p.456 (1969). 
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This was an average 13.57 citations per session, well above 
the next highest rate of citations Which was that of 4 per 
session (Resolution 1654(XVI) )' 15. Indeed, Resolution 
l654(XVI) traces its origins from Resolution 1514 (XV) since 
the former is concerned with the setting up of a Special 
Committee in order to facilitate the implementation of the 
latter. 
The occasions on which the right of self-determination was 
considered relevant were f.or the most part concerned with the 
rights of existing colonies to independence. More unusual 
was the crisis over Southern Rhodesia where a former colony 
declared itself independent. However, government in this 
particular instance was centred in the hands of the white 
minority, which prompted the United Nations to allege this 
to be a breach of the right of the black majority to self-
determination. l6o 
Another area where the right of self-determination enjoyed 
some prominence was before the Sixth Committee. It was one 
of the seven principles of international law concerning 
friendly relations and co-operation among states, being 
considered by the Committee. Views as to the exact nature 
of this right were varied, though growing support attached 
to its categorization as a legal right. 
The Report of the Special Committee delivered to the Twenty-
fourth Session of the General Assembly bears out this opinion. 
15. 
16. 
'Most of the representatives speaking on the subject 
considered the self-determination of peoples a legal 
right, the existence of which was generally tecognized. 
Full title of resolution is 'The Situation with Regard 
to the Imple~entation of the Declaration on the Granting 
of Independence to Colonial Countries and people.' 
The significance of Resolution 1514~XV) in a non-colonial 
situation e.g.Bangladesh,was uncertain for a long time. 
see I.L.M. (1972) p.ll9 et.seq. 
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The nature of the principle as a legal right was 
attested to in various international instruments 
including the Charter of the United Nations and 
the many resolutions of the General Assembly'. 17. 
Among those Member States which expressed such a view were 
the Ukraine and Yugoslavia. 
There were other states, however, Who were more cautious 
in their awroach to this problem. Some representatives, 
including the United Kingdom delegate, refused to be drawn 
on the matter, contenting themselves with reference to the 
'principle' of self determination. 18. Others asserted the 
political nature of previous resolutions and that only then 
was attention being given to those legal aspects of self-
determination. 
'The text of that Declaration ·(on Granting of Independence 
to Colonial Countries and Peoples 1514 (XV)) • • • • • was a 
great political document, which, however, should have no 
more than persuasive force in discussions of the legal 
elements of the principle.' 19. 
(Canadian representative). 
Accordingly, it is interesting to consider the manner in vJb. ich 
the principle of self-determination was expressed in the 
Friendly Relations Declaration (Resolution 2625(XXV)).Are 
its terms a complete departure from those of Resolution 
1514(XV)? If this is so, is it due to the fact that 
Resolution 1514(XV) was merely a political statement of the 
principle of self-determination whose legal elements and 
indeed whose existence as a legal right is only now becoming 
obvious? 
17.Report of the Special Comnittee, Supplement no, 19 (A/7619), 
para. 152 (24th session). 
18.See speech of the United Kingdom delegate to the Sixth 
Committee, 20th session, 890th meeting, 3rd December,l965, 
para. 15-20 
19.Records of the Sixth Committee, 21st Session, 928th meeting, 
9th Novembe~, 1966, para 3 p.l65. 
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The initial remarks of Resolution 2625 (XXV) concerning the 
'principle of equal rights and self-determination of people' 
are as follows. 
'By virtue of the principle of equal rights and self-
determination of peoples enshrined in the Charter, all 
peoples have the right freely to determine, without 
external interference, their political status and to 
pursue their economic social and cultural development, 
and every state has the duty to respect this right in 
accordance with the provisions of the Charter'. 
Compare this \a th Resolution 1514(XV) which declares that 
'All peoples have tbe right to self-determination; 
by virtue of that right they freely determine their 
political status and freely pursue their economic, 
social and cult ural development'. 
Though these two statements do not correspond in toto, it 
appears that there is a great degree of similarity between 
the two provisions - a similarity that extends to other 
provisions. Thus Resolution 2625(XXV) stresses the duty of 
a state to abstain 'from any forcible action which deprives 
peoples' of their right to exercise the principle of self-
determination. A similar sentiment is expressed in 
Resolution 1514(XV) though in what appears to be a more 
militant fashion. 
'All armed action or repressive measures of all kinds 
directed against dependent peoples shall cease in 
order to enable them to exercise peacefully and 
freely their right to complete independence . . . . . 
It appears impossible to deny the parallels that may be 
drawn between Resolutions 1514(xv) and 2625(XXV). Yet 
this is not to deny the fact that each document is different 
in outlook to its fellow. Resolution 1514(XV) strikes a 
propagandist note - as seems only logical in the light of 
its background. 
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In contrast, the tone of Resolution 2625(XXV) is much more 
moderate as befits a document drafted over a number of years 
by the Sixth Committee. The references to 'immediate steps' 
and that 
'Inadequacy of political, economic, social or educational 
preparedness should never serve as a pretext for delay-
ing independence' have disappeared. Instead their 
place is tru~en by much more sedate and well-thought out 
provisions. 
'The territory of a colony or other non-self-governing 
territory has, under the Charter of the U.N., a status 
separate and distinct from the territory of the state 
administering it; and such separate and distinct status 
under the Charter shall exist until the people of the 
colony or non-self-governing territory have exercised 
their right of self-determination in accordance with 
the Charter, and particularly its purposes and 
principles. ' 
In the light of the above comparison, it seems fair to say 
that the terms of both Resolution l514(XV) and 2625(XXV) do 
to some degree reflect one another, although Resolution 2625 
(XXV) probably contains the more comprehensive analysis of 
self-determination. Above all, the right of self-determ-
ination has remained constant - even insofar as the wording 
of both resolutions is identical in some respects. Inde.ed, all 
the indications seem to be that some time after the passage 
of Resolution l514(XV) the right of self-determination became 
a legal right. This is not to say that the provisions of 
l514(XV) as such became binding, merely the right of self-
determination which it elaborates whilst subsequent practice 
on the part of states an<ill. its inclusion in Resolution 2625 C=xv') 
have served to make clear the range of application of the 
principle. 
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If it is accepted that self-determination is a legal right, 
then Resolution 2625(XXV) is a means whereby that legal 
right is delimited to some extent. The bounds of self-
determination are set out, vJhereas before merely the right 
existed. 
But the matter that should really concern us - given the fact 
that self-determination exists as a legal right - is when 
exactly this was achieved. It can be said with some 
confidence that this 'transformation' occurred between the " 
passage of Resolution 1514 and Resolution 2625. There seems 
to be evidence to support this view. Rosalyn Higgins says of 
self-determination:-
'It therefore seems inescapable that self-determination 
has developed into an international legal right and is 
not essentially a domestic matter. The extent and scope 
of the right is still open to some debate.' 20e 
In addition, she refutes the claim that Resolution 1514(XV) 
is binding per se. Self-determination has become a legal 
right because 
'that Declaration, taken together with seventeen years 
of evolving practice by United Nations organs, provides 
ample evidence that there now exists a legal right of 
self-determination'. 21. 
Indeed, it appears more than likely - and the matter cannot 
be stated with greater certainty - that self-determination 
became a legal right soon after the passage of Resolution 
1514(XV). The Organization of American States, two years 
after the passage of Resolution 1514, referred to self-
determination as 
'a basic part of the juridical system that governs 
relations among the republics of the hemisphere and 
20. Rosa:{yn Higgins op.cit Chapter 3, p.l03. 
21. ibid p.l04. 
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makes friendly relations among them possible.' 22o 
In terms of practical examples, the acceptance of a legal 
right of self-determination gathe~impetus after tbe 
Declaration of 1960. Witness the example of Algeria where 
the right of self-determination was asserted contemporan-
eously with the Declaration on self-determination. 23. 
Close on its heels came the re-affirmation of this right in 
a Security Council resolution on Angola. 24. A committee was 
set up by the General Assembly in order to ensure the 
implementation of the Declaration on self-determination 25. 
Moreover, as Southern Rhodesia progressed toward independence, 
the behaviour of th~ United Kingdom was censured as not 
fulfilling the terms of the Declaration on self-determination 
in that the vast majority of the African population were 
being denied equal rights and liberties under the 
constitution at that stage. 
All this led Rosalyn Higgins to the opinion that it was 
'academic to argue that as General Assembly resolutions are 
not binding nothing has changed'; 26. that self-determination 
remains a principle and not a legal right. Though self-
determination, it may be conceded, is a legal right and 
became so soon after 1960, this is not to say that as a 
legal right, its scope is undisputed. Its application to the 
so-called colonial situation is straight-forward enough, in 
that it asserts the rights of the majority within a given unit. 
22. Organization of American States - 8th meeting - Uruguay, 
January 22-31, 1962 - OAS officfual Records OEA/Ser.F/11.8 -; 
56 AJIL p.607 (1962). 
23. See back p.llt-'7 
24. 9th June 1961 S/4835 
25. Resolution 1654 (XVl) 27th November, 1961 
26. Rosalyn Higgins, op.cit, Chapter 3, p.lOl. 
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However, its operation is apparently far from clear in 
situation where a group within an area seeks to break 
away, as did the Bengalis in Pakistan. Here the scope of 
the legal right of self-determination remains unsure. 27. 
Yet if self-determination became a legal right soon after 
the 1960 Declaration, to what may we attribute its 
acquisi~ion of binding force? 
Now if Hart is correct in his description of how 'international 
law' ·Comes into being, a rule is binding if it is accepted 
and functions as such. Undoubtedly the idea of self-
determination has been accepted by the international 
community for a great many years. For proof of this one 
merely bas to look to the Charter of the United Nations. 
Yet it is only recently that self-determination has come to 
function as a legal right and be considered as binding, after 
its statement in Resolution 1514 and its constant re-citation 
in the Assembly as applicable in various 'colonial' 
situations. 
There must be some explanation for the gap between these two 
occure.nces. The concept of self-determination has been agreed 
upon for many years, yet its emergence as a legal right has 
been delayed until states have shown both by word and deed 
that there is sufficient usage for it to be regarded as 
binding. 
Logically if Hart was correct in what be said then there should 
be continuity between acceptance and its function as a rule 
of law. 
27. See p. '~ 
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If there is a gap between these two processes, then why is 
this the case? Let us for the moment take the example of 
self-determination. 
(1) There has been for many years acceptance 
of the principle of self-determination 
(2) It is only after the 1960 Declaration that 
self-determination seems to have achieved 
the status of a legal right. 
(3) The step from (1) to (2) was achieved because 
of the factor called practice. Only when 
self-determination had attained the status 
of a custom by means of practice could it be 
described as binding. 
Indeed, it appears that Hart has neglected this factor (3), 
It is not enough for a rule to be accepted as..-: if it were 
binding. It may only be described as part of international 
law when the criteria for establishing a customary rule of 
international law - practice I opinio juris are satisfied. 
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C H A P T E R XIII 
Resolution 2625(XXV) - official title 'A Declaration of 
the Principles of International Law concerning Friendly 
Relations and Cooperation among States' - is our final 
choice of resolution for discussion and analysis. Adopted 
unanimously by the General Assembly, this declaration had 
as its purpose, 'the progressive development and modification 
of the following principles'. 
(a) The principle that states shall refrain in their 
international relations from the threat or use of 
force against the territorial integrity or 
political independence of any State, or in any 
other manner inconsistent with the purpose of the 
e United Nations; 
(b) The principle that states shall settle their 
international disputes by peaceful means in such 
a manner that international peace and security and 
justice are not endangered; 
(c) The duty not to intervene _in matters viithin the 
domestic jurisdiction of any State in accordance 
with the Charter; 
(d) The duty of States to cooperate with one another 
in accordance with the Charter; 
(e) The principaJe of equal rights and self-determination 
of peoples; 
(f) The principle of sovereign equality of States; 
(g) The principle that States shall fulfil in good 
faith the obligations assumed by them in accordance 
with the Charter, so as to secure their· more 
effective application within the international 
community would promote the realization of the 
purposes of the United Nations. l. 
1. Resolution 2625(XXV), preamble. 
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The first thought that occurs on readiq; these principles 
and the manner in which they are elaborated upon in 
Resolution 2625(XXV) is the familiar ring that many portions 
possess. An explanation is forth-corning in that each of 
these principles originates in the Charter and in some 
instances-the principle to refrain from the use of force is 
one example-even before this. Other matters expounded within 
Resolution 2625(XXV) have been the subject of discussion and 
frequent resolutions within the General Assembly. In this 
context we may mention the assertion that 
'a war of aggression constitutes a crime against the 
peace, for which there is responsibility under 
international law.' 
Immediately this brings to mind the War Crimes Tribunals 
and their setting up at the conclusion of the Second World 
War. There are also echoes of the Organization's own 
deliberations on this topic when concerned with the 
operation of the Nuremberg Tribunal. (RES. 95(i) ). 2& 
Similarities occur in the elaboration of other principles, 
between previous pronouncements of the General Assembly and 
the terms of Resolution .2625(XXV). Indeed, as was pointed 
out in our discussion of the concept of self determination, 
the spirit and sometimes even the words of Resolution 1514(XV) 
are repeated in Resolution 2625(XXV). 
The presence of this air of deja vu leads us to ask whether 
this air of familiarity is an indication that Resolution 
2625(X~) is binding. It seems logical to expect that this 
might prove the case with a resolution that re-iterates much 
that is familiar in international law. Yet, a look at the 
debates \~ich preceded the drawing up of this resolution seem 
to prove the cont.rary. Over and over again, it is asserted by 
2. Passed at 55th plenary meeting of the General Assembly -
11th December, 1946. 
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representatives to the Sixth Committee (where the resolution 
originated) that the resolution that results from their 
deliberations will not be binding~ A cross-section of 
their views makes this plain. 
'In other words, a resolution or a declaration did not 
become a rule of international law merely because it was 
adopted by the General Assembly, and was not binding 
even on the States Members of the United Natilions'. 3. 
(Sir Kenneth Bailey .•• Australia) 
. . . . His delegation therefore did not accept the 
proposition that General Assembly resolutions could 
by themselves create international obligations, even 
for those states which supported them. ' 4a 
(Mr. Brady ••• New Zealand) 
Again, 
'a declaration, which technically speaking was merely a 
recommendation by the General Assembly, could have no 
great legal value, no matter how important its subject 
or how large the majority by which it was adopted.'5. 
(Mr. Patey •.• France) 
'However.valuable its content, no declaration was endowed 
with legal force. '6. 
(Mr. Njo-Lea w •• Cameroon) 
.... everybody knew that General Assembly resolutions 
did not bind memper states. ' 7. 
(Mr. Vasquez ••• Co~umbia) 
Tr.ue there were some states who asserted their belief that 
resolutions might indeed be binding, but these were in a 
minority. 8. 
3. Sixth Committe, 17th session, 758th meeting, 13th November, 
1962, para. 14. (A/C6/SR 732 - 777). Sir Kenneth Bailey-(Australia) 
4. ibid. 766th meeting, 26th November 1962, para.ll, 
Mr. Brady (New Zealand) 
5. ibid. 769th meeting, 27th November,l962, para 4, Mr. Patey (France) 
6. ibid para. 34, Mr. Njo-Lea (Cameroon) 
ibid 770th meeting, 30th November, 1962, para. 15, 
see back p. 12.e - 159 - (Mr. Vasquez(Columbic..;.. 7. 8. 
• 
• 
Resolution 2625(XXV) is judged on the evidence of what 
states have had to say during the course of its formulation, 
a declaration without the power to bind. 
Yet we are aware that many of the principles that have been 
elaborated upon within this resolution are binding rules of 
international law. Take as an example the duty to refrain 
from the use of force. As early as 1928 the :13.rimd-Kellogg 
Pact was making such an obligation incumbent upon states. 9. 
Indeed the probabilities are that even at this early stage, 
this principle was well on the way to being a rule of 
international law • Whilst the terminology of Article 2(4) 
of the United Nations Charter seems to settle the matter 
beyond all shadow of a doubt. 10. 
So it seems that we are faced with the following dilemma:that 
although much of the content of the resolution is well-
established in international law, the resolution itself, 
if the opinion of states is to be believed, is not binding~ 
However it does appear feasible to offer an explanation of 
this state of affairs. The answer is thought to lie in the 
preamble which prefaces the resolution. This speaks in 
terms of 'the progressive development and codification' of 
the seven principles under discussion. 
'Codification' and 'progressive development' refer to 
particular processes which are employed by those whose task 
it is to secure the advancement of international law. 
9. U.K.T.S. 29 (l929)Cmd. 3410; L.N.T.S. 57· 
10. 'All members shlll refrain in their international 
relations from the threat or use of force against 
the teritorial integrity or political independence 
of any state ·• 
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A valuable commentary on the scope of these processes and 
the need which they satisfy, has been provided by Jennings. 11. 
It is to this that we now turn. 
'Codification' Jennings concludes, 'means any systematic 
statement of the whole or part of the law in written form and 
that does not necessarily imply a process which leaves tbe 
main substance of the law unchanged, even though this may be 
true of some cases.' l2e In stressing this degree of 
innwation that may be part and parcel of any codification 
Jennings points out that 'codification properly conceived 
is itself a method for the progressive development of the 
law. ' 13. 
Progressive development instead of focusing its activities on 
an already 'well-developed sphere of law' concentrates instead 
on an area of law which is not 'highly developed or formulated 
in the practice of states. ' It aims to establish new rules 
with a view to channelling the future behaviour of states. 14. 
Having gained some insight into the significance of the terms 
'codification' and 'progressive development', consideration of 
Resolution 2625(XXV) may be renewed. From what has been said, 
it seems that the mention of these two process~in relation to 
this resolution may be of some importance. In order to explore 
this further, we may ask ourselves whether Resolution 2625(XXV) 
aptii}b un t s to 
v' (a) a codification 
(b) a progressive development 
(c) a combination of both processes - as the preamble 
would have us believe. 
11. Jennings - 'Progressive Development of International Law 
and its Codification' 24 B.Y.I.L. p.30l (1947). 
12. ibid p. 3ol 
13. ibid p. 301 
14. ibid p. 301 
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On the evidence of a first reading, it appears that what we 
have is a codification. As has already been pointed out, 
there is much in this resolution which is a duplication 
of already existing rules of international law. Many of its 
provisions merely re-emphasise what is already set out in the 
Charter of the United Nations. A critique of the impact of 
this so-called Friendly Relations declaration has summed up 
the provisions relating to the duty to cooperate as an accurate 
reflection of the obligation under the Charter to cooperate. 15o 
Whilst the principle of sovereign equality of states is said 
to be 'an important affirmation of article 2 paragraph 1, of 
the Charter.' 16. 
However,closer study reveals that the originators of this 
resolution have not been content merely to reiterate the terms 
of the Charter. Take for example that section which deals 
with non-intervention. This represents a concerted effort 
on the part of states to isolate the legal eleHlent s of this 
principle. Previously, states had been content to busy 
themselves with doctrinaire pronouncements on this topic, 
such as that contained in Resolution 213l(XX). 17. What has 
been embarked upon here is attempt to ~~ew political bias, 
and instead develop a cohesive body of law on this particular 
topic. In the context of non-intervention, this task proved 
harder than most, with the Committee ranged between those Who 
favoured wholesale adoption of Resolution 213l(XX) and those 
who opposed it. The outcome was a compromise. Yet compromise 
or not, it shows what the Committee sought to achieve, the 
legal definition of certain principles, rather than their 
mere re-iteration. 
15. 
16. 
17. 
Rosenstock 'Declaration of Principles of International 
Law concerning Friendly Relations' 65 AJIL p.729 (1971) 
ibid. p. 73 3. 
Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in the 
Domestic Affairs of States and the Protection of their 
I:1.dependence and Sovere:ljnty. - 162 -
• 
However, given the lack of progress in the sphere of non-
intervention, the cause of self-determination appears to 
have been advanced. 
The previous chapter, it will be recalled, traced the 
emergence of self determination into a legal right. Here 
the process is advanced a stage further. The point had 
' been reached when it was no longer adequate to state that 
peoples had a right to self-determination; more was needed in 
the shape of an 'in-depth' legal analysis. Resolution 2625(XXV) 
goes, at least some way towards achieving this. To illustrate 
this point, let us refer to the cant ro.versy that has always 
existed over whether or not the right of self-determination 
may be asserted in a situation other than a·colonial 
situation. Paragraph seven of that portion dealing with 
self-determination is said on 'closer examination of its 
text' to 'reward the reader with an affirmation of the 
applicability of the principle to peoples within existing 
states and the necessity for governments to repres~nt the 
governed.' 18. If this reading of the text is accurate, 
then this appears to be an advance ... or perhaps mare 
accurately ••• an attempt at advancing the law in relation 
to self-determination. It can be viewed as an effort to 
resolve the problem of whether self-determination has any 
applicability beyond the colonial situation. The ansv.,rer 
provided here is 'yes'. Just how states will view this 
clarification of the principle will have to be gauged on 
their subsequent behaviour. Thus, when Bangladesh asserted 
that its declaration of independence from Pakistan was a 
vindication of its right of self-determination, the 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
18. Rosenstock op.cit p.732. 
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international community treated this claim with caution • 
The United Nations does finally appeared to have recognised 
the truth of this claim, and as a consequense the success 
achieved by Resolution 2625(XXV) in advancing the cause of 
self-determination. 19. 
All this discussion must, it is believed, lead to the 
inevitable conclusion that Resolution 2625 (XXV) is in 
part a codification and. in part a progressive development. 
Whether the degree of progressive development is merely that 
degree of latitude allowed for within the process of 
codification, as was indicated by Jennings, or whether it 
exceeds those limits, is hard to decide. The innovations 
when they occur can be quite far-reaching. Probably, the 
Polish delegate to the Sixth Committee best summed up the 
Committee's achievement. 
' •••• the principles of the United Nations Charter, 
which had become a part of existing international 
law as soon as the Charter had been drafted, were 
binding on all states whether members of the United 
Nations or not. Many changes, however, had occured 
since 1945. Some of the principles in the Charter 
therefore needed amplification: others needed study 
from a nev1 point of view; still others, hardly formed 
in 1945, had - as the representative of Japan had 
said - matured into legal concepts. For example, 
the principle of self-determination had already 
been maturing for a long time before it had been 
set down in the Charter.' 21. 
Though we may have satisfied ourselves as to the role 
fulfilled by Resolution 2625 (XXV), we still have to 
reconcile these two points of view concerning this resolution. 
19. See I.L.M. (1972) p. 119 et.seq. 
21. 6th Committee, 17th session, 760th meeting, 15th 
November, 1962, Mr. Lachs (Poland) (A/C6/SR 732-777) 
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e gleaned from Sixth Committee debates. 
(b) the view that the content of resolution 2625(XXV) 
is partially though not completely binding. That 
part of it which reflects customary internat~onal 
law has the power to bind states. Whilst the 
remainder is an attempt to direct the future practice 
of states in their dealings with one another. 
The answer seems to lie in the fact that only that portion is 
binding which reflects what is well-established practice among 
states i.e. customary international law. The statement of 
such binding rules, or .indeed potentially binding rules, in 
a resolution in no way accounts for :their binding quality. 
Nor will it suffice to make potentially binding rules, binding. 
What was needed, as was constantly stressed by delegates to 
the Sixth Committee, was that these principles had gained, 
or might in the future gain, the status of ru~es of law 
through the medium of one of the accepted law creating 
processes i.e. custom. Though this is not to dispute 
that inclusion in a resolution might be regarded as 
valuable evidence of the standards of behaviour that states 
regarded as acceptable. Yet this was no more than a step 
towards the proo~ of a rule of customary international law. 
The above deserves to be contrasted with what Hart has to 
say concerning international law. 
'The rules of the simple structure are, like the basic 
rule of the more advanced systems, binding if they 
are accepted and function as such'. 22. 
Here we have acceptance in that resolution 2625(XXV) was 
adopted without dissent. Yet states are unwilling to 
consider themselves bound. If Hart is to be believed, 
international law is no more than a set of rules intended 
to govern a simple social structure. Acceptance should be 
22. Concept of Law. p.230 
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sufficient. Yet the behaviour of states seems to belie 
this. States demanf that in order for them to be bound, 
the power to bind must come from a source other than 
that of mere acceptance. Sir Kenneth Bailey, when dealing 
with the ways in which a rule acquired obligatory force in 
international law, out-lined the following possibilities. 
'The rule was either embodied in a treaty entered into 
in accordance with the constitutional processes of the 
··(-~'-
parties; or it~generally acted upon in the practice of 
states out of a conviction that states were bound so 
to act; or it was adopted by a judicial or similar 
tribunal authorized to declare and apply the law'. 23. 
Nowhere is it indicated that acceptance is enough to bind 
states to a particular pattern of behaviour. Instead there 
are certain criteria that states expect to be fulfilled 
before they consider themsel~es bound. This seems to be 
( 
completly contrary to any picture of international society 
as a simple social structure. Since these criteria do 
undoubtedly exist, then this suggests there is some measure 
of agreement among those who represent states. i.e. their 
officials as to the content of these criteria. Indeed, the 
whole process is reminiscent of that which occurs within a 
municipal law system which possesses a rule of recognition. 
6th Committee, 17th session, 758th meeting, 
13th November, 1962, para. 13. (A/C6/SR 732-777) 
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S U M M A R Y 
It is beiieved that from the examination of Resolutions 
1514, 19b~ and 2625 the following propositions may be 
said to sum up the situation. 
(1) None of these resolutions was binding immediately 
on its passage through the General Assembly. 
The only possible exception was with regard 
to Resolution 2625 some of Whose content might 
be described as binding. The explanation for 
this lies in the fact that the resolution was 
in some instances re-iterating well-established 
rules of customary international law. In no 
respect did the presence of these rules in a 
General Assembly resolution explain their binding 
quality. 
(2) However, it was possible to conclude that in 
certain instances the contents of a particular 
resolution, whether in whole or part, had become 
binding after its passage. 24. The reasons for 
this.are most important. 
Hart suggests that this is so since the rules have 
been accepted and are seen to function as binding 
rules of international law. He does not concede 
the presence of any outside criteria whereby one 
may predict that a rule will be a rule of 
international law. 
24. See back p.t53 Q..t s~ 
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Ho\llever, as has been pointed out, the behaviour 
of states does not seem to accord with this idea 
of Hart's. States would willingly show their 
acceptance of certain codes of behaviour set 
out in resolutions, yet not consider this 
sufficient to create binding rules. 
What was necessary was for states to see whether 
the rules in question fulfilled the criteria for 
establishing themselves as rules of customary 
internationa+ law. This was a concerted view 
whether expressed by state representatives or 
judges of the International Court of Justice. 25. 
Hart compares the rules of international law to 
the rules of etiquette. 26a There is no way 
in which one may predict what will or will not 
be regarded as 'good manners' - only time will tell. 
In contrast, though the process may be 
unsatisfactory and even uncertain, it is custom, 
seen as a definible process, which enables one to 
say what is or is not a rule of international law. 
It enables one to say what is or is not a binding 
ruJ:~. 
25. See back p. /14 u- ~· 
26. Concept of Law p. 228. 
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CH-APTER XIV 
Conclusion 
It is appropriate, at the conclusion of this research, to 
look back over the preceding chapters and try to g;au.ge 
what has been achieved. It will be recalled how we began 
our analysis with a consideration of Hart's conception of 
international law. In this there occured several statements 
on the part of Hart - not the least of \vhich was that 
international law c:onsisted :.of a set of rules - which 
seemed worthy of closer examination. 
Before such a programme of investigation got under way, some 
time was devoted to deciding whether or not Hart's system of 
primary and secondary rules was appropriate for use in 
international lavJ. What emerged was that there was no 
overwhelming reason why this should not be done. In fact 
quite the opposite seemed to be true. Moreover, in the 
process of so deciding, other items of information were 
forthcoming, including the intangible nature of the rule of 
recognition. Indeed, although Hart regarded the emergence 
of such a rule as dependent on the acceptance of officials, 
it was seen how, on an international level, this was hardly 
distinguishable from the emergence of a rule of customary 
international law. There appeared to be no reason why Hart 
might not dismiss the potential content of a rule of 
recognition as nothing more than an addition to the set of 
international law rules. 
Putting this to one side, an analysis of international law 
in terms of primary and secondary rules yielded some very 
interesting results. The premise that international law 
- 169 -
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is a set of primary rules was tested against the 
characterisation of such a society as described by Hart. 
The two were found not to correspond to a very significant 
degree. Defects such as uncertainty and inefficien~ were 
found to be present only in situations where they appeared 
unavoidable given the particular nature of international law. 
Even more significant was the existence of secondary rules 
corresponding to the secondary rules of change and 
adjudication: though these had not developed to quite the 
degree of sophistication encountered among municipal law 
secondary rules. Yet undoubtedly the rules were there, so 
that already our understanding of international law was 
advanced. 
However, it is on the central issue of whether or not 
international law may lay claim to a rule of recognition 
that we intend to dwell. Various sources were considered 
that might potentially provide the content for such a rule. 
They included (i) 
(ii) 
(iii) 
(iv) 
judicial decisions, 
custom) 
multi - lateral treaties, 
resolutions of the United Nations> 
Of these, multi-lateral treaties and judicial decisions 
possessed the weakest claims. Tne former, it was decided, 
could be disregarded; the later, wh~t it could be used to 
asc~ain a rule of international law was regarded as being 
of marginal importance given the scarcity of judicial 
decisions. 
This left us with the two main candidates, custom and United 
Nations resolutions. Now a detailed examination was made 
regarding the status and effect of U.N. resolutions and 
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whether they might be regarded as binding. Without going 
into the evidence once again, it emerged that resolutions 
of the United Nations were regarded as binding immediately 
on their passage through the ~Organjz 9.tion only by a minority 
of states and academics. If the opposite had proved to be 
the case then it might have been possible to say that 
officials had accepted as a rule of recognition, passage 
in a resolution of the U.N. 
At this point we were left with the alternative that:-
(a) either custom formed the content of the rule 
of recognition, a prospect that Hart 
dismissed out of hand, 
(b) or there was no such rule and Hart was correct 
when he described rules as being accepted 
piecemeal within the international system. 
The latter proposition was tested in relation to various 
U.N. resolutions where states had shown their. acceptance 
of a measure by means of an affirmative votre in the General 
Assembly. If what Hart said was accurate then states it 
seems, would show by their behaviour that such rules were 
binding. This was shown not to be the case. States 
stressed time and time again that something more than 
acceptance was needed to bind their actions, and that 
something was more often than not custom. 
Now Hart insisted in the Concept of Law that a rule of 
recognition/basic norm expressed in terms of custom would 
be no more than a statement of the obvious. He quotes an 
example of this:-
'States should behave as they customarily behaved. 1 1. 
1. Concept of Law Ir· 228. 
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Yet, as was pointed the particular fashion in which this 
A 
rule of recognition is framed is not the manner in which 
one would expect such a rule to be expressed. One would 
rather that it specified the feature or features that will 
indicate the presence of a valid rule of law, which it 
does not appear to so. If one were instead to substitute 
the rule that a valid rule of law is one which has 
fulfilled the tests for customary international law, then 
would this stand the test of being a valid rule of 
recognition? 
The point should, it is believed, be made that there does 
not appear to be any prima facie reason for excluding custom 
from the rule of recogniton. Custom can and in the case of 
English law does play some part in the content of the rule. 
Hart admits this to be the case. 2. Then why can it not 
play a similar role in international law? Admittedly, as 
a concept for assessing what is and what is not a valid law, 
custom is more uncertain than most. Yet it is the criterion 
used by officials of the international system to decide what 
is international law, as such officials make plain. 3. 
Moreover, writers such as D'Amato seem to agree with this 
key role that is given to custom: 
'We must bear in mind that custom is indeed a 
secondary rule of la\-1 formation. It can account • • • 
for the introduction, ascertainment, variation or 
elimination of primary rules.' 4e 
Any process that can account for the ascertainment of rules 
must of necessity be encompassed by the rule of recognition. 
2. ibid p. 92. 
3. See back p.11q QJ-~ 
4. D'Arnato op.cit. p.44. 
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Therefore, it appears that we are faced with a circuitous 
argument from which it appears impossible to break out. 
Hart says custom may not form the basis of a rule of 
recognition. Custom is the main way in which international 
law is ascertained. But Hart states that it is not possible 
to state a rule of recognition in such terms with the 
result that international law is dependent on acceptance 
for the promulgation of its rules. Yet it has been shown 
that acceptance in its most basic sense is not the manner 
in which rules of law are adopted. Something more is 
required and that something is custom. This must therefore 
lead to the conclusion that either it must be possible to 
formulate a rule of recognition for international law in 
terms of custom; or that there is some flaw in the actual 
structure of the rule which will not all.ow it to take into 
consideration factors such as custom. But since Hart does 
insist that custom can be accommodated within the rule, then 
a formulation must be possible~ one that states that the 
test of a valid law is its acceptance as a rule of 
customary international law. 
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